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1. Introduction 
 Theory demonstrates that firms can face financial constraints which force them to pass up 
valuable projects (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Tirole, 2006).
1
  Relaxing financial constraints 
on firms is predicted to increase investment and therefore increase firm value.  For example, 
Tirole (2006) shows that the market power of lenders constrains investment and that investment 
is greater when firms instead borrow from lenders that compete aggressively.  Competition 
among lenders can improve access to finance, which relaxes financial constraints and allows 
firms to fund value increasing investments.  In this paper, I empirically examine how firm 
valuations are affected by financial constraints in the context of corporate takeovers.  
Specifically, I examine how the severity of financial constraints on private targets affects firm 
valuation in sellouts to public acquirers.   
A natural link exists between financial constraints and firm valuation in a sellout because 
constraints on targets influence the degree to which targets depend on acquirers for financing.  
Empirical evidence shows that public acquirers provide liquidity to private targets (by financing 
investment and allowing owners to sell their shares) and that the provision of liquidity affects 
target valuations (Officer, 2007; Erel, Jang, and Weisbach, 2013).  Thus, private targets that are 
less financially constrained before the sellout should rely less on acquirers to provide liquidity, 
allowing them to negotiate for a higher valuation. 
The hypothesis that financial constraints affect firm valuation is intuitive yet difficult to 
test empirically.  One challenge is that financial constraints are unobservable, which makes it 
difficult to construct accurate proxies for constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 2000; Hadlock and 
                                                 
1
 Financial constraints can be caused by a variety of frictions such as moral hazard (Jaffee and Russell, 1976), 
information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or market power of 
lenders (Tirole, 2006).  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Whited (1992, 2006), and Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey (2010) empirically examine financial constraints on firms. 
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Pierce, 2010; Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2014).  Perhaps a greater challenge is that measures 
of financial constraints are endogenously determined with firm value.  For example, a proxy for 
financial constraints that relies on financial statement data is likely to be correlated with 
unobserved factors that also affect the firm’s valuation.  Similarly, a proxy that aims to capture 
competition among lenders, such as the number of lenders located near the firm, can be 
positively associated with firm value as a result of reverse causality.  Specifically, lenders may 
locate in areas where firms have good future prospects and, therefore, higher values.  In this 
paper, I implement an empirical design which overcomes both of these challenges and allows for 
a test of the hypothesis that relaxed financial constraints leads to an increase in firm valuations in 
sellouts.    
I exploit an exogenous shock to financial constraints on firms caused by the staggered 
deregulation of the U.S. banking industry at the state level.  The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) removed restrictions on interstate branching.
2
  
IBBEA provided banks new ways to expand across state lines and allowed existing multi-state 
banks to build a more efficient branch network.  However, IBBEA also allowed states to impose 
restrictions on out-of-state banks, a feature of the law that results in deregulation that varies 
across states and over time.  I implement a difference-in-differences test which takes advantage 
of staggered deregulation of interstate bank branching laws.   
My empirical design focuses on private firms which are sold to public acquirers.  IBBEA 
will affect private firms to a greater extent than public firms because private firms tend to rely on 
                                                 
2
 See Johnson and Rice (2008) and Rice and Strahan (2010) for a detailed description of IBBEA and subsequent 
state level legislative responses. 
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local banks for capital (Berger and Udell, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 2002).
3
  Rice and Strahan 
(2010) show that IBBEA significantly lowered the cost of credit for small businesses located in 
states which chose to deregulate interstate bank branching laws.  Therefore, private firms located 
in states that deregulate interstate bank branching laws will experience an easing of financial 
constraints due to improved access to bank credit.   
My first hypothesis predicts that relaxed financial constraints lead to higher valuations for 
private targets.  One of the benefits of a sellout is that the acquirer can finance the private 
target’s projects (Erel, Jang, and Weisbach, 2013).  However, private firms that have better 
access to bank credit following interstate bank branching deregulation can, at least partially, 
substitute bank credit in place of financing that the acquirer can provide.  Better access to finance 
is likely to result in investment in positive net present value (NPV) projects for private firms 
because managers typically have concentrated equity positions that mitigate agency problems.  
The ability to substitute bank credit in place of financing offered by the acquirer strengthens the 
bargaining position of the private target as it increases the value of the outside option.
4
  Thus, 
deregulation of interstate bank branching is predicted to have a positive effect on valuations of 
private targets in sellouts.   
My second hypothesis predicts that relaxed financial constraints lead to higher valuations 
of private targets relative to valuations of matched public targets.  I use private target valuation 
multiples benchmarked to public target valuation multiples to capture the extent to which private 
targets substitute bank credit in place of financing provided by the acquirer.  The intuition behind 
                                                 
3
 It is not the distinction between private and public firms per se which determines the impact of IBBEA.  Rather, it 
is the fact that private firms tend to have greater information asymmetries, are more geographically concentrated, 
and tend to borrow from local banks.  IBBEA can affect a public firm that depends on local banks. 
4
 Due to limited data on private targets, I cannot determine whether or not private targets actually increase 
investment following deregulation of interstate bank branching.  However, the hypothesis goes through as long as 
private targets can credibly threaten to walk away from the deal and use bank credit to finance investment. 
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this measure is that matched public targets provide a baseline valuation of an unconstrained firm.  
The valuation received by private targets, relative to public targets, depends on the degree to 
which private targets rely on the acquirer for financing (Officer, 2007).  Private targets with 
more severe financial constraints depend more on acquirers for financing and, therefore, sell for 
a relatively low price.  Private targets with less severe financial constraints depend less on 
acquirers for financing and, therefore, sell for a relatively high price.   
My third hypothesis predicts that relaxing constraints on private targets negatively 
impacts the wealth gains of the public acquirer’s shareholders.5  Empirical evidence suggests that 
acquirer wealth gains in sellouts can be partially attributed to providing liquidity to private 
targets (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).  Improved access to finance for private targets 
results in less dependence on the acquirer for liquidity and an increase in the target’s relative 
bargaining power.  All else equal, the acquirer’s portion of the economic gain generated in the 
sellout decreases as the target’s ability to bargain for a higher price increases.   
I conduct empirical tests on a sample of 557 sellouts of private firms to public firms 
announced between 1992 and 2000 and find evidence that supports my hypotheses.  The sample 
includes deals announced from three years before to three years after the private target’s home 
state enacted legislation in response to IBBEA.  All states responded to IBBEA by June 1997.  
As described in more detail below, states are counted as non-deregulating if the state maintains 
all restrictions on interstate bank branching.  States are counted as deregulating if the state 
removed at least one barrier to interstate bank branching.  
The empirical methodology follows a difference-in-differences approach (Roberts and 
Whited, 2012) based on whether the sellout occurred before or after the state’s legislative 
                                                 
5
 Unfortunately, I cannot analyze the sharing of gains (Kale, Kini, Ryan, 2003; Ahern, 2012) or premiums paid to 
targets (Comment and Schwert, 1995) because the target’s pre-sellout value is unknown.   
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response to IBBEA and whether or not the state’s legislative response resulted in deregulation of 
interstate bank branching.  I use the total consideration paid to the private target (deal value) as 
the value of the firm and scale this number by the firm’s annual sales.  I use the natural logarithm 
transformation of deal value-to-sales in empirical tests due to skewness in the distribution.   
Univariate tests show that, in states that deregulated interstate bank branching, deal 
value-to-sales multiples increase significantly following the legislative response to IBBEA.  In 
states that did not deregulate, the change in deal value-to-sales multiples around the state’s 
legislative response to IBBEA is statistically insignificant.  A difference-in-differences test 
compares changes in deal value-to-sales multiples from pre- to post-IBBEA periods between 
sellouts of firms in deregulating and non-deregulating states.  As predicted by my first 
hypothesis, this difference is positive and statistically significant, indicating that deregulation of 
interstate bank branching has a positive impact on the valuation of private targets.   
My multivariate analysis implements the difference-in-differences methodology in a 
regression framework that controls for acquirer, target, deal, and state characteristics as well as 
state, industry, and year fixed effects.  This analysis yields a consistently positive and 
statistically significant effect of interstate bank branching deregulation on deal value-to-sales 
multiples of private targets.  Estimates of the economic significance indicate that deregulation of 
interstate bank branching results, ceteris paribus, in an increase in deal value-to-sales multiples 
of 7.3%.   
As a proxy for the degree to which the private target depends on the acquirer for 
financing, I benchmark each private target’s deal value-to-sales multiple to deal value-to-sales 
multiples of matched public targets.  Again, I use the natural logarithm transformation of this 
ratio in empirical tests to address skewness in the distribution.  As in Officer (2007), public 
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targets are matched on industry, deal value, and date of announcement.  In support of my second 
hypothesis, the ratio of private target multiples to public target multiples is positively and 
significantly impacted by deregulation of interstate bank branching.  This evidence indicates that 
targets depend less on acquirers for financing when access to bank credit improves. 
Next, I analyze acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated over the (-5, +5) 
day window around the announcement of the sellout.  Consistent with the magnitude 
documented in previous studies, announcement period CARs average 3.51% for public acquirers 
of private targets (Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).  For sellouts announced 
in states that deregulate interstate bank branching, acquirer CARs average 5.00% before 
deregulation and 2.93% after deregulation.  Multivariate tests also show that deregulation of 
interstate bank branching has a negative effect on acquirer CARs.  I note that acquirer CARs 
remain positive on average, albeit smaller, following deregulation.    
 I also analyze the dollar abnormal wealth gain of the acquirer relative to the deal value.  
This variable measures the NPV to the acquirer’s shareholders per dollar paid to the target 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990).  This measure will be lower if relaxed financial constraints 
enable private targets to obtain more of the economic gains generated in the transaction.  In both 
univariate and multivariate tests, I find that deregulation of interstate bank branching has a 
negative effect on acquirer wealth gain-to-deal value ratios.  Overall, the results indicate that 
acquirer returns are lower when private targets have relaxed financial constraints, in support of 
my third hypothesis.   
I expect that the effect of deregulation of interstate bank branching is greater for smaller 
private targets compared to larger private targets.  Private firms that are smaller in size are likely 
to face greater constraints in borrowing and therefore benefit more from IBBEA than larger 
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private firms.  I find that the effect of deregulation on deal value-to-sales multiples and the ratio 
of private-to-public target multiples is greater for smaller private targets compared to larger 
private targets.  However, there is not an incremental effect for smaller private targets on 
acquirer wealth gains.   
I conduct a falsification test on a sample of takeovers of public targets.  Public firms are 
characterized by less severe information asymmetries than private firms (due more stringent 
disclosure laws, analyst coverage, media coverage, etc.).  As a result, public firms have a variety 
of financing alternatives and are likely less dependent on banks located in their home state 
compared to private firms.  Therefore, I predict that public targets are not impacted by 
deregulation of interstate bank branching, in contrast to my finding on a sample of private 
targets.  I find no effect of deregulation on valuation multiples, acquirer CARs, or acquirer 
wealth gain-to-deal value ratios for a sample of 722 public target takeovers.   
 An alternative explanation for my empirical results is that a selection effect in sellouts 
drives the increase in target valuation.  Improved access to finance for private firms, caused by 
deregulation of interstate bank branching, can change the composition of firms that choose a 
sellout.  For example, before deregulation there can be more liquidity motivated sales of firms 
(leading to lower firm valuations) and after deregulation there can be fewer liquidity motivated 
sales and more sales of firms motivated by operational synergies (leading to higher firm 
valuations).  To evaluate the selection effect explanation, I test whether or not deal 
characteristics of sellouts are significantly impacted by deregulation of interstate bank branching 
laws.  I find that the univariate difference-in-differences is not statistically significant for target 
sales, acquirer market value, relative size of the acquirer and target, the proportion of all cash 
deals, the proportion of targets and acquirers in the same industry or same state, the proportion of 
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high tech targets, or state income growth.  Also, the proportion of sellouts to firms in the state is 
not significantly affected by IBBEA.
6
  These results do not completely rule out the possibility of 
a selection effect, but they provide evidence against this alternative explanation. 
I perform a series of robustness tests on my empirical results.  One concern is that 
outliers in the data (especially for deal value-to-sales ratios) are driving the results.  I test 
whether or not my results are driven by outliers by winsorizing the data at the 10
th
 and 90
th
 
percentiles and transforming the dependent variables into ranked values (e.g., 1 for the lowest 
value and 557 for the highest value).  I find similar results to those described above using both 
approaches.  A second concern is that one state may have an outsized influence on my tests.  The 
sample includes 95 private targets headquartered in California (17.06% of the sample), far more 
than any other state.  In addition, California is home to many “internet firms” in the latter part of 
the sample period which are likely to have high valuations.  I remove all 95 private targets 
headquartered in California and find similar results as described above. 
 Because deregulation is a choice made at the state level, state characteristics may drive 
my results rather than relaxed financial constraints.  I address this concern in three ways.  First, I 
include state fixed effects in my empirical tests, which control for unobservable time-invariant 
state characteristics.  Second, I control for time varying state economic growth in multivariate 
tests.  Third, I conduct a test to alleviate the concern that factors which lead a state to deregulate 
or not are correlated with private firm value and, thus, drive my results.  In this test, I predict 
which states are likely to deregulate or not using state-level variables motivated by Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999).  Then, I replicate my empirical results on a sub-sample of deals where the 
private target is located in a state where the choice to deregulate or not is less predictable (using 
                                                 
6
 I obtain the annual number of firms in the state from the U.S. Census.  I note that this test offers only a rough 
approximation of the proportion of sellouts in a state due to the fact that not all sellouts are observed. 
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various cutoffs).  I obtain similar results to those reported above in this sub-sample which 
suggests that my results are not driven by factors that lead a state to deregulate or not.  In 
summary, neither observable nor unobservable state characteristics appear to drive my results.     
Further, I find that the results are similar if I calculate acquirer CARs around the (-2, +2) 
day window around the deal announcement.  Finally, the main results in the paper hold when 
using a more granular definition of deregulation that classifies deregulating states into groups 
based on how many restrictions on interstate bank branching were relaxed.   
 This paper makes several contributions to the literature.  First, I show that valuations of 
private targets in sellouts are impacted by the target’s ability to access bank credit.  This finding 
contributes to the literature that studies how financial constraints impact economic growth (see, 
e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998).  Because I examine a shock to state level banking laws, this finding 
contributes to the literature that studies how local financial development influences economic 
outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004; Becker, 2007; Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; 
Gilje, 2012).  My paper complements Chava and Purnanandam (2011) who find evidence that 
adverse capital shocks to banks at the national level negatively impacts the value of public firms, 
especially those without access to public debt markets.  My paper focuses on a shock at the state 
level and finds valuation effects for private firms in the context of corporate takeovers.  Despite 
the importance of private firms to the U.S. economy (Askar, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 
2014), private firms are relatively underexplored in the literature.  My evidence suggests that 
state-level financial development matters for certain firms, even in an advanced economy such as 
the U.S. in the 1990s.   
10 
 
 Second, a novel finding in this paper is that bank credit offers private target firms a 
substitute for financing provided by public acquirers.  Officer (2007) and Erel, Jang, and 
Weisbach (2013) show that public acquirers provide liquidity to private targets.  I extend this line 
of research by demonstrating that the ratio of private target valuation multiples to matched public 
target valuation multiples, a proxy for the degree to which targets depend on acquirers for 
liquidity, decreases when the target firm has better access to bank credit.  
 Third, this paper provides new insight into the factors that drive announcement returns to 
public acquirers of private targets.  Specifically, I find that acquirer returns are lower when 
private targets are less financially constrained.  This finding provides direct evidence that 
acquirer returns in sellouts are driven, at least in part, by the provision of liquidity to targets.  
Previous research identifies the method of payment, relative size of the acquirer and target, the 
formation of a blockholder in the acquirer, and valuation uncertainty as determinants of acquirer 
returns (Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter, Stegemoller, 2002; Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin, 2006; 
Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller, 2009; Cooney, Moeller, and Stegemoller, 2009).  Private 
targets that are less financially constrained are likely to have greater bargaining power relative to 
the acquirer.  Thus, consistent with Ahern (2012) and Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe (2013), 
my evidence also suggests that bargaining power is important in acquisition outcomes. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical design and 
hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the sample, the construction of key variables, and univariate 
tests. Sections 4 and 5 present multivariate empirical results. Section 6 describes robustness tests 
and Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Empirical design and hypotheses 
The main hypothesis that I test is that private target valuations are positively impacted by 
relaxed financial constraints.  The empirical design addresses the concern that firm value and 
financial constraints are endogenously determined.   
 
2.1. Exogenous shock to financial constraints and empirical design 
To test for the effect of relaxed financial constraints on private target valuations in 
sellouts, I exploit exogenous variation in financial constraints caused by deregulation of the U.S. 
banking industry.  Private firms are likely to be affected by state level banking law changes 
because they rely on local banks to resolve information asymmetries and provide capital (Berger 
and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  In a panel of private U.S.-based firms, Zarutskie 
(2006) finds debt in more than 70% of the observations.  In a sample of small businesses with ten 
or more employees, Black and Strahan (2002) find that 96% use a commercial bank service and 
76% have a credit facility.  Despite technological advances in the banking industry, Petersen and 
Rajan (2002) find that the median (75
th 
percentile) distance from a small business to the firm’s 
bank was 5 (20) miles in the early 1990s.  Given a reliance on local banks, deregulation of a 
state’s banking industry provides an exogenous shock to financial constraints for private firms 
located in that state.    
IBBEA removed barriers to interstate branching, which allowed banks to cross state lines 
in ways that were not previously possible (Johnson and Rice, 2008; Rice and Strahan, 2010).  
However, IBBEA also gave each state a three year window to opt-out of interstate bank 
branching deregulation or establish restrictions that limit the ability of out-of-state banks to do 
12 
 
business in the state.  The result was staggered deregulation that varied across states and over 
time.  
IBBEA provides a nice setting to test for the effect of loosened financial constraints on 
firm value for the following reasons.  First, empirical research shows that deregulation of 
interstate bank branching laws have a positive effect on the percentage of out-of-state bank 
branches in a state and a negative effect on the cost of credit for small firms (Johnson and Rice, 
2008; Rice and Strahan, 2010).  Second, the factors which cause states to deregulate are not 
likely to be correlated with private firm sales.  Kroszner and Strahan (1999) show that 
Congressional votes which favor deregulation are more likely when large banks have a greater 
share of bank assets in the legislator’s state or bank rivals (such as insurance companies) are less 
influential in the legislator’s state.  These factors are unlikely to be systematically correlated with 
private firm sale prices in a state.  
Third, a shock to financial constraints caused by IBBEA should be experienced to a 
greater degree by private targets (who are likely to depend on banks in the state) than public 
acquirers (who are likely to have many financing alternatives).  Since the sale price of the target 
is determined through a negotiation, it is ideal to utilize a shock which affects the target’s 
financial constraints but not the acquirer’s financial constraints.  Fourth, the staggering of 
deregulation over time allows for a broad control sample compared to a deregulation event that 
occurs simultaneously for all states. 
For these reasons, I use IBBEA as an exogenous shock to financial constraints on private 
firms located in a state.  I implement a difference-in-differences methodology (Roberts and 
Whited, 2012) where observations are classified based on whether the private target’s home state 
deregulates or not and whether the sellout occurs before or after each state’s response to IBBEA.  
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States are counted as deregulating or not based on the initial legislative response to IBBEA as 
identified by Johnson and Rice (2008) and Rice and Strahan (2010).   
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
Private target value is measured by the total consideration paid to the private firm (deal 
value), scaled by the firm’s annual sales in order to adjust for size (Bayar and Chemmanur, 2012; 
Officer, 2007; Poulsen and Stegemoller, 2008).  Following deregulation of interstate bank 
branching, private firms will have better access to bank credit.  Improved access to finance will 
strengthen the private target’s bargaining position in a sellout as it gives private targets an 
alternative to the financing an acquirer can provide.  Firm owners can increase the standalone 
value of their firm by using bank credit to finance positive NPV projects.  Because owners of 
private firms typically hold concentrated equity positions, they have strong incentives to choose 
positive NPV projects when financial constraints are relaxed.  The higher standalone value of the 
firm will be reflected in a higher valuation when the firm is sold.   
Better access to bank credit can increase the firm’s valuation in the sellout even if the 
firm has not yet made the investment in a new project.  The reason is that the ability to substitute 
bank credit in place of financing from the acquirer increases the value of the private target’s 
outside option.  Thus, the firm owner can bargain for a higher valuation.  In summary, relaxing 
financial constraints improves the bargaining position of the private target and is predicted to 
increase the valuation of private targets, as formalized in the following hypothesis.     
 
Hypothesis 1: Relaxing financial constraints on private targets leads to higher valuations in 
sellouts. 
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The ability of private firms to substitute bank credit for financing provided by acquirers 
should be reflected not only in the valuation of the private target, but in the valuation of the 
private target relative to matched public targets.  The intuition behind this measure is that public 
targets do not depend heavily on acquirers for financing and public target valuations should not 
reflect the provision of financing by acquirers.  Thus, public target valuations provide a 
benchmark that can be used to measure the degree of financing provided by acquirers to private 
targets (Officer, 2007).  If improved access to bank credit offers private target owners a 
substitute for some part of the financing provided by acquirers, then the relative valuation of the 
private target should increase.  Therefore, I predict that the valuations of private targets, 
benchmarked to valuations of matched public targets, will increase as the financial constraints 
faced by them are alleviated.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Relaxing financial constraints on private targets leads to higher valuations of 
private targets relative to valuations of matched public targets.  
 
 The easing of financial constraints on private targets can affect the wealth gain of the 
acquirer’s stockholders.  Relaxed financial constraints on private targets allow owners to receive 
higher prices for their firms and therefore capture a larger portion of the economic gain 
generated in the transaction.  Consequently, the acquirer will capture a smaller portion of the 
economic gain.  Under the assumption that the total economic gain generated in the transaction 
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does not increase, the wealth gain of the acquirer’s stockholders will decrease when the acquirer 
pays more for the target.
7
   
 CARs are widely used to measure the effect of acquisitions on the wealth of the 
acquirer’s shareholders.  CARs are an estimate of the NPV of the deal from the perspective of 
the acquirer’s shareholders scaled by the acquirer’s market value before the transaction.  Another 
way to measure the effect of acquisitions on the wealth of the acquirer’s shareholders is to scale 
the NPV by the price paid for the target.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) argue that a benefit 
of this measure is that the quality of the acquisition is independent of the beginning market value 
of the acquirer.
8
  I predict that loosened financial constraints on private targets result in a 
decrease in both acquirer CARs and acquirer wealth gains per dollar paid to the target.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Relaxing financial constraints on private targets leads to lower acquirer CARs 
and lower acquirer wealth gains per dollar paid to the target. 
 
Testing the hypotheses above relies on the implicit assumption that the firms sold before 
a state responds to IBBEA are similar to the firms sold following a state’s response to IBBEA.  
However, improved access to finance may alter the composition of firms that choose a sellout.  
For example, before deregulation of interstate bank branching, a large portion of sellouts may be 
motivated by liquidity reasons.  Following deregulation, when access to finance improves, there 
may be fewer liquidity motivated sellouts and more sellouts motivated by operational synergies.  
                                                 
7
 The assumption that the total economic gain generated in the transaction does not increase is reasonable if the 
acquirer can finance all the projects that a bank can finance.  Then, improved access to finance for private targets 
will alter the division of gains, but will not increase the total gain generated in the transaction. 
8
 For example, two sellouts that generate $50 in wealth for the acquirer shareholders and pay target owners $200 
will have the same Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) ratio of 0.25.  If the wealth generated is scaled by the 
acquirer’s market value (say $2,500 and $5,000 respectively), then the quality of the transaction will look quite 
different across deals when using CARs (0.02 and 0.01 respectively).   
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Because sellouts motivated by liquidity reasons are likely to result in lower multiples, lower 
multiples relative to matched public targets, and greater acquirer returns than sellouts motivated 
by operational synergies, the predictions are the same given a selection effect or a bargaining 
power effect.  I test for the possibility that a selection effect exists below.    
 
3. Data and univariate tests 
3.1. State level legislative response to IBBEA 
Johnson and Rice (2008) and Rice and Strahan (2010) gather data on the initial legislative 
response to IBBEA for each of the 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia.
9
  These data are 
presented in Table 1. Between 1994 and 1997, each state responded to IBBEA and had the 
opportunity to implement four restrictive provisions: (1) a minimum age of in-state banks 
targeted for an acquisition, (2) restrictions on the ability of out-of-state banks to open a new 
branch (restrictions on de novo interstate branching), (3) restrictions on the ability of out-of-state 
banks to acquire a single in-state bank branch, and (4) a statewide cap on deposits below 30% of 
the total deposits in the state.  
Rice and Strahan (2010) describe how these four restrictions raise the cost for out-of-state 
banks to build an interstate branch network or distort a bank’s means of entry into the state.  
States that adopt all four restrictive provisions (or opted-out of IBBEA) are counted as non-
deregulating states.  States that choose not to adopt all four provisions and therefore remove at 
least one barrier to interstate branching are counted as deregulating states.   
[Insert Table 1: State-level interstate bank branching laws] 
 
 
                                                 
9
 For ease of exposition, the District of Columbia is referred to as a state. 
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3.2. Sample of private target sellouts and takeovers of public targets 
The sample of sellouts is from Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum Mergers and 
Acquisitions database (SDC).  Deals include a private target and a public acquirer with stock 
price data on CRSP at the time of the acquisition announcement.  The acquirer must purchase 
100% of the private target’s stock in the sellout.  Recapitalizations, leveraged buyouts, 
repurchases, spin offs, acquisitions of partial interest, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
buybacks, and exchange offers are excluded.  Deals with target firms in the financial industry 
and utility industry are also excluded (SIC codes 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4999).   
To ensure the inclusion of deals that are likely to disclose financial data on targets, the 
deal value must be $50 million (Officer, 2007; Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2007; Poulsen and 
Stegemoller, 2008) and also the deal value must be 1% of the acquirer’s market value of equity.  
These restrictions likely result in the exclusion of some small private targets that are affected by 
IBBEA.  This will bias against my empirical tests.  The announcement of the acquisition must be 
between three years before and three years after the target’s state responded to IBBEA (see 
Figure 1).
10
  This six-year window allows time for the banking industry to respond to new state 
legislation and for a relatively large sample of deals in both the pre- and post-IBBEA period.  
The final sample is 557 sellouts announced from 1992 to 2000.  
[Insert Figure 1: State laws and sample selection] 
I construct a sample of takeovers of public targets from SDC data using similar 
restrictions.  I include only takeovers that involved a public acquirer who purchases 100% of the 
public target’s equity and has no toehold in the target in order to make comparisons to sellouts 
where the acquirer purchases the entire private firm.  Public targets are matched to private targets 
                                                 
10
 A few states changed interstate bank branching laws a second time during the three year post-IBBEA period.  In 
this case, the window for sellouts in the post-IBBEA period extends only until the law is changed the second time. 
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to create my proxy for the degree to which private targets depend on the acquirer for financing.  
Also, I use a sample of 722 public target takeovers announced around state’s responses to 
IBBEA as a falsification test in Section 5. 
 Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of private target sellouts by year. The number 
of sellouts peaks at 125 in 1997, which corresponds to the final wave of state legislative 
responses to IBBEA. Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of sellouts by state. California is 
home to the most private targets (95, 17.06% of the sample) followed by Texas, Illinois, New 
York, and Georgia.  There are 28 states that are represented by at least five deals in the sample.  
Eight of the 51 states are not represented in the sample.
11
 
[Insert Table 2: Year and state distribution] 
 
3.3. Variables and summary statistics 
The first measure of firm value is Deal Value to Sales which is equal to deal value 
divided by annual sales.  The natural logarithm transformation (LN Deal Value to Sales) is used 
in tests due to skewness in the distribution.  Annual sales is last twelve months sales, measured 
as close as possible from the quarter of the deal announcement.  Sales data are often found in 
private target financials disclosed in the acquirer’s filings on the SEC’s EDGAR website.  
Otherwise, sales numbers are collected from news articles found in LexisNexis.  
Each private target is matched to public targets in the same two-digit SIC code, with a 
deal value within 20%, and announced within the four-year calendar window centered on the 
                                                 
11
 In the sample, there are no sellouts of private targets based in Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, or Wyoming. 
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announcement of the sellout.
12
  A total of 431 private targets can be matched to at least one 
public target.  In Section 6, I describe robustness results that use alternative matching criteria.  
On average, each private target is matched to six public targets, while the median number of 
matched public targets is four.  The difference in deal values between private targets and 
matched public targets averages -1% while the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles are -16%, 
-11%, -1%, 9%, and 15%, respectively.  The private target deal value-to-sales ratio is divided by 
the average deal value-to-sales ratio of the matched public targets to create Private to Public 
Value.  The natural logarithm transformation is used in tests due to skewness in the distribution 
(LN Private to Public Value).
13
  
Announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers are calculated from CRSP data using 
a value-weighted index market model.  Daily returns for 240 days beginning 300 days before the 
announcement of the acquisition are used to estimate the market model parameters (a minimum 
of 30 observations are required).  The acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return (Acquirer CAR) is 
measured over the (-5, +5) day window centered on the announcement.  The market value of the 
acquirer’s equity, Acquirer Market Value, is measured 15 days before the announcement of the 
sellout and the natural logarithm transformation is LN Acq Mkt Value. 
The second measure of the acquirer’s stock performance is the acquirer’s abnormal 
wealth gain divided by the deal value of the target (Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value). The 
abnormal wealth gain is equal to Acquirer CAR multiplied by Acquirer Market Value.   
Summary statistics are show in Table 3.  All continuous variables are winsorized by 
setting values that are beyond the 1
st
 (99
th
) percentile to the value of the 1
st
 (99
th
) percentile. All 
                                                 
12
 To allow for a greater number of potential matches, I don’t require that the public target acquisition is announced 
within the three year window around the response to IBBEA.  Also, since I match based on deal value, I don’t 
explicitly require that public target acquisitions are $50 million in deal value or 1% of the acquirer’s equity. 
13
 Bayar and Chemmanur (2012) use a similar measure to compare the valuation of sellout firms to firms that 
conduct an IPO. 
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dollar values are in millions and are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index to year 2000 dollars.  
Variables are described in Appendix A.  The mean (median) deal value is $202.17 ($114.04) 
million.  The mean (median) level of sales for the target is $151.19 ($73.16) million. Mean 
(median) Deal Value to Sales is 15.49 (1.68).  The mean (median) of LN Deal Value to Sales is 
0.76 (0.51).  The mean (median) of LN Private to Public Value is 0.07 (-0.10).  The mean 
(median) of Acquirer CAR is 3.51% (2.17%).  Mean (median) acquirer wealth gain is $2.62 
($10.64) million.  The mean (median) of Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value is 0.07 (0.08).  
[Insert Table 3: Summary statistics] 
Relative Size is deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value 15 days before the 
announcement of the sellout. The median of this measure is 18%.  State Income Growth is the 
annual percentage change in real per capita personal income for the state in the year before the 
deal announcement.  I follow Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and calculate this variable with data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The mean of State Income Growth is 2.02%.  High Tech 
Target is a dummy variable which indicates that the target operates in one of the four-digit SIC 
code industries identified by Loughran and Ritter (2004) as a high tech industry (29% of the 
sample).  All Cash is a dummy variable that equals one if the consideration paid for the target is 
all cash and no stock (29% of the sample), and is zero otherwise.  Same State is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the acquirer and target are headquartered in the same state (18% of the 
sample), and is zero otherwise. Same Industry is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer 
and target share the same four-digit SIC code (34% of the sample), and is zero otherwise.  
 The dummy variable Dereg State is equal to one for all sellouts of private targets 
headquartered in states that deregulate (whether or not the deal was announced before the 
response to IBBEA) and zero for all sellouts of private targets headquartered in states that do not 
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deregulate.  Deregulation is defined as relaxing at least one restriction to interstate bank 
branching.  The dummy variable After is equal to one for all sellouts announced in a state after 
the state responds to IBBEA (whether the state deregulates or not) and is equal to zero for all 
sellouts announced before the state responds to IBBEA.  The interaction Dereg State x After 
indicates sellouts that are announced in a deregulated banking environment.  Of 557 sellouts, 
84% include private targets in a state which deregulates (Dereg State = 1) and 67% are 
announced after the target’s home state has responded to IBBEA (After = 1).  Therefore, 56% 
(84% multiplied by 67%) of all sellouts are announced in a deregulating state following 
deregulation (Dereg State x After = 1).   
   
3.4. Univariate tests 
Table 4 shows the means and medians of key variables in subsamples divided based on 
whether a sellout was announced in a deregulating state or non-deregulating state and whether 
the announcement occurred before or after a state’s response to IBBEA.  For sellouts of firms 
based in deregulating states, the changes to LN Deal Value to Sales, Acquirer CAR, and Acquirer 
Wealth Gain to Deal Value are all in the predicted direction and statistically significant.  For 
sellouts of firms based in non-deregulating states, changes are measured around the state’s 
legislative response to IBBEA which allowed the state to maintain restrictions on interstate bank 
branching.  The change in each of the four key measures is statistically insignificant.  The 
insignificant result is to be expected since the state essentially maintained the status quo.  The 
bottom four rows of Table 4 show that the difference-in-differences is in the predicted direction 
for all four variables, and statistically significant for LN Deal Value to Sales and Acquirer 
Wealth Gain to Deal Value.   
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 [Insert Table 4: Univariate tests] 
I extend the analysis of Table 4 to include deal characteristics in order to examine 
whether or not deregulation of interstate bank branching affects the types of deals that occur.  If 
deals are systematically different after deregulation, then a selection effect in observed deals can 
be responsible for an increase in private firm sale prices rather than a shift in bargaining power.  
In Appendix B: Supplemental Results, I show that the univariate difference-in-differences is not 
statistically significant for Sales, Relative Size, All Cash, Acquirer Market Value, High Tech 
Target, Same State, Same Industry, and State Income Growth.  I do find, however, that State 
Income Growth and High Tech Target are significantly higher for sellouts announced after 
deregulation compared to before deregulation in deregulating states.  In multivariate tests that 
follow, I control for these variables.  
In another test, I examine whether the likelihood of a sellout changes following 
deregulation.  For each state and year, I calculate the number of sellouts in my sample per 
100,000 firms.  The time series of number of firms is from Census data and includes all firms 
with one to 499 employees.  Appendix B: Supplemental Results shows that in both deregulating 
and non-deregulating states, the proportion of sellouts increases on average following the state’s 
response to IBBEA. However, the difference-in-differences is not statistically significant.  
Overall, the generally similar deal characteristics and lack of change in likelihood of a sellout 
indicate that a selection effect in observed deals is probably not driving my results. 
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4. Empirical specification and main empirical results 
4.1. Regression specification  
Two empirical specifications are used to implement the difference-in-differences 
approach and test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  The first specification of the regression is: 
 
                                                         
                                       , (1) 
 
where the unit of observation is sellout i.  The dependent variable is either LN Deal Value to 
Sales, LN Private to Public Value, Acquirer CAR, or Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value.  The 
variable Dereg State controls for common factors among states that deregulate.  The coefficient 
on the interaction term Dereg State x After (  ) captures the effect of bank branching 
deregulation.  Specifically, the coefficient captures the difference in changes to LN Deal Value to 
Sales (or another dependent variable) before and after responses to IBBEA between sellouts in 
deregulating states and those in non-deregulating states.  The term           captures industry 
fixed effects where industry is defined by two digit-SIC codes and the term       captures year 
fixed effects.  Control variables include Relative Size, LN Acq Mkt Value, All Cash, High Tech 
Target, Same State, Same Industry, and State Income Growth.  The deal level control variables 
have been shown to be important in acquisition outcomes (Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter, 
Stegemoller, 2002; Faccio, McConnell, Stolin, 2006; Officer, Poulsen, Stegemoller, 2009).  To 
address correlation between observations within each state, robust standard errors are clustered at 
the state level for all regressions (Petersen, 2009).    
A second methodology controls for fixed differences between states by adding state fixed 
effects to the specification.  The specification of the regression for the second approach is: 
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                 , (2) 
 
where the unit of observation is sellout i;           captures industry fixed effects,        
captures state fixed effects, and       captures year fixed effects.  The variable Dereg State is 
omitted from the regression due to the inclusion of state fixed effects.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term Dereg State x After    ) captures the effect of bank branching deregulation.  
When implementing equation (1), there is an implicit assumption that deals in 
deregulating states are comparable to deals in non-deregulating states (the control group).  
However, the specification of equation (2) takes advantage of staggered responses to IBBEA 
across time and allows for a control group that includes deals in non-deregulating states plus 
deals in states that have not yet deregulated, but will do so in the future.  For example, North 
Carolina responded to IBBEA in 1995 while Georgia responded in 1997.  Even though both 
states eventually deregulate interstate bank branching, sellouts of Georgia-based firms 
announced in 1996 (before deregulation in Georgia) are used as controls for sellouts of North 
Carolina-based firms announced in 1996 (after deregulation in North Carolina).   
Another benefit of implementing the difference-in-differences test with equation (2) 
instead of equation (1) is the ability to control for state level differences in the value of firms 
with state fixed effects.  For example, firms in North Carolina can be systematically valued 
higher than firms in Georgia.  When all deregulating states are grouped into a single category, as 
in the first approach, such differences in valuation are not accounted for.  However, a potential 
drawback of including state fixed effects is the difficulty in precisely estimating the average 
value of a firm in a state with a small number of deals.  Given that many states have a small 
25 
 
number of observed deals, it may be difficult to obtain a precise estimate of the true average 
value of a firm in those states. Thus, the tradeoff for estimating a state fixed effect is that the 
fixed effect could be estimated imprecisely for many states.  As it turns out, the results are 
largely similar with either specification.  
 
4.2. Multivariate tests of private firm valuations 
 In Tables 5 and 6, I implement multivariate tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively.  
The dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in Table 5 and LN Private to Public Value in 
Table 6.  Each table shows the estimation of equations (1) and (2) on a sample of sellouts 
announced in the +/- three year window around a state’s response to IBBEA as well as the +/- 
two year window, and the +/- one year window.  The key variable of interest is Dereg State x 
After.   
Table 5 shows the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation where the dependent 
variable is LN Deal Value to Sales.  In column (1), the coefficient on Dereg State x After is 0.597 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 2.936).  This finding indicates that 
deregulation had a significantly positive impact on private target valuations.  The coefficient on 
Dereg State is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating that private firm 
valuation multiples are lower in deregulating states than non-deregulating states before the 
response to IBBEA.  The positive and significant coefficient on Relative Size could be attributed 
to the greater bargaining power of private firms which are larger relative to the acquirer.  The 
negative coefficient on All Cash suggests that private firm owners accept a lower price for the 
firm in order to receive the immediate liquidity of a cash payment.   
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In Table 5, column (2) the regression includes state fixed effects and the coefficient on 
Dereg State x After is 0.544 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-stat = 2.032), again 
indicating a significantly positive impact of deregulation on private target valuations.  In 
columns (3) and (4) the sample is restricted to sellouts in the +/- two year window around the 
response to IBBEA and I find similar results.  Columns (5) and (6) show positive coefficients on 
Dereg State x After (significant at the 10% level) when the window for sellouts is one year 
around the response to IBBEA.   
To estimate the economic significance of relaxed financial constraints, I take the 
exponential of both sides of the equation in column (2) and evaluate when the independent 
variables are at their mean values and Dereg State x After changes from 0 to 1.  The result is a 
change in Deal Value to Sales of 1.135, an increase of 7.3% from the sample mean.
14
  The 
evidence that deregulation of interstate bank branching restrictions raises private firm valuations 
supports Hypothesis 1.  
[Insert Table 5: LN Deal Value to Sales] 
Table 6 tests Hypothesis 2 by examining the impact of deregulation on LN Private to 
Public Value.  In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction term Dereg State x After is 0.712 
and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 2.774).  The negative and significant 
coefficient on Dereg State indicates that LN Private to Public Value is lower for firms in 
deregulating states than non-deregulating states before the response to IBBEA.  The negative and 
significant coefficient on All Cash is consistent with results in Officer (2007).  In column (2), the 
coefficient on the interaction term Dereg State x After is 0.834 and is also statistically significant 
at the 1% level (t-stat = 2.808).  The results are similar in columns (3) through (6).  The evidence 
                                                 
14
 When Dereg State x After equals 0, the predicted value of the regression is 0.45143.  Then, the change in Deal 
Value to Sales as Dereg State x After changes from 0 to 1 is (exp(0.45143+0.544) – exp (0.45143)) = 1.135. 
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suggests that loosened financial constraints increases the relative value of private targets 
compared to public targets. 
The economic significance of the coefficient in column (2) suggests that the ratio of 
private target valuations to public target valuations increases by 22% due to deregulation of 
interstate bank branching restrictions.  The evidence supports Hypothesis 2 and indicates that 
relaxed financial constraints allow private targets to substitute bank credit in place of financing 
provided by the acquirer.   
[Insert Table 6: LN Private to Public Value] 
 
4.3. Multivariate tests of acquirer wealth gains 
Tables 7 and 8 test Hypothesis 3.  The tables estimate equations (1) and (2) with Acquirer 
CAR and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value as the dependent variables and are structured the same 
as Tables 5 and 6.  The equations are estimated by weighted least squares (WLS) where the 
weight for each observation is the inverse of the standard deviation of the residual from the 
value-weighted index market model used to estimate acquirer abnormal returns.  This method 
gives more weight to observations where the market model can better explain the acquirer’s time 
series of returns. 
Table 7 shows estimates of equations (1) and (2) with Acquirer CAR as the dependent 
variable. In column (1), the coefficient on Dereg State x After is -2.860 but not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (t-stat = -1.460).  In column (2), the coefficient on Dereg State 
x After is -3.292 and statistically significant at the 10% level (t-stat = -1.831).  This finding 
indicates that acquirer returns are significantly negatively impacted by banking deregulation in 
the private target’s home state.  Columns (1) and (2) also show that acquirer CARs are lower for 
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larger acquirers, consistent with Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006).  The coefficients on 
Dereg State x After are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (3) 
through (6) where the sample is restricted to the +/- two year window and the +/- one year 
window around the state’s response to IBBEA.  
[Insert Table 7: Acquirer CAR] 
In Table 8, the dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value.  In column (1), the 
coefficient on Dereg State x After is -0.498 and statistically significant at the 10% level (t-stat = -
1.836).  A difference-in-differences of -0.498 is in line with the -0.370 drop documented in 
univariate tests in Table 4 and represents an economically significant decrease in the wealth gain 
per dollar paid to the target.  In column (2), the coefficient on Dereg State x After is negative, but 
not statistically significant.  The coefficients on Dereg State x After are negative and statistically 
significant in columns (3), (5), and (6) and the coefficient is negative, but not statistically 
significant in column (4).  Overall, the multivariate evidence presented in Tables 7 and 8 
supports Hypothesis 3.  Acquirers have lower wealth gains when private targets have relaxed 
financial constraints.    
[Insert Table 8: Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value] 
 
5. Variation in the impact of loosened financial constraints 
 The effect of loosened financial constraints, achieved by banking industry deregulation, 
can vary across different types of firms.  Empirical evidence shows that firm size is a significant 
predictor of financial constraints (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).  Large private firms generally have 
more financing options as information asymmetries are less severe than for small private firms 
(Berger and Udell, 1998).  For example, large private firms may have operations over a wide 
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geographic area, which makes them less dependent on local banks and therefore less affected by 
IBBEA.  Also, evidence shows that improvements to financing conditions tend to benefit large 
firms less than small firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005).  Therefore, I predict 
that the impact of deregulation is greater for small private targets than large private targets.  I test 
this prediction in Section 5.1.    
 The effect of IBBEA should also vary across private firms and public firms.  In general, 
public firms tend to have fewer information asymmetries than private firms due to reporting 
requirements, analyst coverage, and media coverage.  Therefore, public firms have a variety of 
financing alternatives to bank debt.  Public firms that do tend to borrow from banks are likely to 
have access to banks outside of their home state, mitigating the effect of state-level banking law 
changes.  Therefore, I conduct a falsification test using a sample of public targets.  I predict that 
IBBEA will not have a significant effect on firm valuations, acquirer CARs, and acquirer wealth 
gains per dollar paid to targets for public target takeovers.  I test this prediction in Section 5.2. 
 
5.1. The impact of deregulation on small private targets versus large private targets  
 To test the prediction that the effect of relaxed financial constraints is stronger for small 
private firms compared to large private firms, I include additional terms in equations (1) and (2).  
Specifically, I interact Dereg State x After with a dummy variable, Small, that is set to one for 
firms which have below median annual sales ($73.16 million) and is set to zero otherwise.  A 
statistically significant coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small indicates a differential effect of 
relaxed financial constraints for small private firms compared to large private firms.  I also 
include Small and other interactions with Small in the regression as appropriate.   
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 In Table 9, Panel A, the dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in columns (1) 
through (4) and LN Private to Public Value in columns (5) through (8).  The sample is based on 
the +/- three year window in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) and the +/- two year window in 
columns (3), (4), (7), and (8).  The control variables are the same as in the regressions in Tables 
5 and 6.   
 Columns (1) through (4) of Panel A show a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small which indicates that the effect of deregulation on LN 
Deal Value to Sales is greater for smaller private firms than for larger private firms.  In column 
(2), the coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small is 0.564 (t-stat = 1.923) while in column (4) 
the coefficient is 0.595 (t-stat = 3.403).   
 The coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small is positive and statistically significant in 
columns (5) through (8) as well.  This evidence indicates that the effect of deregulation on LN 
Private to Public Value is greater for smaller private targets than for larger private targets.  For 
example, the coefficient is 0.852 (t-stat = 2.176) in column (6) and 0.742 (t-stat = 2.863) in 
column (8).  The coefficient on Small is positive and statistically significant in every column in 
Table 9, Panel A, indicating that small private targets have significantly higher valuations than 
larger private targets. 
 Table 9, Panel B is structured the same as Panel A.  The dependent variable is Acquirer 
CAR in columns (1) through (4) and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value in columns (5) through (8).  
The coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small is positive in every regression, opposite to my 
prediction, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  There does not appear to 
be an incremental effect of deregulation for small private targets on Acquirer CAR or Acquirer 
Wealth Gain to Deal Value.   
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[Insert Table 9: Interaction with Small] 
 
5.2. Takeovers of public targets and IBBEA 
 I next conduct a falsification test which investigates whether or not IBBEA had a 
significant effect on a sample of public targets.  I estimate equations (1) and (2) on a sample of 
722 takeovers of public targets by public acquirers.  I include only takeovers that involved an 
acquirer who purchases 100% of the target’s equity and has no toehold in the target.  The 
average deal value in this sample is $1.29 billion and the average level of sales for the target is 
$731 million.  Acquirer CARs average -2.01% and the target’s deal value averages 49.8% of the 
acquirer’s pre-deal market value. 
Table 10 presents the results of the estimation, where the dependent variable is LN Deal 
Value to Sales in columns (1) and (2), Acquirer CAR in columns (3) and (4), and Acquirer 
Wealth to Deal Value in columns (5) and (6).
15
  I predict that the coefficient on Dereg State x 
After is not significant in columns (1) through (6).  Indeed, I find that the coefficient on Dereg 
State x After is not statistically significant in any regression.  The coefficient is 0.038 (t-stat = 
0.170) in column (1), 0.659 (t-stat = 0.212) in column (3), and -0.010 (t-stat = -0.026) in column 
(5).   
 I also examine whether smaller public targets are impacted more by IBBEA than larger 
public targets.  I interact Dereg State x After with Small, where Small is set to one if the public 
target has sales below the median ($192 million) and zero otherwise.  In Appendix B: 
Supplemental Results, I show that the coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small is not 
statistically significant in regressions where the dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales, 
Acquirer CAR, or Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value.  These non-results using public targets suggest 
                                                 
15
 It is not appropriate to construct the variable LN Private to Public Value for this sample of takeovers.   
32 
 
that the effect of deregulation of interstate bank branching is insignificant for firms which are not 
dependent on local banks.   
[Insert Table 10: Public Firm Sales, Falsification Test] 
 
6. Robustness tests 
This section discusses robustness tests of the empirical results.  First, I consider the 
influence of outliers in the data.  I note that I use the natural logarithm transformations LN Deal 
Value to Sales and LN Private to Public Value in empirical tests to mitigate the influence of 
outliers.  To further examine the influence of outliers on my empirical results, I winsorize the 
data at the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles.  I find that the average of Deal Value to Sales falls from 
15.49 when winsorization is at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to 3.20 when winsorization is at the 
10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles.  The average of LN Deal Value to Sales falls from 0.76 to 0.65 while 
the average of LN Private to Public Value falls from 0.07 to 0.001.   
I replicate Tables 5 through 9 on the sample of sellouts where winsorization is done at the 
10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles and present the coefficients on the main variable of interest in Table 11.  
Panels A, B, C, and D show the coefficient on Dereg State x After from replications of Tables 5, 
6, 7, and 8, respectively.  Panel E shows the coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small from 
replications of Table 9, Panel A, columns (1) through (4).  Panel F shows the coefficient on 
Dereg State x After x Small from replications of Table 9, Panel A, columns (5) through (8).  I do 
not present replication results of Table 9, Panel B because the results in the original panel (and in 
replications of that panel) are not statistically significant.  The results in Table 11, Panels A 
through F are very similar to the original results in Tables 5 through 9.  Thus, my empirical 
results do not appear to be driven by large outliers in the data.  
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[Insert Table 11: Robustness Test] 
Second, I examine whether or not my results are robust to excluding private targets 
headquartered in California.  This robustness test addresses two concerns.  First, private targets 
headquartered in California represent 17.06% of the sample (95 deals), much more than any 
other state.  Therefore, private targets in this state could have a large influence on my tests.  
Second, California is home to many “internet firms” during the latter part of the sample period.  
Such firms can receive systematically high valuations and drive my results.  I exclude 95 private 
targets headquartered in California and replicate the empirical results in Tables 5 through 9.  
Table 12 summarizes the findings and is structured the same as Table 11.  As show in Table 12, 
the empirical results in Panels A, B, C, D, and F are similar to the original results.  However, 
Panel E shows that the statistical significance of the coefficient on Dereg State x After x Small is 
noticeably reduced in the first two regressions.  In columns (1) and (2) the coefficient is not 
statistically significant while in columns (3) and (4), it is significant at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  Overall, the main results in the paper are robust to excluding private targets 
headquartered in California.  
[Insert Table 12: Robustness Test] 
Third, factors that influence a state to deregulate or not may also be correlated with 
private firm valuations.  For example, firms with large growth opportunities may lobby the state 
to deregulate interstate bank branching.  In that case, IBBEA may not be a truly exogenous 
event.  I conduct a robustness test which eliminates deals in states that are very likely to 
deregulate or not (i.e., the test retains deals in states where the choice to deregulate is less 
predictable).  Motivated by Kroszner and Strahan’s (1999) analysis of the factors that influence 
deregulation, I estimate the likelihood that each state deregulates based on the following 
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independent variables: small bank asset share of bank assets in the state, small firm share of 
firms in the state, whether or not banks can sell insurance in the state, relative size of insurance 
and banking sectors in states where banks can (cannot) sell insurance, state income growth, and a 
dummy if the governor of the state is a Democrat.
16
  Then, I eliminate 112 deals (20.1% of the 
sample) where private targets are headquartered in states that had a high likelihood of making the 
choice that they eventually made.  These deals are headquartered in the two deregulating states 
with the highest likelihood of deregulating (Arizona and California) and the two non-
deregulating states with the lowest likelihood of deregulating (Arkansas and Iowa).  Table 13 
summarizes the findings and is structured the same as Table 11.  Table 13, Panels A through F, 
show that the results are qualitatively similar to the original results in Tables 5 through 9.   In 
Appendix B: Supplemental Results, I exclude 125 deals in eight states that are likely to 
deregulate or not and 151 deals in twelve states that are likely to deregulate or not and continue 
to find similar results.  Thus, factors that influence the state’s choice to deregulate do not appear 
to drive my results.  
[Insert Table 13: Robustness Test] 
Fourth, I calculate LN Private to Public Value using different matching criteria.  Similar 
to the results presented above, I match private targets to public targets where the takeover 
involved a public acquirer who purchases 100% of the public target’s equity and has no toehold 
in the target.  Now, I alter the matching criteria in four ways: 1) allow failed takeovers as long as 
the public acquirer sought 100% of the equity, 2) allow failed takeovers and include deal values 
within +/-50% of the private target’s deal value, 3) choose public targets where the deal is 
announced within 3 years of the target’s home state’s response to IBBEA, and 4) match on Fama 
French 48 industry codes rather than two-digit SIC industry codes. In Appendix B: Supplemental 
                                                 
16
 I thank Phil Strahan for providing data on the year that each state allowed banks to sell insurance products. 
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Results, I show that my empirical results are similar using each of these four different matching 
criteria. 
Fifth, I construct Acquirer CAR and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value based on 
announcement returns measured over the (-2, +2) day window around the deal announcement.  
The results are shown in Appendix B: Supplemental Results and are largely similar to those 
reported in Tables 7 and 8.  For example, for sellouts announced two years before to two years 
after the state’s response to IBBEA, with Acquirer CAR measured over the (-2, +2) day window, 
the coefficient on Dereg State x After is -3.792 (significant at the 5% level) in the specification 
without state fixed effects and is -5.134 (significant at the 1% level) in the specification with 
state fixed effects. 
Finally, I examine an alternative definition of deregulation that groups deregulating states 
into finer categories based on the number of restrictions that were relaxed.  The variable Dereg 
State is decomposed into four dummy variables according to whether the state relaxed one, two, 
three, or four restrictions on interstate bank branching.  The results are presented in Appendix B: 
Supplemental Results.  Under this definition of deregulation, I obtain similar conclusions as 
under the original definition of deregulation.  Deregulation results in higher valuations for 
private targets, higher valuations for private targets benchmarked to public targets, and acquirer 
returns are lower. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper provides evidence that valuations of private targets increase when financial 
constraints are relaxed.  I use exogenous variation to financial constraints caused by interstate 
bank branching deregulation to execute empirical tests.  The difference-in-differences approach 
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demonstrates that relaxing financial constraints leads to a statistically significant increase of 
7.3% in private firm valuation multiples.   
When financial constraints are eased, private firms also sell for a higher valuation 
multiple benchmarked to public target valuation multiples, which suggests that they can 
substitute bank credit in place of financing from an acquirer.  The impact on private target 
valuations and valuations benchmarked to public target valuations is greater for small private 
targets than large private targets, suggesting that firms with greater information asymmetries 
benefit more from relaxed financial constraints. 
Acquirer abnormal stock returns and acquirer abnormal wealth gains scaled by the price 
of the target are negatively impacted by relaxed financial constraints on private targets.  Acquirer 
returns are not incrementally lower when the private target is small.  It is important to note that 
acquirer returns are still positive and economically significant, on average, for deals announced 
in a deregulated environment.  Thus, sellouts are still beneficial to acquirers, even after private 
targets have relaxed financial constraints.   
I find no effect of state-level banking deregulation on a sample of takeovers of public 
targets.  This evidence is consistent with state-level banking deregulation having the greatest 
impact on firms that depend on local banks for financing.  The evidence overall suggests that 
deregulation of the banking industry improves access to finance and allows private firms to 
substitute bank credit for some of the financing benefits provided by acquirers.    
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Description 
LN Deal Value to Sales Natural logarithm of Deal Value to Sales, which is SDC deal value divided by the 
target's annual sales. 
 
LN Private to Public Value Natural logarithm of Private to Public Value, which is the deal value-to-sales ratio of 
the private target divided by the average deal value-to-sales ratio of matched public 
targets. Public targets are matched on two-digit SIC code, deal value within +/- 20%, 
and date of announcement within +/- 24 months.   
Acquirer CAR  Cumulative average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  
 
Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value Acquirer Wealth Gain divided by SDC deal value.  Wealth gain is the cumulative 
average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity 15 days before the 
announcement of the deal. 
Dereg State Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated its bank branching 
laws or will eventually deregulate its bank branching laws. Deregulation is defined 
by relaxing at least one restriction to interstate bank branching. 
After Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced after the target's state 
initially responded to IBBEA. All states represented in the sample responded to 
IBBEA between 1995 and 1997, even states that opted out or otherwise maintained 
restrictions to interstate bank branching. 
Dereg State x After Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated bank branching 
laws at the time of the sellout. 
LN Acq Mkt Value Natural log of the acquirer's market value of equity 15 days before the announcement 
of the deal. 
Relative Size SDC deal value divided by the acquirer's market value of equity 15 days before the 
announcement of the deal. 
State Income Growth Annual percentage change in real per capita personal income for the state in the year 
before the deal was announced.  Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
All Cash Deal Dummy variable that equals 1 if the consideration paid was cash only. Due to 
inconsistencies in SDC data, cash only means that the value of cash consideration is 
at least 99% of the deal value and the value of common stock consideration is 0. 
High Tech Target Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's four-digit SIC code is one of the high 
tech industry codes identified by Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
Same State Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer are headquartered in the 
same state and zero otherwise. 
Same Industry Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer share the same four-digit 
SIC code and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1: Sample by State and Quarter. The figure shows the sample selection. Light (dark) shaded areas are before (after) the 
state’s response to IBBEA. Zero means that the state did not deregulate and one means that the state did deregulate.  An asterisk 
(*) indicates that the state changed interstate bank branching laws again, and deals after this time are excluded. 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Alabama 1
Alaska 1
Arizona 1
Arkansas 0
California 1
Colorado 0
Connecticut 1
D. of Columbia 1
Delaware 1
Florida 1
Georgia 1
Hawaii 1
Idaho 1
Illinois 1
Indiana 1 *
Iowa 0
Kansas 0
Kentucky 0 *
Louisiana 1
Maine 1
Maryland 1
Massachusetts 1
Michigan 1
Minnesota 1
Mississippi 0
Missouri 0
Montana 0
Nebraska 0
Nevada 1
New Hampshire 0
New Jersey 1
New Mexico 1
New York 1
North Carolina 1
North Dakota 1
Ohio 1
Oklahoma 0 *
Oregon 1
Pennsylvania 1
Rhode Island 1
South Carolina 1
South Dakota 1
Tennessee 1 *
Texas 0
Utah 1
Vermont 1
Virginia 1
Washington 1
West Virginia 1
Wisconsin 1
Wyoming 1
199319921991 20001994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
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Table 1: State level response to IBBEA 
This table shows the date of each state’s initial response to IBBEA as well as the type of restrictions imposed.  There are four 
types of restrictions: (1) a minimum age of in-state banks targeted for an acquisition, (2) restrictions on the ability of out-of-
state banks to open a new branch (restrictions on de novo interstate branching), (3) restrictions on the ability of out-of-state 
banks to acquire a single in-state bank branch, and (4) a statewide cap on deposits below 30% of the total deposits in the state. 
If at least one restriction was relaxed, then the state is considered to be a deregulating state.  The data are from Rice and 
Strahan (2010) and Johnson and Rice (2008). 
State Date of Initial 
Response to 
IBBEA 
Restrict 
Target Age 
Restrict 
De Novo 
Restrict 
Single Branch 
Acquisitions 
Restrict 
With 
Deposit Cap 
Deregulating  
State 
 
Alabama 5/31/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Alaska 1/1/1994 Yes Yes No No Yes  
Arizona 9/1/1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Arkansas 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
California 9/28/1995 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Colorado 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Connecticut 6/27/1995 Yes No No No Yes  
Delaware 9/29/1995 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
D. of Columbia 6/13/1996 No No No No Yes  
Florida 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Georgia 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Hawaii 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Idaho 9/29/1995 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Illinois 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Indiana 6/1/1997 No No No No Yes  
Iowa 4/4/1996 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Kansas 9/29/1995 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Kentucky 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Louisiana 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Maine 1/1/1997 No No No No Yes  
Maryland 9/29/1995 No No No No Yes  
Massachusetts 8/2/1996 Yes No No No Yes  
Michigan 11/29/1995 No No No No Yes  
Minnesota 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Mississippi 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Missouri 9/29/1995 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Montana 9/29/1995 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Nebraska 5/31/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Nevada 9/29/1995 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
New Hampshire 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
New Jersey 4/17/1996 No Yes No No Yes  
New Mexico 6/1/1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
New York 6/1/1997 Yes Yes No No Yes  
North Carolina 7/1/1995 No No No No Yes  
North Dakota 5/31/1997 No Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Ohio 5/21/1997 No No No No Yes  
Oklahoma 5/31/1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Oregon 7/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Pennsylvania 7/6/1995 No No No No Yes  
Rhode Island 6/20/1995 No No No No Yes  
South Carolina 7/1/1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
South Dakota 3/9/1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Tennessee 6/1/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Texas 8/28/1995 Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
Utah 6/1/1995 Yes Yes No No Yes  
Vermont 5/30/1996 Yes Yes No No Yes  
Virginia 9/29/1995 No No No No Yes  
Washington 6/6/1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
West Virginia 5/31/1997 No No No Yes Yes  
Wisconsin 5/1/1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Wyoming 5/31/1997 Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
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Table 2: Year and State Distribution 
This table shows the distribution of sellouts by year and by the private target’s home state. The sample is 557 
acquisitions of private targets by public acquirers.  The deal must be announced three years before to three years 
after the private firm’s home state responded to IBBEA.  Targets that are financial or utility firms are excluded.   
Panel A: Distribution by Year     
        
Year Announced Frequency Percent   
1992 9 1.62   
1993 19 3.41   
1994 54 9.69   
1995 55 9.87   
1996 103 18.49   
1997 125 22.44   
1998 120 21.54   
1999 53 9.52   
2000 19 3.41   
  557 100.0   
 
 
Panel B: Distribution by State 
       
Private Target State Frequency Percent   Private Target State Frequency Percent 
California 95 17.06   Kentucky 5 0.90 
Texas 43 7.72   Oklahoma 5 0.90 
Illinois 40 7.18   Tennessee 4 0.72 
New York 36 6.46   South Carolina 3 0.54 
Georgia 30 5.39   Arkansas 2 0.36 
Massachusetts 28 5.03   Iowa 2 0.36 
Michigan 27 4.85   Kansas 2 0.36 
Florida 26 4.67   Maine 2 0.36 
Pennsylvania 19 3.41   New Hampshire 2 0.36 
North Carolina 16 2.87   D. of Columbia 1 0.18 
New Jersey 15 2.69   Idaho 1 0.18 
Ohio 15 2.69   Mississippi 1 0.18 
Arizona 13 2.33   Montana 1 0.18 
Colorado 13 2.33   Nebraska 1 0.18 
Minnesota 12 2.15   Nevada 1 0.18 
Virginia 12 2.15   Rhode Island 1 0.18 
Wisconsin 12 2.15   Vermont 1 0.18 
Missouri 10 1.80   Alaska 0 0.00 
Indiana 9 1.62   Delaware 0 0.00 
Louisiana 9 1.62   Hawaii 0 0.00 
Washington 9 1.62   New Mexico 0 0.00 
Connecticut 8 1.44   North Dakota 0 0.00 
Maryland 8 1.44   South Dakota 0 0.00 
Oregon 6 1.08   West Virginia 0 0.00 
Utah 6 1.08   Wyoming 0 0.00 
Alabama 5 0.90   Total 557 100.00 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics   
This table shows summary statistics for a sample of 557 acquisitions of private targets by public acquirers.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  All dollar values are in millions of 2000 dollars.  Deal Value to Sales is SDC deal value divided by the target's annual sales.  Private to Public Value is the deal 
value-to-sales ratio of the private target divided by the average deal value-to-sales ratio of matched public targets.  Acquirer Market Value is the acquirer's market value of 
equity 15 days before the announcement of the deal.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  Acquirer Wealth to 
Deal Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC deal value.  Relative Size is SDC deal value 
divided by the acquirer's market value of equity.  State Income Growth is the annual percentage change in real per capita personal income for the state in the year before the 
deal was announced.  High Tech Target is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's four-digit SIC code is one of the high tech industry codes identified by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004).  All Cash  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consideration paid was cash only.  Same State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target and 
acquirer are headquartered in the same state and zero otherwise.  Same Industry is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC 
code and zero otherwise.  Dereg State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated it's bank branching laws or will eventually deregulate its bank 
branching laws. Deregulation is defined by relaxing at least one restriction to interstate bank branching.  After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced 
after the target's state  initially responded to IBBEA.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for sellouts announced in deregulating states after deregulation.   
Variable Description N Mean Std Dev Min 10
th
  25th Median 75th 90th Max 
Deal Value ($mil) 557 202.17 268.90 50.81 59.23 73.21 114.04 196.50 403.13 1,685.30 
Target Sales ($mil) 557 151.19 229.80 0.40 9.11 32.33 73.16 156.70 376.44 1,401.11 
Deal Value to Sales 557 15.49 67.59 0.16 0.47 0.83 1.68 4.08 12.68 492.25 
LN Deal Value to Sales 557 0.76 1.44 -1.89 -0.74 -0.20 0.51 1.38 2.49 6.20 
Deal Value to Sales,  
     Matched Public Targets 431 4.37 6.67 0.29 0.65 1.26 2.46 4.69 8.18 49.48 
Private to Public Value 431 3.80 10.37 0.07 0.20 0.42 0.90 2.34 5.99 72.95 
LN Private to Public Value 431 0.07 1.42 -2.69 -1.63 -0.88 -0.10 0.85 1.79 4.29 
                  
Acquirer Market Value ($mil) 557 1,982.55 3,455.66 27.56 143.97 340.66 704.37 2,035.40 5,316.53 21,606.43 
Acquirer CAR (-5,+5) 557 3.51 12.45 -26.11 -10.51 -3.97 2.17 9.68 18.35 52.49 
Acquirer Wealth Gain ($mil) 557 2.62 262.73 -1,524.52 -135.89 -25.85 10.64 58.63 199.95 777.20 
Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value 557 0.07 1.42 -7.53 -0.92 -0.21 0.08 0.40 1.36 4.77 
Relative Size  557 0.34 0.47 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.39 0.89 2.52 
State Income Growth 557 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 
                  
High Tech Target 557 0.29             
AllCash 557 0.29             
Same State 557 0.18             
Same Industry 557 0.34             
Dereg State 557 0.84             
After 557 0.67             
Dereg State x After 557 0.56             
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Table 4: Univariate comparisons  
This table shows univariate tests for a sample of 557 acquisitions of private targets by public acquirers. The sample is divided into four groups based on whether the 
sellout was in a state that deregulates or not and whether the sellout occurred before or after each state’s initial response to IBBEA. Differences in means are tested 
with a t-test and differences in median are tested by a Wilcoxon two sample test.  LN Deal Value to Sales is the natural logarithm of SDC deal value divided by the 
target's annual sales.  LN Private to Public Value is the natural logarithm of the deal value-to-sales ratio of the private target divided by the average deal value-to-sales 
ratio of matched public targets.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value is 
the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC deal value.  
Univariate Tests: Deregulating States vs. Non-Deregulating States, Before and After Response to IBBEA  
                        
 
Before Response to IBBEA After Response to IBBEA 
 
  
Sellouts in Deregulating States N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Diff in 
Mean p-value 
 Diff in 
Median p-value 
 
LN Deal Value to Sales 159 0.40 0.40 311 0.94 0.54 0.54 0.00 *** 0.14 0.00 *** 
LN of Relative Value 114 -0.06 -0.09 251 0.16 -0.04 0.22 0.15  0.05 0.44  
Acquirer CAR (-5,+5) 159 5.00 3.59 311 2.93 1.79 -2.07 0.07 * -1.80 0.04 * 
Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value 159 0.31 0.15 311 -0.02 0.07 -0.33 0.01 ** -0.08 0.02 ** 
                        
 
Before Response to IBBEA After Response to IBBEA           
Sellouts in Non-Deregulating States N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Diff in 
Mean p-value 
 Diff in 
Median p-value 
 
LN Deal Value to Sales 23 0.86 0.84 64 0.72 0.45 -0.14 0.62  -0.39 0.37  
LN of Relative Value 17 0.01 -0.03 49 -0.06 -0.25 -0.07 0.86  -0.22 0.61  
Acquirer CAR (-5,+5) 23 3.07 0.30 64 2.72 1.15 -0.35 0.90  0.85 0.93  
Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value 23 -0.06 0.01 64 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.81  0.02 0.75  
                        
              
 Diff in 
Diff p-value 
 
    
 
LN Deal Value to Sales             0.68 0.03 **     
LN of Relative Value             0.29 0.49      
Acquirer CAR (-5,+5)             -1.72 0.56      
Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value           -0.37 0.07 *     
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Table 5: Private Target Deal Value-to-Sales 
  
OLS regression of  LN Deal Value to Sales for 557 acquisitions of private targets by public acquirers. LN Deal Value 
to Sales is the natural log of SDC deal value divided by the target's annual sales. Dereg State is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated its bank branching laws or will eventually deregulate its bank branching 
laws in its initial response to IBBEA. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced after the 
target's state had initially responded to IBBEA. Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's 
state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics 
(in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
Dependent variable LN Deal Value to Sales 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 1 Year +/- 1 Year 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
Dereg State x After 0.597*** 0.544** 0.783** 0.757* 0.540* 0.913* 
  (2.936) (2.032) (2.690) (2.013) (1.746) (1.934) 
Dereg State  -0.488* 
 
-0.533** 
 
-0.363  
  (-1.884) 
 
(-2.133) 
 
(-1.091)  
After -0.232 -0.425 -0.340 -0.559 -0.276 -0.416 
  (-0.963) (-1.341) (-1.075) (-1.277) (-0.838) (-0.820) 
Relative Size 0.376** 0.336** 0.439** 0.400* 0.478 0.583* 
  (2.489) (2.382) (2.229) (1.916) (1.633) (1.717) 
All Cash -0.289** -0.302** -0.186 -0.279* -0.064 -0.153 
  (-2.573) (-2.448) (-1.391) (-1.793) (-0.260) (-0.491) 
LN Acq Mkt Value 0.288*** 0.292*** 0.244*** 0.247*** 0.186*** 0.192*** 
  (5.378) (4.952) (5.738) (5.706) (4.126) (3.291) 
High Tech Target 0.545** 0.431* 0.500* 0.332 0.640 0.582 
  (2.424) (1.811) (1.799) (1.003) (1.535) (0.909) 
Same State 0.275 0.257 0.138 0.073 0.191 -0.006 
  (1.564) (1.566) (0.704) (0.380) (1.059) (-0.020) 
Same Industry 0.092 0.103 -0.043 -0.051 -0.136 -0.250 
  (0.644) (0.713) (-0.358) (-0.372) (-1.048) (-1.083) 
State Income Growth 7.605 16.060*** 5.580 10.390* 7.844 1.963 
 
(1.671) (3.168) (1.459) (1.851) (0.987) (0.137) 
Constant -1.368*** -0.779 -3.656*** -2.584*** -0.717 -0.779 
  (-2.958) (-1.679) (-5.013) (-3.354) (-1.096) (-1.032) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  
    
  
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
Number of States 43 43 41 41 35 35 
R-squared 0.47 0.53 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.59 
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Table 6: Private Target Value Relative to Public Targets  
  
OLS regression of  LN Private to Public Value for 557 acquisitions of private targets by public acquirers. LN Private to 
Public Value is the natural logarithm of the deal value-to-sales ratio of the private target divided by the average deal 
value-to-sales ratio of matched public targets.  This variable is missing for some deals where matches could not be 
found.  Dereg State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated its bank branching laws or 
will eventually deregulate its bank branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA. After is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal was announced after the target's state had initially responded to IBBEA. Dereg State x After is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
Dependent variable LN Private to Public Value 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 1 Year +/- 1 Year 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
Dereg State x After 0.712*** 0.834*** 0.857*** 1.139** 0.811** 1.799*** 
  (2.774) (2.808) (3.096) (2.621) (2.726) (4.289) 
Dereg State  -0.542* 
 
-0.485* 
 
-0.611  
  (-1.717) 
 
(-1.766) 
 
(-1.514)  
After -0.421 -0.743** -0.529* -1.034* -0.431 -1.411*** 
  (-1.572) (-2.251) (-1.785) (-2.007) (-1.267) (-3.083) 
Relative Size 0.267 0.211 0.393 0.282 0.424 0.582 
  (1.058) (0.858) (1.287) (0.977) (1.082) (1.358) 
All Cash -0.443*** -0.470*** -0.346* -0.468** -0.145 -0.547 
  (-2.879) (-2.911) (-1.780) (-2.243) (-0.377) (-1.130) 
LN Acq Mkt Value 0.136* 0.135 0.125 0.127 0.047 0.050 
  (1.785) (1.668) (1.578) (1.626) (0.511) (0.424) 
High Tech Target 0.480** 0.367 0.420 0.232 0.716* 0.298 
  (2.227) (1.479) (1.566) (0.716) (1.830) (0.456) 
Same State 0.328 0.345* 0.173 0.138 0.196 0.051 
  (1.507) (1.986) (0.742) (0.740) (1.176) (0.154) 
Same Industry 0.095 0.146 0.052 0.095 -0.111 -0.414 
  (0.565) (0.882) (0.353) (0.607) (-0.557) (-1.383) 
State Income Growth 3.120 14.355 0.846 7.563 11.854 -20.213 
 
(0.462) (1.573) (0.138) (0.770) (1.005) (-0.961) 
Constant 0.083 -2.558*** -0.447 -1.356 0.836 -0.885 
  (0.102) (-3.458) (-0.512) (-1.464) (0.840) (-1.001) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  
    
  
Observations 431 431 295 295 156 156 
Number of States 40 40 38 38 32 32 
R-squared 0.24 0.34 0.23 0.38 0.28 0.50 
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Table 7: Acquirer CARs   
Weighted least squares regression of  Acquirer CAR for 557 acquisitions of private targets by public acquirers.  
Weights are the inverse of the standard deviation of the market model residuals.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative 
average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  Dereg State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
target's state has deregulated its bank branching laws or will eventually deregulate its bank branching laws in its initial 
response to IBBEA. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced after the target's state had 
initially responded to IBBEA. Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated 
bank branching laws at the time of the sellout. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
Dependent variable Acquirer CAR 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 1 Year +/- 1 Year 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
Dereg State x After -2.860 -3.292* -6.380*** -7.868*** -9.511*** -12.319*** 
  (-1.460) (-1.831) (-3.786) (-5.322) (-4.347) (-6.244) 
Dereg State  2.620 
 
4.659*** 
 
5.217**  
  (1.641) 
 
(2.874) 
 
(2.556)  
After -3.926 -3.838 -0.904 0.660 3.008 5.869* 
  (-1.643) (-1.445) (-0.455) (0.254) (1.356) (1.790) 
Relative Size 1.986 2.845* 2.032 3.016 0.473 1.634 
  (1.202) (1.759) (1.100) (1.537) (0.271) (0.773) 
All Cash -0.780 -0.870 -1.062 -0.943 -0.458 -0.783 
  (-0.953) (-1.005) (-0.977) (-0.785) (-0.261) (-0.374) 
LN Acq Mkt Value -1.258*** -1.078*** -1.202*** -0.975*** -0.810 -0.452 
  (-3.491) (-2.948) (-3.055) (-2.781) (-1.240) (-0.533) 
High Tech Target 0.912 1.236 -0.080 0.418 -0.524 0.158 
  (0.634) (0.733) (-0.045) (0.202) (-0.183) (0.043) 
Same State 1.408 1.152 1.674 0.893 -0.608 -2.235 
  (1.494) (1.232) (1.216) (0.639) (-0.364) (-0.842) 
Same Industry 0.565 0.579 0.892 1.506 1.320 0.999 
  (0.608) (0.580) (0.767) (1.082) (1.003) (0.491) 
State Income Growth -25.974 23.105 -37.825 -72.351 -32.601 -51.265 
 
(-0.775) (0.494) (-0.956) (-1.388) (-0.538) (-0.404) 
Constant 11.161** 23.847*** 10.886* 11.333** 1.495 8.606 
  (2.208) (4.358) (1.991) (2.325) (0.210) (0.698) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  
    
  
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
Number of States 43 43 41 41 35 35 
R-squared 0.22 0.30 0.26 0.38 0.31 0.50 
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Table 8: Acquirer Wealth Gains per Dollar Paid to Target   
Weighted least squares regression of  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value for 557 acquisitions of private targets by public 
acquirers.  Weights are the inverse of the standard deviation of the market model residuals.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal 
Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC 
deal value.   Dereg State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated its bank branching laws 
or will eventually deregulate its bank branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA. After is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal was announced after the target's state had initially responded to IBBEA. Dereg State x After is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
Dependent variable Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 1 Year +/- 1 Year 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
Dereg State x After -0.498* -0.276 -0.559* -0.189 -0.757** -1.024*** 
  (-1.836) (-1.036) (-1.772) (-0.780) (-2.066) (-3.021) 
Dereg State  0.555*** 
 
0.632*** 
 
0.748**  
  (3.826) 
 
(3.645) 
 
(2.257)  
After -0.376 -0.462 -0.353 -0.116 0.069 0.789 
  (-1.272) (-1.620) (-1.089) (-0.333) (0.211) (1.406) 
Relative Size -0.050 -0.064 -0.063 -0.013 0.091 0.106 
  (-0.304) (-0.365) (-0.381) (-0.085) (0.450) (0.353) 
All Cash 0.110 0.149 0.002 0.138 0.166 0.293 
  (0.726) (0.867) (0.009) (0.614) (0.626) (1.208) 
LN Acq Mkt Value -0.095 -0.080 -0.090 -0.045 -0.077 -0.028 
  (-1.037) (-0.829) (-0.709) (-0.382) (-0.421) (-0.139) 
High Tech Target 0.147 0.241 0.046 0.155 -0.027 0.120 
  (0.754) (0.961) (0.208) (0.500) (-0.083) (0.290) 
Same State 0.132 0.123 0.171 0.069 -0.041 -0.143 
  (0.579) (0.568) (0.594) (0.233) (-0.181) (-0.550) 
Same Industry 0.128 0.142 0.101 0.080 0.332 0.181 
  (0.813) (0.714) (0.512) (0.353) (1.263) (0.533) 
State Income Growth -8.225* -10.840 -8.525* -23.384*** -8.531 -23.936 
 
(-1.759) (-1.674) (-1.960) (-2.952) (-1.133) (-1.391) 
Constant 0.042 0.096 1.311* -0.361 -0.122 0.176 
  (0.065) (0.105) (1.716) (-0.513) (-0.124) (0.126) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  
    
  
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
Number of States 43 43 41 41 35 35 
R-squared 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.42 0.37 0.51 
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Table 9: Impact of IBBEA by Firm Size  
This table presents regressions that examine the incremental impact of firm size on the effect of deregulation.  The sample is 557 acquisitions of private firms by public firms.  Panel A 
analyzes LN Deal Value to Sales (the natural logarithm of SDC deal value divided by the target's annual sales) and  LN Private to Public Value (the natural logarithm of the deal value-to-
sales ratio of the private target divided by the average deal value-to-sales ratio of matched public targets).  Panel B analyzes Acquirer CAR (the cumulative average abnormal return of the 
acquirer over the (-5, +5) window) and  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value (the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC deal 
value).  Dereg State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated its bank branching laws or will eventually deregulate its bank branching laws in its initial response 
to IBBEA. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced after the target's state had initially responded to IBBEA. Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  Small is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has below median annual sales ($73 million).  Deal level 
controls are: Relative Size, All Cash, LN Acq Mkt Value, High Tech Target, Same State, Same Industry, and State Income Growth. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
Panel A: LN Deal Value to Sales and LN Private to Public Value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years 
Dependent variable 
LN Deal Value to 
Sales 
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Private to  
Public Value 
LN Private to  
Public Value 
LN Private to  
Public Value 
LN Private to  
Public Value 
Dereg State x After x Small 0.625* 0.564* 0.584** 0.595*** 1.090* 0.852** 1.655*** 0.742*** 
  (1.892) (1.923) (2.060) (3.403) (1.783) (2.176) (2.936) (2.863) 
Dereg State x After -0.136 -0.123 0.130 0.149 -0.425 -0.044 -0.694* 0.399 
  (-0.986) (-0.438) (0.834) (0.578) (-1.136) (-0.104) (-1.722) (0.809) 
Dereg State x Small -0.164   -0.044   -0.463   -0.879*   
  (-0.480)   (-0.178)   (-0.741)   (-1.804)   
Dereg State -0.124   -0.231**   0.105   0.551*   
  (-1.003)   (-2.088)   (0.240)   (1.772)   
After x Small -0.249 -0.190 -0.336 -0.354** -0.347 -0.085 -1.017* -0.027 
  (-1.033) (-0.662) (-1.603) (-2.098) (-0.572) (-0.206) (-1.970) (-0.078) 
After 0.149 0.031 0.016 -0.070 0.140 -0.331 0.524 -0.674 
  (1.037) (0.088) (0.094) (-0.207) (0.368) (-0.736) (1.530) (-1.142) 
Small 1.411*** 1.209*** 1.289*** 1.196*** 1.594** 1.134*** 1.904*** 0.994*** 
  (4.400) (6.097) (5.497) (10.111) (2.504) (4.539) (3.698) (5.116) 
Deal Level Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 431 431 295 295 
Number of States 43 43 41 41 40 40 38 38 
R-squared 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.45 0.52 0.43 0.55 
continued…  
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Table 9, continued 
Panel B: Acquirer CAR and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 2 Years +/- 2 Years 
Dependent variable 
Acquirer  
CAR 
Acquirer  
CAR 
Acquirer  
CAR 
Acquirer  
CAR 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Dereg State x After x Small 0.354 1.788 4.787 2.195 0.778 0.277 0.724 0.183 
  (0.086) (0.641) (1.134) (0.583) (1.630) (0.765) (1.452) (0.480) 
Dereg State x After -1.558 -3.262 -7.175*** -8.079*** -0.796** -0.364 -0.844* -0.235 
  (-0.479) (-1.376) (-2.974) (-3.361) (-2.291) (-0.917) (-1.959) (-0.705) 
Dereg State x Small 2.837   -0.430   -0.396   -0.304   
  (0.886)   (-0.144)   (-1.051)   (-0.886)   
Dereg State 0.245   3.836**   0.736***   0.764***   
  (0.089)   (2.524)   (3.679)   (3.640)   
After x Small 1.729 1.068 -0.009 2.931 -0.644 -0.181 -0.549 0.084 
  (0.454) (0.339) (-0.002) (0.755) (-1.566) (-0.406) (-1.202) (0.182) 
After -6.082 -4.959 -1.958 -0.954 -0.130 -0.417 -0.140 -0.170 
  (-1.664) (-1.500) (-0.734) (-0.277) (-0.352) (-0.942) (-0.328) (-0.390) 
Small -4.477 -2.760 -3.140 -4.217** 0.209 -0.081 0.136 -0.194 
  (-1.443) (-1.527) (-1.056) (-2.133) (0.639) (-0.253) (0.393) (-0.557) 
Deal Level Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 557 557 383 383 
Number of States 43 43 41 41 43 43 41 41 
R-squared 0.22 0.30 0.27 0.39 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.42 
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Table 10: Public Targets, Falsification Test  
The sample is 722 acquisitions of public firms by public firms.  LN Deal Value to Sales is the natural logarithm of SDC deal 
value divided by the target's annual sales.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, 
+5) window.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market 
value of equity divided by SDC deal value.  Dereg State is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated 
its bank branching laws or will eventually deregulate its bank branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA. After is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced after the target's state had initially responded to IBBEA. Dereg State x After is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Window for sellouts +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years +/- 3 Years 
Dependent variable 
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
Acquirer  
CAR 
Acquirer  
CAR 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Dereg State x After 0.038 -0.059 0.659 0.278 -0.010 -0.019 
  (0.170) (-0.293) (0.212) (0.082) (-0.026) (-0.043) 
Dereg State  -0.219   0.730   -0.030   
  (-1.078)   (0.314)   (-0.166)   
After 0.048 0.143 -2.544 -2.643 -0.235 -0.220 
  (0.219) (0.698) (-0.845) (-0.777) (-0.654) (-0.592) 
Relative Size 0.145* 0.199** -0.159 -0.339 0.103 0.135 
  (1.769) (2.173) (-0.178) (-0.338) (1.027) (1.113) 
All Cash -0.321*** -0.331*** 3.145*** 3.062*** 0.320*** 0.213** 
  (-3.820) (-3.499) (4.858) (4.139) (3.385) (2.504) 
LN Acq Mkt Value 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.028 0.050 0.004 0.007 
  (5.560) (5.275) (0.108) (0.186) (0.087) (0.134) 
High Tech Target 0.129 0.068 -1.996 -1.560 -0.008 0.059 
  (0.754) (0.380) (-1.626) (-1.213) (-0.034) (0.254) 
Same State -0.014 0.030 0.580 0.127 -0.211* -0.312** 
  (-0.164) (0.375) (0.738) (0.143) (-1.793) (-2.420) 
Same Industry 0.104 0.108 1.517 1.578 0.116 0.046 
  (1.338) (1.197) (1.623) (1.503) (1.110) (0.462) 
State Income Growth 7.228* 10.982** -39.722 -47.888 -4.438 1.467 
 (1.765) (2.626) (-1.651) (-1.394) (-1.441) (0.260) 
Constant -1.089 -2.597*** -16.447*** -17.246*** -0.799 -0.374 
  (-1.561) (-3.533) (-3.455) (-2.847) (-1.536) (-0.444) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
              
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722 
Number of States 46 46 46 46 46 46 
R-squared 0.40 0.45 0.17 0.24 0.11 0.17 
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Table 11: Robustness: Winsorize the Sample at the 10th and 90th percentiles 
Replications of Tables 5 through 9 (in Panels A through F) where the sample is winsorized at the 10 th and 90th percentiles to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is reported.  All specifications 
and variable definitions are the same as the respective tables above.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 LN Deal Value to Sales                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.428** 0.370* 0.547*** 0.524** 0.380* 0.637* 
  (2.639) (1.853) (2.833) (2.146) (1.738) (1.910) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
 LN Private to Public Value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.586** 0.667*** 0.621*** 0.813*** 0.670** 1.290*** 
  (2.551) (2.933) (2.723) (3.570) (2.090) (4.891) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 431 431 295 295 156 156 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -2.857 -2.643 -5.678*** -6.976*** -8.502*** -11.416*** 
  (-1.521) (-1.401) (-3.304) (-5.244) (-3.600) (-5.964) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.322** -0.269 -0.463*** -0.435*** -0.652** -0.920*** 
  (-2.260) (-1.636) (-3.011) (-3.207) (-2.473) (-3.594) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.677** 0.400* 0.534** 0.516**   
  (2.285) (1.892) (2.122) (2.175)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 557 557 383 383   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.116** 0.595* 1.417*** 0.463**   
  (2.289) (1.904) (3.246) (2.050)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 431 431 295 295   
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Table 12 : Robustness: Exclude Private Targets Headquartered in California 
Replications of Tables 5 through 9 (in Panels A through F) where deals with private targets headquartered in the state of California 
are excluded from the sample.  Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is reported.  All specifications 
and variable definitions are the same as the respective tables above.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.529** 0.488* 0.739** 0.746** 0.531 0.775* 
  (2.525) (1.764) (2.097) (2.477) (1.572) (1.927) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 462 462 325 325 172 172 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.536** 0.682** 0.672** 0.975** 0.863* 1.574*** 
  (2.099) (2.150) (2.274) (2.232) (2.012) (3.776) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 349 349 244 244 129 129 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -2.684 -2.836 -6.156*** -7.876*** -9.280*** -11.786*** 
  (-1.224) (-1.512) (-3.056) (-4.049) (-3.669) (-3.972) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 462 462 325 325 172 172 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.356 -0.104 -0.390 -0.055 -0.577** -0.852*** 
  (-1.138) (-0.327) (-1.073) (-0.166) (-2.148) (-3.671) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 462 462 325 325 172 172 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.485 0.503 0.540* 0.608***   
  (1.259) (1.482) (1.821) (2.875)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 462 462 325 325   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.151* 0.909** 1.915*** 0.911***   
  (1.864) (2.081) (3.346) (2.941)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 349 349 244 244   
 
 
56 
 
 
Table 13: Robustness: Exclude Private Targets Located in States Very Likely to Deregulate or Not 
Replications of Tables 5 through 9 (in Panels A through F) where 112 deals in states that were very likely to deregulate or not 
(AZ, CA, AR, IA) are excluded from the sample.  Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is reported.  
All specifications and variable definitions are the same as the respective tables above.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  T-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 LN Deal Value to Sales                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.618** 0.604* 0.849** 0.752** 0.769** 0.699* 
  (2.533) (1.899) (2.463) (2.065) (2.724) (1.767) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 445 445 311 311 162 162 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
 LN Private to Public Value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.586** 0.805** 0.639* 0.892* 1.086** 1.433*** 
  (2.304) (2.596) (1.996) (2.007) (2.588) (4.008) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 334 334 232 232 121 121 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -4.260** -4.541** -6.967*** -7.892*** -11.021*** -12.693*** 
  (-2.118) (-2.571) (-3.194) (-4.063) (-4.190) (-4.475) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 445 445 311 311 162 162 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.418 -0.112 -0.521 -0.066 -0.766*** -0.939*** 
  (-1.086) (-0.316) (-1.254) (-0.209) (-2.850) (-4.821) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 445 445 311 311 162 162 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.496 0.449 0.667** 0.620**   
  (1.229) (1.222) (2.245) (2.674)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 445 445 311 311   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.204* 0.983** 1.970*** 1.002***   
  (1.901) (2.066) (3.411) (3.220)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 334 334 232 232   
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Appendix B: Supplemental Results  
  
 This appendix presents univariate and multivariate tests.  The tables in Appendix B are numbered 
B-1, B-2, B-3, etc.  Tables B-1 and B-2 present univariate tests.  This includes an examination of how 
deal characteristics change from before to after deregulation and an examination of the likelihood of a 
sellout before and after deregulation. 
 Tables B-3 through B-8 examine the influence of outliers in the data.  This includes transforming 
dependent variables into a ranked value (e.g., 1 for the lowest value, 2 for the second lowest value, …, 
557 for the highest value), trimming the sample by deleting observations below the 1
st
 percentile and 
above the 99
th
 percentile, trimming the sample by deleting observations below the 5
th
 percentile and above 
the 95
th
 percentile, trimming the sample by deleting observations below the 10
th
 percentile and above the 
90
th
 percentile, estimating regressions to the median, and estimating regressions to the 75
th
 percentile.            
 Tables B-9 through B-12 examine whether or not the results are driven by deals in states which 
are likely to deregulate.  In the first three tables, I exclude from the sample deals located in states which 
are likely to deregulate or not.  The cutoff for likely to deregulate or not in various tables is: the eight 
states with the most extreme predicted value of deregulation (4 deregulating states with the highest 
likelihood of deregulation and 4 non-deregulating states with the lowest likelihood of deregulation), the 
twelve states with the most extreme predicted value of deregulation (6 deregulating states with the highest 
likelihood of deregulation and 6 non-deregulating states with the lowest likelihood of deregulation), the 
top six states with the most extreme predicted value of deregulation (regardless of whether the state 
deregulates or not).  In the fourth table, I create a dummy variable for deals in deregulating states with a 
high likelihood of deregulation (based on a state-level cutoff which roughly divides deals in deregulating 
states into two equal groups) and examine whether the effects of IBBEA are greater for deals in these 
states versus states with a low likelihood of deregulation. 
 Tables B-13 through B-22 examine other robustness issues. This includes measuring Relative Size 
as target sales divided by acquirer sales, measuring acquirer returns over the (-2,+2), alternative 
calculations of LN Private to Public Value, imposing a Relative Size cutoff of 5%, imposing a Relative 
Size cutoff of 10%, sub-samples based on private firm sales, interacting Dereg State x After with a 
dummy variable that indicates changes in out-of-state bank deposits, measuring deregulation at a finer 
level (relaxing 1, 2, 3 or 4 restrictions), and examining which components of deregulation are the most 
important (Deposit Cap, De Novo, Single Branch Acquisitions, Age). 
 Tables B-23 and B-24 examine samples of public targets.  First, I show that IBBEA did not have 
a differential effect on small versus large public targets.  Second, I pool public and private targets and 
show that the effects of IBBEA are significantly greater for private targets than public targets.  
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Outline of Tables in Appendix B: 
 
Table  Description 
Univariate tests 
B-1 Univariate Tests: Differences in firm characteristics 
B-2 Likelihood of sellout 
  
Tests to examine the influence of outliers 
B-3 Dependent variable is a ranked version of the underlying variable 
B-4 Trimmed sample: delete observations below 1
st
 percentile & above 99
th
 percentile 
B-5 Trimmed sample: delete observations below 5
th
 percentile & above 95
th
 percentile 
B-6 Trimmed sample: delete observations below 10
th
 percentile & above 90
th
 percentile 
B-7 Regression to Median  
B-8 Regression to 75
th
 percentile 
  
Analysis of deals in states which are likely to deregulate or not 
B-9 Exclude targets in 8 states; 4 deregulating states and 4 non-deregulating states 
B-10 Exclude targets in 12 states; 6 deregulating states and 6 non-deregulating states 
B-11 Exclude targets in the 6 states most likely to deregulate 
B-12 Divide deregulating states into high and low likelihood of deregulating 
  
Other tests 
B-13 Examine impact of relaxing 1, 2, 3, or 4 restrictions 
B-14 Examine impact of relaxing specific components (Deposit Cap, etc.) 
B-15 Relative Size measured as target sales divided by acquirer sales 
B-16 Acquirer CAR measured of (-2,+2) day window 
B-17 Divide sample based on Small vs. Large 
B-18 Impose Relative Size cutoff at 5% and 10% level 
B-19 Robustness on matching procedure for LN Private to Public Value 
B-20 Include three-digit SIC code industry dummies 
B-21 Interaction with dummy for change in out-of-state bank deposits 
B-22 Dependent variable is inverse of the ratio measure 
  
Public targets 
B-23 Public Targets, interact with Small 
B-24 Public Targets and Private Targets pooled together, interact with Private 
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Table B-1: Univariate Analysis 
This table shows the mean and median of various variables and the univariate difference-in-differences of the mean.  Variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  A t-test is conducted to examine whether the means are significantly different and the p-value is reported. 
Sellouts in  
Deregulating States 
Before Response to IBBEA 
 
After Response to IBBEA 
    
 
N Mean Median   N Mean Median   
Diff in 
Mean p-value   
Sales 159 173.23 104.20   311 137.51 62.26   -35.72 0.11   
Relative Size 159 0.33 0.17   311 0.33 0.16   0.00 0.86   
All Cash 159 0.31 0.00   311 0.27 0.00   -0.04 0.28   
LN Acq Mkt Value 159 6.70 6.61   311 6.67 6.59   -0.03 0.82   
High Tech Target 159 0.25 0.00   311 0.35 0.00   0.10 0.02 ** 
Same State 159 0.16 0.00   311 0.21 0.00   0.05 0.18   
Same Industry 159 0.31 0.00   311 0.31 0.00   0.00 0.95   
State Income Growth 159 0.01 0.01   311 0.02 0.02   0.01 0.00 *** 
 
Sellouts in  
Non-Deregulating States 
Before Response to IBBEA 
 
After Response to IBBEA 
     
 
N Mean Median   N Mean Median   
Diff in 
Mean p-value   
Sales 23 211.52 54.29   64 141.25 82.96   -70.27 0.40   
Relative Size 23 0.45 0.26   64 0.42 0.21   -0.03 0.83   
All Cash 23 0.26 0.00   64 0.34 0.00   0.08 0.47   
LN Acq Mkt Value 23 6.40 6.46   64 6.56 6.39   0.16 0.66   
High Tech Target 23 0.13 0.00   64 0.19 0.00   0.06 0.54   
Same State 23 0.13 0.00   64 0.16 0.00   0.03 0.77   
Same Industry 23 0.52 1.00   64 0.44 0.00   -0.08 0.49   
State Income Growth 23 0.01 0.00   64 0.02 0.03   0.01 0.00 *** 
            
         
Diff in  
Diff p-value  
Sales          -34.55 0.68   
Relative Size          -0.03 0.87   
All Cash          0.12 0.27   
LN Acq Mkt Value          0.19 0.62   
High Tech Target          -0.04 0.59   
Same State          -0.02 0.78   
Same Industry          -0.08 0.53   
State Income Growth          0.00 0.59  
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Table B-2: Likelihood of a sellout 
This tables shows the likelihood of a sellout.  For each state and each year, I calculate the number of sellouts per 100,000 firms in the state.  
The annual number of firms includes those with one to 499 employees, as provided by the Census, and is lagged one year.  Then, I average 
the proportion of sellouts for the three years before deregulation.  I also average the proportion of sellouts over the three years following 
deregulation.  I report the average and median number of sellouts to firms in the state before and after deregulation, as well as the change. I 
also report t-stats for whether the average change is statistically significant and a t-stat for the difference in differences.    
    Before   After   Change   
   N Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median t-stat 
Dereg State = 0 12 0.59 0.30   1.75 1.38   1.16 1.11 3.36 
                      
Dereg State = 1 31 1.43 1.41   2.22 1.94   0.79 0.51 2.56 
           
Difference in Differences              0.33   0.69 
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Legend for Tables B-3 through B-8 
The set-up in Tables B-3 through B-8 is as follows.  The sample is 557 sellouts from 1992 to 2000.  Only the coefficient on 
Dereg State x After or Dereg State x After x Small is reported.  The dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in Panel A, LN 
Private to Public in Panel B, Acquirer CAR in Panel C, and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value in Panel D.  If Panels E and F are 
presented, the dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in Panel E and LN Private to Public in Panel F.  The first two 
columns of each panel present results from the sample of sellouts announced three years before to three years after the state’s 
response to IBBEA.  In the third and fourth (fifth and sixth) columns, sellouts are announced two years (one year) before to two 
years (one year) after the state’s response to IBBEA.   LN Deal Value to Sales is the natural logarithm of SDC deal value divided 
by the target's annual sales.  LN Private to Public Value is the natural logarithm of the deal value-to-sales ratio of the private 
target divided by the average deal value-to-sales ratio of matched public targets.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average 
abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average 
abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC deal value.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated interstate bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  Small is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the target has below median sales ($73.16 million) and zero otherwise.  Each regression includes the 
control variables Relative Size, All Cash, Acquirer Market Value, High Tech Target, Same State, Same Industry, and State Income 
Growth.  Variables are defined in Appendix A.  Every regression includes year fixed effects and industry (two-digit SIC code) 
fixed effects. State fixed effects are included where indicated.  T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels.   
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Table B-3 Ranked Dependent Variables 
In this table, the dependent variable is a ranked transformation of LN Deal Value to Sales, LN Private to Public Value, Acquirer CAR, 
or Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value. To create RANK(LN Deal Value to Sales), the data are sorted by (non-winsorized) LN Deal Value to 
Sales.  RANK(LN Deal Value to Sales)=1 for the observation with the smallest value and RANK(LN Deal Value to Sales)=557 for the 
observation with the largest value.  The other dependent variables are transformed analogously.   
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is RANK(LN Deal Value to Sales)               
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 65.164** 50.591 87.283** 75.989* 43.379 85.217 
  (2.512) (1.657) (2.609) (1.948) (1.160) (1.546) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is RANK(LN Private to Public Value) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 67.194** 69.761** 79.795*** 98.652*** 67.583* 151.245*** 
  (2.513) (2.384) (3.046) (3.615) (1.995) (4.592) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 431 431 295 295 156 156 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is RANK(Acquirer CAR)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -55.102 -51.241 -106.323*** -124.354*** -160.251*** -218.083*** 
  (-1.608) (-1.622) (-3.414) (-4.752) (-3.963) (-6.223) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is RANK(Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -74.965** -66.455 -125.875*** -130.879*** -168.745*** -233.431*** 
  (-2.093) (-1.620) (-3.420) (-3.426) (-2.862) (-5.357) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is RANK(LN Deal Value to Sales)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 81.927* 62.534** 43.979 68.919**   
  (1.920) (2.384) (1.308) (2.412)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 557 557 383 383   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is RANK(LN Private to Public Value)  
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 110.389* 76.128** 140.474** 56.371**   
  (1.901) (2.174) (2.597) (2.438)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 431 431 295 295   
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Table B-4: Trimmed sample: delete observations below 1st percentile and above 99th percentile 
In this table, the data are trimmed to exclude observations with extreme values of the dependent variable.  The sample is slightly 
different in each panel, as the data are trimmed based on extreme values of the dependent variable.  For example, in Panel A, the 
sample excludes all observations where LN Deal Value to Sales is below the value of the 1st percentile or above the value of the 
99th percentile.  In Panel B, the sample excludes all observations where LN Private to Public Value  is below the value of the 1st 
percentile or above the value of the 99th percentile.  The data are trimmed in a similar fashion for the other panels.    
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.567*** 0.475* 0.689** 0.674* 0.507 0.886* 
  (2.724) (1.814) (2.505) (1.936) (1.567) (1.766) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 545 545 376 376 201 201 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.682** 0.817*** 0.830*** 1.119** 0.803** 1.839*** 
  (2.655) (2.757) (2.948) (2.611) (2.550) (4.793) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 426 426 293 293 154 154 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -2.784 -3.090* -6.384*** -7.743*** -9.743*** -12.167*** 
  (-1.384) (-1.770) (-3.615) (-5.073) (-4.336) (-6.136) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 551 551 379 379 200 200 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.509* -0.263 -0.553* -0.191 -0.733* -1.031*** 
  (-1.832) (-0.977) (-1.811) (-0.807) (-1.941) (-3.117) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 551 551 380 380 202 202 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.672** 0.589** 0.553* 0.576***   
  (2.138) (2.374) (1.959) (3.040)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 545 545 376 376   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.051* 0.816** 1.618*** 0.721***   
  (1.758) (2.042) (2.871) (2.778)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 426 426 293 293   
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Table B-5: Trimmed sample: delete observations below 5th percentile and above 95th percentile 
In this table, the data are trimmed to exclude observations with extreme values of the dependent variable.  The sample is slightly 
different in each panel, as the data are trimmed based on extreme values of the dependent variable.  For example, in Panel A, the 
sample excludes all observations where LN Deal Value to Sales is below the value of the 5th percentile or above the value of the 
95th percentile.  In Panel B, the sample excludes all observations where LN Private to Public Value  is below the value of the 5th 
percentile or above the value of the 95th percentile.  The data are trimmed in a similar fashion for the other panels.    
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.389** 0.334 0.493** 0.505 0.358 0.668 
  (2.023) (1.432) (2.190) (1.651) (1.449) (1.520) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 501 501 350 350 187 187 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.470* 0.456 0.485* 0.527* 0.341 0.798 
  (1.860) (1.548) (1.774) (1.731) (0.709) (1.560) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 389 389 272 272 143 143 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -3.049 -2.794 -5.056*** -6.571*** -7.363*** -10.178*** 
  (-1.544) (-1.295) (-2.794) (-4.487) (-2.935) (-5.761) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 503 503 347 347 185 185 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.254 -0.371 -0.425* -0.652*** -0.571* -0.985*** 
  (-1.408) (-1.599) (-1.998) (-3.060) (-1.734) (-3.755) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 502 502 348 348 185 185 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.738* 0.495 0.600* 0.650*   
  (2.001) (1.585) (1.859) (1.909)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 501 501 350 350   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.769** 0.266 0.699 0.264   
  (2.158) (1.183) (1.590) (0.959)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 389 389 272 272   
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Table B-6: Trimmed sample: delete observations below 10th percentile and above 90th percentile 
In this table, the data are trimmed to exclude observations with extreme values of the dependent variable.  The sample is slightly 
different in each panel, as the data are trimmed based on extreme values of the dependent variable.  For example, in Panel A, the 
sample excludes all observations where LN Deal Value to Sales is below the value of the 10th percentile or above the value of the 
90th percentile.  In Panel B, the sample excludes all observations where LN Private to Public Value  is below the value of the 10th 
percentile or above the value of the 90th percentile.  The data are trimmed in a similar fashion for the other panels.    
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.310** 0.230 0.355** 0.327 0.197 0.224 
  (2.666) (1.584) (2.394) (1.587) (1.051) (0.845) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 446 446 310 310 166 166 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.525** 0.570** 0.738*** 0.871*** 0.536 0.858* 
  (2.674) (2.267) (3.461) (3.144) (1.271) (1.895) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 344 344 243 243 127 127 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -3.068 -3.788*** -4.370** -6.461*** -6.631* -11.257*** 
  (-1.646) (-2.775) (-2.067) (-5.576) (-1.853) (-4.312) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 446 446 307 307 162 162 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.078 -0.140 -0.279** -0.500*** -0.285* -0.515*** 
  (-0.678) (-1.134) (-2.044) (-3.949) (-1.910) (-2.911) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 447 447 313 313 168 168 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.524* 0.390 0.282 0.492   
  (1.961) (1.374) (0.964) (1.323)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 446 446 310 310   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.275*** 0.390* 1.407*** 0.532**   
  (3.890) (1.975) (3.362) (2.083)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 344 344 243 243   
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Table B-7: Regression to the median 
This table presents results from quantile regressions to the median.  The estimation is performed with the command “bsqreg” in 
Stata.  Standard errors are calculated by boot-strapping and the number of replications is set to 100.   
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.403 0.163 0.632 0.415 0.275 0.362 
  (1.110) (0.471) (1.569) (0.955) (0.489) (0.482) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 1.057* 0.856 1.209** 1.328* 0.808 0.775 
  (1.950) (1.306) (2.128) (1.713) (0.986) (0.620) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 431 431 295 295 156 156 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -3.639 -0.879 -9.592** -9.394 -10.631 -9.731 
  (-0.787) (-0.194) (-1.985) (-1.601) (-1.315) (-1.008) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.042 -0.168 -0.469* -0.417 -0.491 -0.355 
  (0.238) (-0.786) (-1.911) (-1.280) (-0.931) (-0.460) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
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Table B-8: Regression to the 75th percentile 
This table presents results from quantile regressions to the 75th percentile.  The estimation is performed with the command 
“bsqreg” in Stata.  Standard errors are calculated by boot-strapping and the number of replications is set to 100.   
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.687 0.592 0.876** 0.557 1.112 0.945 
  (1.611) (1.435) (1.985) (0.938) (1.534) (1.074) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.703 1.381** 1.279 1.135 0.556 3.918** 
  (1.138) (2.044) (1.505) (1.097) (0.467) (2.498) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 431 431 295 295 156 156 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -2.914 -2.384 -10.590** -9.823 -5.058 -11.347 
  (-0.544) (-0.412) (-2.093) (-1.493) (-0.578) (-1.011) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.019 -0.224 -0.431 -0.433 -0.426 -0.782 
  (-0.076) (-0.825) (-1.032) (-0.957) (-0.996) (-1.062) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
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Legend for Tables B-9 through B-12 
The set-up in Tables B-9 through B-12 is as follows.  The sample is 557 sellouts from 1992 to 2000.  From this sample, I identify 
deals in states which are likely to deregulate or not.  In Tables B-9 through B-11, I exclude deals in states which are likely to 
deregulate or not using different criteria in each table.  In Table B-12, I create indicators for deals in deregulating states which are 
likely to deregulate or not.  Only the coefficient(s) of interest are reported.  The dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in 
Panel A, LN Private to Public in Panel B, Acquirer CAR in Panel C, and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value in Panel D.  If Panels E 
and F are presented, the dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in Panel E and LN Private to Public in Panel F.  In Tables 
B-9 through B-11, the first two columns of each panel present results from the sample of sellouts announced three years before to 
three years after the state’s response to IBBEA.  In the third and fourth (fifth and sixth) columns, sellouts are announced two 
years (one year) before to two years (one year) after the state’s response to IBBEA. In Table B-12, the window of sellouts is 
indicated.  LN Deal Value to Sales is the natural logarithm of SDC deal value divided by the target's annual sales.  LN Private to 
Public Value is the natural logarithm of the deal value-to-sales ratio of the private target divided by the average deal value-to-
sales ratio of matched public targets.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) 
window.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of 
equity divided by SDC deal value.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated 
interstate bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  Small is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target has below median 
sales ($73.16 million) and zero otherwise.  Each regression includes the control variables Relative Size, All Cash, Acquirer 
Market Value, High Tech Target, Same State, Same Industry, and State Income Growth.  Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Every regression includes year fixed effects and industry (two-digit SIC code) fixed effects. State fixed effects are included 
where indicated.  T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
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Table B-9: Exclude deals in 8 states which are likely to deregulate or not  
In this table, the sample excludes deals in eight states which are likely to deregulate or not.  The eight states are the four 
deregulating states with the highest likelihood of deregulation and four non-deregulating states with the lowest likelihood of 
deregulation. 
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.549** 0.604* 0.730** 0.739* 0.639** 0.728* 
  (2.485) (1.887) (2.246) (2.023) (2.212) (1.882) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 432 432 304 304 158 158 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.548** 0.789** 0.551 0.855* 0.908** 1.422*** 
  (2.053) (2.529) (1.612) (1.899) (2.322) (3.853) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 344 344 243 243 127 127 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -2.887* -4.367** -5.650*** -7.608*** -10.395*** -12.426*** 
  (-1.694) (-2.469) (-3.217) (-3.837) (-4.049) (-4.510) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 432 432 304 304 158 158 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.190 -0.057 -0.276 0.023 -0.792*** -0.929*** 
  (-0.528) (-0.157) (-0.733) (0.070) (-2.804) (-4.759) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 432 432 304 304 158 158 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.395 0.318 0.741** 0.596**   
  (1.049) (0.825) (2.434) (2.463)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 432 432 304 304   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.269* 1.006* 2.214*** 1.031***   
  (1.951) (1.802) (3.796) (3.069)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 323 323 225 225   
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Table B-10: Exclude deals in 12 states which are likely to deregulate or not  
In this table, the sample excludes deals in twelve states which are likely to deregulate or not.  The twelve states are the six 
deregulating states with the highest likelihood of deregulation and the six non-deregulating states with the lowest likelihood of 
deregulation. 
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.517** 0.565* 0.732* 0.726 0.836*** 1.092*** 
  (2.112) (1.752) (1.822) (1.675) (2.804) (2.952) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 406 406 283 283 144 144 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.510 0.734** 0.519 0.868 1.119*** 1.552*** 
  (1.684) (2.195) (1.299) (1.677) (3.341) (3.966) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 304 304 210 210 108 108 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -1.942 -4.398** -4.278** -7.530*** -8.746*** -12.093*** 
  (-1.192) (-2.270) (-2.380) (-3.486) (-3.333) (-3.865) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 406 406 283 283 144 144 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.014 0.031 0.046 0.210 -0.433* -0.901*** 
  (0.041) (0.083) (0.140) (0.745) (-1.776) (-5.069) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 406 406 283 283 144 144 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.443 0.397 0.790** 0.689**   
  (1.230) (0.967) (2.449) (2.745)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 406 406 283 283   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.264* 1.086* 2.229*** 1.120***   
  (1.889) (1.971) (3.655) (3.105)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 304 304 210 210   
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Table B-11: Exclude deals in 6 states which are likely to deregulate or not  
In this table, the sample excludes deals in six states which are likely to deregulate or not.  The six states are identified without 
regard to whether they are deregulating states or not.  It turns out that all six states are deregulating states. 
 Panel A: Replicate Table 5, dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.582** 0.544* 0.800** 0.776** 0.552 0.770* 
  (2.403) (1.784) (2.318) (2.067) (1.601) (1.762) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 427 427 297 297 154 154 
              
 Panel B: Replicate Table 6, dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After 0.547** 0.694** 0.625* 0.908* 0.883** 1.580*** 
  (2.092) (2.095) (1.940) (1.941) (2.133) (4.241) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 320 320 221 221 115 115 
              
Panel C: Replicate Table 7, dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -3.294 -3.423* -6.373*** -8.082*** -9.544*** -12.896*** 
  (-1.451) (-1.789) (-2.803) (-4.075) (-3.653) (-4.220) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 427 427 297 297 154 154 
              
Panel D: Replicate Table 8, dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.428 -0.145 -0.444 -0.086 -0.576** -0.934*** 
  (-1.287) (-0.424) (-1.163) (-0.267) (-2.078) (-4.827) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 427 427 297 297 154 154 
              
Panel E: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (1) through (4), dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small 0.694 0.601 0.777** 0.725***   
  (1.675) (1.653) (2.616) (3.082)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 427 427 297 297   
              
Panel F: Replicate Table 9, Panel A, Columns (5) through (8), dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
  (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Dereg State x After x Small 1.334** 1.081** 2.135*** 1.123***   
  (2.181) (2.407) (3.740) (3.625)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 320 320 221 221   
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Table B-12: Indicators for deals in states which are highly likely to deregulate or not  
In this table, the sample includes all 557 sellouts.  Deals located in deregulating states are classified into two groups: High 
Likelihood of Deregulating State and Low Likelihood of Deregulating State.  The cutoff is at the state level and is such that the 
number of deals in each group is roughly equivalent.  For each regression, I also present the p-value from an F-test where the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficient on Low Likelihood of Deregulating State x After is equal to the coefficient on High Likelihood of 
Deregulating State x After.  
 Panel A: Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
    (1) (2) (3)  
Window   +/-3 +/-2 +/-1  
Low Likelihood of Deregulating State x After 0.566* 0.689* 0.803  
    (1.999) (1.722) (1.636)  
High Likelihood of Deregulating State x After 0.522* 0.823** 1.023*  
    (1.748) (2.112) (1.958)  
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes  
Observations   557 383 203  
p-value from F-test; null is that coefficients are equal 0.846 0.509 0.526   
       
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
    (1) (2) (3)  
Window   +/-3 +/-2 +/-1  
Low Likelihood of Deregulating State x After 0.932*** 1.189** 1.676***  
    (3.028) (2.702) (3.920)  
High Likelihood of Deregulating State x After 0.742* 1.092** 1.921***  
   (1.991) (2.236) (3.333)  
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes  
Observations   431 295 156  
p-value from F-test; null is that coefficients are equal 0.572 0.773 0.671  
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
    (1) (2) (3)  
Window   +/-3 +/-2 +/-1  
Low Likelihood of Deregulating State x After -3.172 -8.357*** -11.740***  
    (-1.465) (-4.862) (-3.208)  
High Likelihood of Deregulating State x After -3.419* -7.400*** -12.724***  
   (-1.725) (-4.025) (-4.489)  
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes  
Observations   557 383 203  
p-value from F-test; null is that coefficients are equal 0.906 0.624 0.850  
              
Panel D:Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
    (1) (2) (3)  
Window   +/-3 +/-2 +/-1  
Low Likelihood of Deregulating State x After -0.210 -0.124 -0.473  
    (-0.672) (-0.447) (-1.224)  
High Likelihood of Deregulating State x After -0.347 -0.250 -1.409***  
   (-1.313) (-1.032) (-3.608)  
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes  
Observations   557 383 203  
p-value from F-test; null is that coefficients are equal 0.580 0.572 0.103  
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Legend for Tables B-13 through B-22 
The set-up in Tables B-13 through B-22 is as follows.  The sample is 557 sellouts from 1992 to 2000.  Only the coefficients of 
interest are reported.   The dependent variable and window for sellouts are given in the table.  LN Deal Value to Sales is the 
natural logarithm of SDC deal value divided by the target's annual sales.  LN Private to Public Value is the natural logarithm of 
the deal value-to-sales ratio of the private target divided by the average deal value-to-sales ratio of matched public targets.  
Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal 
Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC deal value.  
Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target's state has deregulated interstate bank branching laws at the 
time of the sellout.  Small is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target has below median sales ($73.16 million) and zero 
otherwise.  Each regression includes the control variables Relative Size, All Cash, Acquirer Market Value, High Tech Target, 
Same State, Same Industry, and State Income Growth.  Variables are defined in Appendix A.  Every regression includes year 
fixed effects and industry (two-digit SIC code) fixed effects. State fixed effects are included where indicated.  T-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
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Table B-13: Different measurement of deregulation; relax 1, 2, 3, or 4 restrictions 
In this table, I define deregulation at a more granular level.  I decompose the variable Dereg into dummy variables which 
indicate whether deregulating states relaxed 1, 2, 3, or 4 restrictions when initially responding to IBBEA.  Note that the variable 
Dereg is a linear combination of these four indicator variables.  Non-deregulating states relaxed 0 restrictions.  These indicator 
variables are then interacted with After.  In Panel A (B), sellouts are announced three (two) years before to three (two) years 
after the state responded to IBBEA.  
Panel A: +/-3 year window       
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Window   +/-3 +/-3 +/-3 +/-3 
Dependent Variable   
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Private to 
Public Value 
Acquirer 
CAR 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Relax 4 Restrictions  x After 0.168 -0.039 -2.727 -0.092 
 
(0.612) (-0.105) (-1.169) (-0.316) 
Relax 3 Restrictions  x After 0.882** 0.870*** -5.565** -0.156 
 (2.375) (3.111) (-2.565) (-0.317) 
Relax 2 Restrictions  x After 0.761** 0.796*** -3.249 -0.326 
 (2.605) (2.793) (-1.415) (-0.681) 
Relax 1 Restriction x After 0.604** 1.236*** -3.252 -0.415 
 (2.241) (4.865) (-1.528) (-1.485) 
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   557 431 557 557 
       
 
Panel B: +/-2 year window       
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Window   +/-2 +/-2 +/-2 +/-2 
Dependent Variable   
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Private to 
Public Value 
Acquirer 
CAR 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Relax 4 Restrictions  x After 0.477 0.401 -8.359*** -0.109 
 
(1.489) (0.919) (-4.862) (-0.402) 
Relax 3 Restrictions  x After 0.969** 1.201** -9.491*** -0.133 
 (2.316) (2.613) (-3.266) (-0.361) 
Relax 2 Restrictions  x After 1.050** 0.563 -4.052 0.318 
 (2.608) (1.175) (-1.079) (0.800) 
Relax 1 Restriction x After 0.759* 1.432*** -7.613*** -0.326 
 (1.986) (3.580) (-3.976) (-1.163) 
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   383 295 383 383 
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Table B-14: Examination of components of deregulation 
In this table, I decompose the variable Dereg into dummy variables which indicate the specific laws which the state deregulated.  
All states deregulated by relaxing restrictions on deposit caps (Deposit Cap Only = 1).  Some states deregulated by relaxing all 
four restrictions allowed by IBBEA (Totally Open = 1).  Some states deregulated by relaxing restrictions on deposit caps plus 
one or two aditional restrictions (Deposit Cap Plus = 1).  Note that Dereg is a linear combination of Deposit Cap Only, Deposit 
Cap Plus, and Totally Open.  I then interact these three indicator variables with After.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Window   +/-2 +/-2 +/-2 +/-2 
Dependent Variable   
LN Deal Value 
to Sales 
LN Private to 
Public Value 
Acquirer 
CAR 
Acquirer Wealth 
to Deal Value 
Deposit Only  x After 0.763* 1.443*** -7.692*** -0.329 
 
(1.934) (3.471) (-4.014) (-1.174) 
Deposit Plus  x After 1.010** 0.715* -4.689 0.388 
 (2.637) (1.789) (-1.642) (1.160) 
Totally Open  x After 0.611* 0.683 -9.002*** -0.189 
 (1.709) (1.369) (-5.279) (-0.792) 
After -0.558 -1.061** 0.664 -0.085 
 (-1.303) (-2.047) (0.250) (-0.238) 
State Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   383 295 383 383 
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Table B-15: Measure Relative Size as target sales divided by acquirer sales 
In this table, I present estimation results from replications of regressions in Tables 5 through 8 where Relative Size is defined as 
the ratio of target sales to acquirer sales. In columns (1) and (2), the window for sellouts is +/-3 years around the response to 
IBBEA and in columns (3) and (4), the window for sellouts is +/- 2 years around the response to IBBEA.   
 Panel A: Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After 0.490** 0.455* 0.602** 0.634*   
  (2.594) (1.717) (2.383) (1.825)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 556 556 382 382   
              
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After 0.602** 0.753** 0.603* 0.954**   
  (2.278) (2.592) (1.977) (2.202)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 431 431 295 295   
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After -2.541 -2.961 -6.154*** -7.598***   
  (-1.271) (-1.639) (-3.575) (-5.208)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 556 556 382 382   
              
Panel D: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After -0.479* -0.264 -0.549* -0.189   
  (-1.817) (-0.998) (-1.780) (-0.774)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 556 556 382 382   
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Table B-16: Measure Acquirer CAR over (-2,+2) window 
In this table, I measure acquirer abnormal returns over the (-2,+2) day window surrounding the announcement of the sellout.  The 
variables Acquirer CAR and Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value are recalculated using this definition of acquirer returns.  Panel A 
replicates Table 7 and Panel B replicates Table 8 using this alternative measure of acquirer returns.  The first two columns of each 
panel present results from the sample of sellouts announced three years before to three years after the state’s response to IBBEA.  
In the third and fourth (fifth and sixth) columns, sellouts are announced two years (one year) before to two years (one year) after 
the state’s response to IBBEA.    
 Panel A: Dependent Variable is Acquirer CAR (-2,+2)                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -1.841 -2.021 -3.792** -5.134*** -3.788* -6.207*** 
  (-0.916) (-1.083) (-2.204) (-3.301) (-1.976) (-3.760) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
              
 Panel B: Dependent Variable is Acquirer Wealth (-2,+2) to Deal Value                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After -0.390* -0.319 -0.522** -0.381** -0.451* -0.746*** 
  (-2.001) (-1.505) (-2.134) (-2.053) (-1.879) (-2.840) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 557 557 383 383 203 203 
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Table B-17: Sub-Samples of Small vs. Large 
In this table, I divide the sample of deals based on Small.  The sample includes 383 sellouts announced from two years before to 
two years after the target’s state responded to IBBEA.   
 Panel A: Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Sub-sample Small Large  Small  Large  
Dereg State x After 0.784** 0.147  0.889* 0.178  
  (2.735) (0.754)  (2.016) (0.681)  
State Fixed Effects No No  Yes Yes  
Observations 187 196  187 196  
              
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4)  
Sub-sample Small Large  Small  Large  
Dereg State x After 1.214*** -0.616*  1.871*** -0.299  
  (3.345) (-1.703)  (6.027) (-0.470)  
State Fixed Effects No No  Yes Yes  
Observations 160 135  160 135  
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Sub-sample Small Large  Small  Large  
Dereg State x After -5.626** -5.467**  -9.890** -8.856***  
  (-2.128) (-2.038)  (-2.603) (-3.898)  
State Fixed Effects No No  Yes Yes  
Observations 187 196 
 
187 196  
              
Panel D: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4)  
Sub-sample Small Large  Small  Large  
Dereg State x After -0.566 -1.141**  -0.474 -0.745  
  (-1.075) (-2.231)  (-0.757) (-1.471)  
State Fixed Effects No No  Yes Yes  
Observations 187 196  187 196  
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Table B-18: Relative Size cutoff of 5% or 10% 
In this table, I include sellouts which have a Relative Size of 5% (columns (1) and (2)) or 10% (columns (3) and (4)).  The initial 
sample includes 383 sellouts announced from two years before to two years after the target’s state responded to IBBEA.   
 Panel A:Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 Relative Size >=5%   Relative Size >=10% 
   (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dereg State x After 0.750*** 0.823**   0.538** 0.739** 
  (3.542) (2.296)   (2.712) (2.464) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes   No Yes 
Observations 324 324   264 264 
              
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
 Relative Size >=5%   Relative Size >=10% 
   (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dereg State x After 0.754** 1.247**   0.557 1.150** 
  (2.600) (2.373)   (1.590) (2.666) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes   No Yes 
Observations 247 247   197 197 
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
 Relative Size >=5%   Relative Size >=10% 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dereg State x After -6.934*** -12.391***   -7.295** -12.711*** 
  (-2.932) (-6.566)   (-2.479) (-5.290) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes   No Yes 
Observations 324 324   264 264 
              
Panel D: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
 Relative Size >=5%   Relative Size >=10% 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dereg State x After -0.660*** -0.861***   -0.453** -0.741*** 
  (-3.258) (-4.469)   (-2.206) (-5.818) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes   No Yes 
Observations 324 324   264 264 
     continued… 
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 Table B-18, continued             
Panel E: Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales   
 Relative Size >=5%   Relative Size >=10% 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dereg State x After x Small 0.799*** 0.646**   1.844** 0.869** 
  (2.771) (2.594)   (2.584) (2.082) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes   No Yes 
Observations 324 324   247 247 
              
Panel F: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value   
 Relative Size >=5%   Relative Size >=10% 
  (5) (6)   (3) (4) 
Dereg State x After x Small 0.963*** 0.672**   1.927** 1.064** 
  (3.154) (2.644)   (2.398) (2.606) 
State Fixed Effects Yes No   Yes   
Observations 264 264   197 197 
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Table B-19: Robustness on matching procedure for LN Private to Public Value 
In this table, I present results for alternative calculations of LN Private to Public Value. The window for sellouts is 
+/-2 years around the response to IBBEA of the private target’s home state.  In every alternative, the potential 
public target matches include deals with public acquirers who buy (or seek) 100% of the equity of the public target 
and have no toehold in the public target.  In Panel A, potential public target matches include those in both 
successful and unsuccessful deals.  In Panel B, the difference in deal value between the private target and matched 
public target is within +/- 50% and both successful and unsuccessful deals are included.  In Panel C, only public 
targets that are announced within 3 years of their home state’s response to IBBEA are included as potential 
matches.  In addition, the public target deal announcement must be within 1.5 years of the private target deal 
announcement.  In Panel D, the private and public targets have the same Fama French 48 Industry code. 
 Panel A: Successful and unsuccessful public target takeovers 
 
(1) (2)     
Dereg State x After 0.829*** 1.055**     
  (3.171) (2.568)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 305 305     
  
  
        
Panel B: Successful and unsuccessful public target takeovers, deal value within +/-50% 
 
(1) (2)     
Dereg State x After 0.905*** 0.945**     
  (3.023) (2.208)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 350 350     
  
  
        
Panel C: Public targets announced within 3 years of home state response to IBBEA 
 
(1) (2)     
Dereg State x After 1.084*** 1.146***     
  (3.336) (3.026)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 254 254 
 
   
  
  
        
Panel D: Private target and public target in same Fama French 48 industry 
 
(1) (2) 
 
   
Dereg State x After 0.679** 0.906**     
  (2.277) (2.163)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 321 321     
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Table B-20: Include three-digit SIC code industry dummies 
Regressions include three-digit SIC code industry dummies as well as year fixed effects.  There are roughly 140 
industry dummies in each regression.  The window for sellouts is +/-2 years around the response to IBBEA of 
the private target’s home state.   
 Panel A:Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After 0.629*** 0.773**     
  (2.990) (2.528)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 383 383     
              
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
   (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After 0.746* 1.482***     
  (1.700) (4.015)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 295 295     
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After -6.499** -7.107**     
  (-2.590) (-2.291)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 383 383     
              
Panel D: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After -0.480 -0.062     
  (-1.421) (-0.202)     
State Fixed Effects No Yes     
Observations 383 383     
      
 
  
83 
 
Table B-21: Interaction with dummy for change in out-of-state bank deposits 
Top Quartile Change in Out-of-state Bank Deposits is a dummy which equals 1 for deals where the change in 
proportion of deposits held by out-of-state-banks in the private target’s home state is in the top quartile and zero 
otherwise.  The quartile cutoff is based on deal level data, not state level data.  The change is measured from one year 
before to three years after the state’s response to IBBEA.  Data is from the FDIC summary of deposits.  Each 
regression includes all seven variables necessary for the triple interaction, although only two are shown.  The window 
for sellouts is +/-3 (2) years around the private target’s home state’s response to IBBEA in column (1)((2)).   
 Panel A:Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
   (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After x Top Quartile Change in Out-of-state Bank Deposits  1.635*** 2.335***     
  (3.386) (5.170)     
Dereg State x After 0.495** 0.380*     
 (2.506) (1.911)     
State Fixed Effects No No     
Observations 557 383     
              
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Private to Public Value                  
   (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After x Top Quartile Change in Out-of-state Bank Deposits 1.598*** 2.123***     
  (2.785) (3.721)     
Dereg State x After 0.769** 0.666**     
 (2.482) (2.072)     
State Fixed Effects No No     
Observations 431 295     
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After x Top Quartile Change in Out-of-state Bank Deposits -15.854*** -10.442**     
  (-3.601) (-2.513)     
Dereg State x After -0.974 -5.621***     
 (-0.476) (-3.646)     
State Fixed Effects No No     
Observations 557 383     
              
Panel D: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2)     
Dereg State x After x Top Quartile Change in Out-of-state Bank Deposits -1.001** -0.976*     
  (-2.098) (-1.880)     
Dereg State x After -0.314 -0.322     
 (-1.104) (-1.177)     
State Fixed Effects No No     
Observations 557 383     
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Table B-22: Dependent variable is inverse of the ratio measure 
Regressions where the dependent variable is calculated as the inverse of the ratio.  In Panels A and B, the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of Sales to Deal Value.  In Panels C and D, the dependent variable is the matched public target deal value-to-
sales ratio divided by the private target’s deal-value-to-sales ratio.    In columns (1) and (2), the window for sellouts is +/-3 years 
around the response to IBBEA and in columns (3) and (4), the window for sellouts is +/- 2 years around the response to IBBEA.   
 Panel A: Dependent variable is LN Sales to Deal Value                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After -0.596*** -0.535* -0.775** -0.744*   
  (-2.819) (-1.933) (-2.603) (-1.944)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 557 557 383 383   
              
 Panel B: Dependent variable is LN Sales to Deal Value                 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small -0.634* -0.546* -0.588** -0.569***   
  (-1.915) (-1.894) (-2.115) (-3.307)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 557 557 383 383   
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is LN Public to Private Value        
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After -0.740*** -0.852*** -0.856*** -1.138**   
  (-2.902) (-2.801) (-3.092) (-2.621)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 431 431 295 295   
              
Panel D: Dependent variable is LN Public to Private Value        
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dereg State x After x Small -1.135* -0.875** -1.654*** -0.736***   
  (-1.921) (-2.336) (-2.939) (-2.856)   
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes   
Observations 431 431 295 295   
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Legend for Tables B-23 and B-24 
The sample is 722 takeovers of public targets by public acquirers and 577 sellouts from 1992 to 2000.  Only the coefficients of 
interest are reported.   The dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales in Panel A, Acquirer CAR in Panel B, and Acquirer 
Wealth to Deal Value in Panel C.  The first two columns of each panel present results from the sample of sellouts announced 
three years before to three years after the state’s response to IBBEA.  In the third and fourth (fifth and sixth) columns, sellouts are 
announced two years (one year) before to two years (one year) after the state’s response to IBBEA.   LN Deal Value to Sales is 
the natural logarithm of SDC deal value divided by the target's annual sales.  Acquirer CAR is the cumulative average abnormal 
return of the acquirer over the (-5, +5) window.  Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value is the acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal 
return multiplied by the market value of equity divided by SDC deal value.  Dereg State x After is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the target's state has deregulated interstate bank branching laws at the time of the sellout.  Small is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the target has below median sales (calculated separately for public targets and private targets) and zero otherwise.  
Each regression includes the control variables Relative Size, All Cash, Acquirer Market Value, High Tech Target, Same State, 
Same Industry, and State Income Growth.  Variables are defined in Appendix A.  Every regression includes year fixed effects and 
industry (two-digit SIC code) fixed effects. State fixed effects are included where indicated.  T-statistics (in parentheses) are 
calculated based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
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Table B-23: Public targets, interact with small 
The sample is 722 public-public takeovers announced from 1992 to 2000.  The variable of interest is  Dereg State x After x Small.   
 Panel A: Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After x Small 0.392 0.049 0.199 0.089 0.077 -0.170 
  (1.549) (0.271) (0.630) (0.474) (0.131) (-0.485) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 722 722 508 508 247 247 
              
Panel B:Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After x Small 4.278 1.978 8.013 1.419 7.346 3.563 
  (0.785) (1.192) (1.236) (0.444) (1.224) (1.029) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 722 722 508 508 247 247 
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After x Small 0.511 0.280 0.135 -0.195 0.283 -0.350 
  (1.014) (1.180) (0.266) (-0.710) (0.399) (-0.662) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 722 722 508 508 247 247 
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Table B-24: Private and public targets, Interact with dummy for private target 
The sample includes 722 public-public takeovers plus 557 sellouts from 1992 to 2000.  The variable Private is a dummy variable 
that is one for private targets and zero for public targets.   
 Panel A: Dependent variable is LN Deal Value to Sales                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After x Private 0.453** 0.362** 0.894*** 0.565*** 0.808 0.529* 
  (2.041) (2.388) (3.363) (4.332) (1.477) (1.999) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,279 1,279 891 891 450 450 
              
Panel B:Dependent variable is Acquirer CAR        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After x Private -3.033 -1.438 -5.904 -2.828 -11.784** -6.637** 
  (-0.740) (-0.725) (-1.438) (-1.077) (-2.176) (-2.191) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,279 1,279 891 891 450 450 
              
Panel C: Dependent variable is Acquirer Wealth to Deal Value      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dereg State x After x Private -0.552* -0.112 -0.766** -0.105 -1.199** -0.444 
  (-1.781) (-0.595) (-2.543) (-0.511) (-2.548) (-0.867) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,279 1,279 891 891 450 450 
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Abstract 
 
I examine reverse mergers (RMs) as an exit mechanism for private firm owners and compare 
RMs to both IPOs and sellouts to a public acquirer.  I find evidence that information asymmetry 
and product market competition influence the choice among the three exit mechanisms.  RM 
firms are significantly different from IPO firms along observable characteristics.  Also, I find 
that RM firm owners have less wealth following the exit than firm owners of matched IPO firms.  
Together, this evidence suggests that an IPO is not a realistic option for the vast majority of RM 
firms.  In contrast, RM firms are similar to sellout firms along observable characteristics and 
owners of RM firms receive the same, or greater, wealth as owners of comparable sellout firms.  
Thus, a sellout appears to be a viable alternative to a RM for many firms.  I examine whether or 
not RMs generate positive synergy.  I find that synergy is positive, on average, when synergy is 
calculated using valuations of private firms that are inferred from industry multiples of private-
private takeovers.  In contrast, I find that synergy is negative, on average, when synergy is 
calculated using private firm valuations produced by financial advisors to the public firm board 
of directors.  The evidence leads me to conclude that financial advisors produce inflated 
valuations of private firms that mechanically drives down the estimate of synergy.     
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1. Introduction 
 Private firms often gain access to public equity markets when owners exit the firm by 
selling a portion of their stake to other investors.  Two commonly studied exit mechanisms are 
an initial public offering (IPO) and the sale of the firm to a public acquirer (sellout) (see, e.g., 
Ritter and Welch, 2002; Brau, Francis, Kohers, 2003).  A third exit mechanism that has received 
less attention in the literature is a reverse merger (RM).  In a RM, the private firm merges with a 
public firm and the private firm owners control the combined publicly-traded firm.  The public 
firm in a RM is often a defunct operating company or a shell company.
1
   From 1996 to 2010, 
over 2,700 private firms executed a RM (Comment, 2010).  Although the typical RM firm is 
small, some well-known firms have used the RM mechanism such as the New York Stock 
Exchange, Siebert Financial, Jamba Juice, American Apparel, and Summer Infant.   
 Several studies compare RMs to IPOs (Gleason, Jain, and Rosenthal, 2008; Adjei, Cyree, 
and Walker, 2008; Floros and Sapp, 2010) while other studies compare sellouts to IPOs (Brau, 
Francis, and Kohers, 2003; Poulsen and Stegemoller, 2008; and Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011, 
2012).  In this paper, I examine all three exit mechanisms in a unified framework.  I address 
three research questions: 1) What factors influence the choice of RM, IPO, or sellout?, 2) How 
much wealth do private firm owners have following a RM compared to what could have been 
obtained in an IPO or a sellout?, and 3) Do RMs generate positive synergy?   
 To answer the first research question, I hypothesize that differences across firms 
regarding information asymmetries between insiders and potential investors, the ability to 
compete in product markets, and private benefits of control influence the choice of a RM, IPO, 
or sellout.  I first consider the influence of information asymmetries on the choice of exit 
                                                          
1
 Shell companies are firms that have no or nominal operating assets or assets that consist mostly of cash.  Appendix 
A provides institutional details on reverse merger transactions. 
3 
 
mechanism.  Both RMs and sellouts are negotiated transactions between two parties in which 
only one party (the public firm) needs to become informed about the private firm.  In contrast, in 
an IPO, many investors must become informed about the private firm.  Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1999) show theoretically that negotiating with a single party (e.g., a RM or sellout) is 
preferable to selling to dispersed investors (e.g., an IPO) when information asymmetries are 
more severe.  Therefore, I predict that firms characterized by greater information asymmetries 
are more likely to choose a RM (or sellout) compared to an IPO.   
 Next, I consider the influence of product market competition and private benefits of 
control on the choice of exit mechanism.  An RM and an IPO result in a stand-alone firm, which 
allows owners to retain private benefits of control but forces the firm to compete independently 
in product markets.  In contrast, private firm owners in sellouts forfeit private benefits of control 
but gain support in product market competition as the firm is integrated into the public firm 
(Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011).  Therefore, I predict that firms which are better prepared to 
compete in product markets are more likely to choose a RM (or an IPO) compared to a sellout. I 
also predict that firms with greater private benefits of control are more likely to choose a RM (or 
an IPO) compared to a sellout.     
 To address the second research question, I hypothesize that the wealth of private firm 
owners following a RM is greater than, or equal to, the wealth that can be obtained in either an 
IPO or a sellout.  This prediction is motivated by theoretical models that assume that private firm 
owners choose the exit mechanism that maximizes the value of their wealth (Zingales, 1995; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011).  For example, in Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1999), the private firm owner maximizes the cash flow accruing to him/her after 
the exit.  I calculate the wealth of private firm owners (scaled by annual sales) following a RM, 
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IPO, or sellout.  This includes the value of their equity position as well as cash and other 
consideration received in the transaction.  I predict that the wealth of the private firm owner of an 
RM firm is not significantly different than that of the owner of an IPO firm (or sellout firm), 
controlling for factors that influence the choice of exit mechanism.     
 To answer the third research question, I make predictions regarding the level of synergy 
generated in a RM.  As a business combination, the RM will generate synergy if the combined 
firm is more valuable than the sum of the values of the stand-alone firms.  Therefore, synergy is 
estimated as the value of the combined firm less the value of public firm and private firm.  One 
potential source of synergy is the ability of private firm owners to access finance to fund positive 
net present value (NPV) projects.  A second potential source of synergy is from managers and 
directors of the public firm who have valuable experience and remain as part of the combined 
firm.  I predict that the synergy is positive and is larger when RM firms have access to better 
quality projects or when the public firm contributes valuable human capital to the combined 
firm.   
 I test my hypotheses on a sample of 110 RMs, 455 IPOs, and 805 sellouts completed 
from 2005 to 2010.  I require that the RM firm, IPO firm, as well as the public acquirer in the 
sellout, list their stock on a major U.S. exchange (NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX) following the 
transaction in order to draw a sample of firms that are likely to be comparable.  I find that RM 
firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms tend to come from the same industries.  About half the sample 
is from two-digit SIC codes 73 (Business Services), 28 (Chemicals), and 36 (Electronics).  
However, within each industry, RM firms have significantly lower sales than IPO firms, but a 
similar level of sales as sellout firms.  For example, the average IPO firm in SIC code 73 reports 
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sales of $184 million while the average RM firm reports sales of $35 million and the average 
sellout firm reports sales of $31 million. 
 In my first series of tests, I analyze how information asymmetries, product market 
competition, and private benefits of control influence the choice of exit mechanism.  In 
univariate and multivariate analyses, I find that firms with greater information asymmetries are 
more likely to execute a RM than an IPO and are more likely to execute a sellout than an IPO.  
Specifically, I find that both a RM and a sellout are more likely than an IPO for firms with fewer 
sales, foreign firms, and firms that execute the transaction when stock market returns are more 
volatile.  I also find that a RM is more likely than an IPO for firms with a non-Big 4 auditor, 
firms that lack venture capital backing, and younger firms.     
 Next I examine how product market competition and private benefits of control influence 
the choice of exit mechanism.  I find that foreign firms and firms that execute a transaction when 
future conditions are more favorable for small business owners (as measured by the Small 
Business Optimism Index) are more likely to choose a RM over a sellout.
2
  I also find evidence 
that the level of sales, industry Tobin’s Q, and the size of the largest firm in the industry 
influence the choice of an IPO over a sellout.  Overall, this evidence supports the prediction that 
product market competition influences the choice of exit mechanism.  I proxy for private benefits 
of control based on perquisite compensation at the industry level (Bayar and Chemmanur, 2012; 
Rajan and Wulf, 2006) and find that RMs and IPOs are more likely than a sellout when private 
benefits of control are larger.  I also proxy for private benefits of control with an indicator for 
whether or not a family name is in the name of the firm and find opposite results, although the 
                                                          
2
 The Small Business Optimism Index is calculated monthly by the National Federation of Independent Business 
Research Foundation.  The index measures, among other things, plans to increase employment and capital outlays, 
expectation of future sales, credit conditions, and whether or not now is a good time to expand.   
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statistical significance is often weak.  Thus, the evidence that private benefits of control 
influence the choice among a RM, IPO, and sellout is mixed.     
  A striking finding in my study is that RM firms are significantly different than IPO firms 
along nearly every measurable dimension (size, age, market conditions before the deal, presence 
of venture capitalist, etc.).  I note that my sample is biased towards finding similarities between 
RM and IPO firms because I select only RM firms that list on a major U.S. exchange.  Therefore, 
one of the main conclusions to draw from my study is that comparisons of RM firms to IPO 
firms should be done with caution.  In sharp contrast, RM firms have similar characteristics to 
many sellout firms.  I conclude that RM firms, at least those that list on a major exchange, are 
more appropriately compared to sellout firms than IPO firms.   
 In my second series of tests, I empirically examine the post-deal wealth of RM firm 
owners and compare this value to the post-deal wealth of IPO firm owners and sellout firm 
owners.  I use three methods: 1) matching by size and industry, 2) matching by propensity score, 
and 3) forecasts of wealth that control for self-selection bias.  I find that the wealth-to-sales ratio 
of a RM firm is, on average, significantly lower than the wealth-to-sales ratio of the matched IPO 
firm.  For example, only 21% of RM firms have a larger wealth-to-sales ratio than the size- and 
industry-matched IPO firm.  Similarly, only 28% of RM firms have a larger wealth-to-sales ratio 
than the propensity score matched IPO firm.  I find some evidence that the proportion of RM 
firms with larger wealth-to-sales ratios than the propensity score matched IPO firm increases as 
the quality of the match increases.  However, even for a sample of 58 RMs that are closely 
matched to IPO firms, I still find that only 37% have a larger wealth-to-sales ratio than the 
propensity score matched IPO firm.  My findings also hold on a sample of only domestic firms.   
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 The third methodology generates forecasts of the wealth-to-sales ratio that each RM firm 
owner can obtain in an IPO while controlling for self-selection bias (Dunbar, 1995).  I find that 
RM firm owners have, on average, significantly lower wealth-to-sales ratios than the forecasted 
wealth-to-sales ratio that can be obtained in an IPO.  In summary, all three methodologies 
demonstrate that RM firm owners have lower wealth-to-sales ratios than IPO firm owners. 
 The finding that the wealth of RM firm owners is significantly less than the wealth of 
owners of similar IPO firms does not support the prediction that firm owners choose the exit 
mechanism that maximizes their wealth.  However, when combined with the earlier evidence on 
the significant differences between RM firms and IPO firms, an alternative explanation is that an 
IPO is not a realistic option for most RM firms.  Sjostrom (2008) contends that a comparison 
between RMs and IPOs is irrelevant for most RM firms because they fail to meet the revenue, 
net income, and potential for growth criteria of investment banks that underwrite IPOs.  Thus, an 
IPO may not be a realistic option for most firms that eventually choose a RM.   
 Next, I analyze the post-deal wealth of RM firm owners and compare this to the post-deal 
wealth of sellout firm owners.  Overall, I find that the wealth-to-sales ratio of RM firms is 
comparable to that of matched sellout firms.  Specifically, I find that 61% of RM firms have a 
larger wealth-to-sales ratio than the size- and industry- matched sellout firm.  Across a variety of 
propensity score matching criteria, slightly more than 50% of RM firms have a larger wealth-to-
sales ratio than the matched sellout firm.   
 Using Dunbar’s (1995) methodology, I find that RM firm owners have wealth-to-sales 
ratios that are similar to the forecasted wealth-to-sales ratios of sellout firm owners.  However, 
this finding only holds when forecasting wealth-to-sales ratios based on sellout firms matched to 
RM firms on size and industry.  Taken as a whole, the evidence supports my prediction that RM 
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firm owners have similar, or greater, wealth-to-sales ratios as owners of comparable sellout 
firms. 
 In my third series of tests, I analyze the synergy generated in a RM.  To calculate 
synergy, I begin with the value of the combined firm and then subtract the value of the public 
firm and the value of the private firm and adjust for cash exchanged in the transaction.  The 
value of the combined firm’s equity and the public firm’s equity are available from stock price 
data in CRSP.  To obtain the equity value of the private firm, I use two different measures.  First, 
I use valuations prepared by financial advisors to the public firm.  Financial advisors often 
prepare discounted cash flow valuations of the stand-alone value of the private firm.  However, 
these valuations may be inflated, as demonstrated by prior research on takeovers of public targets 
by public acquirers (Cain and Denis, 2013).  Public firm directors and managers in RMs may use 
inflated valuations to convince shareholders to vote for the RM or to protect themselves against 
litigation following the transaction.  An inflated value of the private target will drive the estimate 
of synergy down mechanically.  A notable difference in my sample compared to other studies of 
financial advisor valuations is that the financial advisors in RM transactions are hired solely for 
the purpose of providing a fairness opinion and their compensation is not tied to deal completion.   
Second, I use valuations of the private firm inferred from industry valuation multiples of 
takeovers of private targets by private acquirers.  The benefit of the second approach is that I do 
not rely on (possibly inflated) valuations of financial advisors.  However, the inferred valuations 
are not true stand-alone values of the firm as industry valuation multiples of takeovers include a 
portion of the synergy generated in the transaction.  Thus, inferred valuations could also be 
biased upwards, which will reduce synergy.  Weighing the pros and cons of each method, I 
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believe using industry multiples of private-private takeovers provides a better estimate of the 
value of the private firm than using valuations produced by financial advisors to the public firm. 
    I calculate the synergy generated in 33 RM transactions using data on private firm 
valuations from financial advisors.  Perhaps not surprisingly, I find that synergy averages -
$107.74 million while the median is -$74.02 million.  Thus, RMs appear to destroy a substantial 
amount of wealth.  In cross-sectional regressions of synergy on deal characteristics, I find that 
synergy is larger when the private firm is in an industry with greater Tobin’s Q or operating 
margins.  Synergy is also larger when the CEO of the private firm has previous experience at a 
public company.  I do not find evidence that synergy is larger when the public firm contributes 
human capital to the combined firm.  
Next, I calculate the synergy generated in 36 RM transactions using inferred valuations 
from private-private takeovers.  I find that synergy averages $45.08 million and the median is 
$20.60 million.  Thus, RMs appear to generate wealth, on average.  In cross-sectional regressions 
of synergy on deal characteristics, I find that synergy is larger when the RM firm has venture 
capitalist backing and when small business optimism is higher before the RM.  Thus, RMs 
appear to generate positive synergy when using valuations inferred from private-private 
takeovers and negative synergy when using valuations prepared by financial advisors to the 
public firm.    
 This paper makes several contributions to the literature.  First, this paper extends the 
literature on the choice of exit mechanism by examining reverse mergers.  Previous work 
examines reverse mergers compared to IPOs (Gleason, Jain, and Rosenthal, 2008; Adjei, Cyree, 
and Walker, 2008; Floros and Sapp, 2010) and sellouts compared to IPOs (Brau, Francis, and 
Kohers, 2003; Poulsen and Stegemoller, 2008; and Bayar and Chemmanur 2011, 2012).  I 
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examine reverse mergers, IPOs, and sellouts in a unified framework.  I find that information 
asymmetry and product market competition are important factors that influence the choice 
among these three exit mechanisms.  These empirical findings support theoretical models that 
show the importance of evaluation costs (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999) and product market 
competition (Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011; Chemmanur and He, 2011) in exit decisions.   
 Second, this paper contributes to the literature that examines reverse mergers (Gleason, 
Rosenthal, and Wiggins, 2005; Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal, 2008; Adjei, Cyree, and Walker, 
2008; Floros and Sapp, 2010).  My empirical evidence indicates that reverse merger firms are 
drastically different from IPO firms based on observable characteristics.  A novel finding in my 
study is that the wealth of RM firm owners is significantly less than the wealth of matched IPO 
firm owners.  At face value, this finding suggests that RM firms should have instead chosen an 
IPO.  However, I conclude that an IPO is not a realistic option for the vast majority of RM firms.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to compare reverse merger firms to sellout 
firms.  I find that RM firms are comparable to sellout firms along observable characteristics and 
RM firm owners have a similar level of wealth as comparable sellout firm owners.  Thus, the 
evidence suggests that a sellout is a viable alternative to a reverse merger.  I note that my results 
are obtained on a sample of RMs which list on a major exchange and may not be generalizable to 
the universe of RMs.    
 Third, my analysis lends insight into the recent Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rulings on reverse mergers.  Following allegations of fraud in reverse merger transactions, 
the SEC adopted a regulation that limited the ability of reverse merger firms to trade on major 
U.S. exchanges.
3
   These “seasoning” rules, implemented in November 2011, stipulate that the 
firm must trade on another exchange for one year before being up-listed to a major exchange.  
                                                          
3
 The press release can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm 
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These rules are designed to protect investors by forcing the firm to distribute a full year’s worth 
of audited financial statements and demonstrate that the firm’s stock can maintain its share price.  
My evidence suggests that the sellout exit mechanism is a feasible alternative for private firm 
owners who are considering a reverse merger, thus mitigating potential negative effects of 
restrictions on reverse merger transactions. 
 Fourth, this paper contributes to the literature on the role of financial advisors in M&A 
transactions, specifically the rendering of fairness opinions by financial advisors (see, e.g., 
Davidoff, Makhija, Narayanan, 2011; Cain and Denis, 2013).  I analyze valuations of private 
firms produced by financial advisors to the public firm in a reverse merger.  Based on these 
valuations, the synergy generated in the transaction is often negative and private firm owners 
experience a reduction in wealth by choosing a reverse merger rather than staying private.  
Conversely, I find that synergy is positive, on average, when valuations of private firms are 
inferred from private-private takeover multiples.  A possible explanation for this evidence is that 
financial advisors in reverse merger transactions produce inflated valuation estimates of private 
firms.  A novel finding of my study is that valuations produced by financial advisors appear to be 
inflated despite the fact that the financial advisor’s compensation is structured as a flat fee not 
contingent of deal completion. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops hypotheses and presents 
empirical proxies.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 examines the choice of RM, IPO, or 
sellout.  Section 5 examines the wealth of RM firm owners versus IPO and sellout firm owners.  
Section 6 examines the synergy generated in RMs.  Section 7 concludes. 
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2.  Hypotheses and empirical proxies 
2.1. Choice among the RM, IPO, and sellout exit mechanisms  
I develop hypotheses regarding the choice of exit mechanism based on theoretical models 
in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) and Bayar and Chemmanur (2011).  As described in more 
detail below, the choice among a RM, IPO, and sellout can be influenced by information 
asymmetries between private firm owners and potential investors, product market competition 
considerations, and private benefits of control.  My hypotheses focus on the choice of an RM 
compared to either an IPO or sellout but I also make predictions for the choice among all exit 
mechanisms.  I also discuss empirical proxies that are used to test hypotheses.   
 First, I consider the impact of information asymmetries on the choice of exit mechanism.  
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) model the decision to raise funds from numerous small 
investors (e.g., an IPO) or by negotiating with a single party (e.g., a RM or sellout).  The benefit 
of negotiating an exit, as in a RM, is the lower aggregate cost to resolve information asymmetries 
since only the public firm must learn about the private firm’s projects.  In contrast, selling to 
dispersed investors, as in an IPO, results in a large aggregate cost to resolve information 
asymmetries as each investor learns about the firm.
4
  However, the benefit of the RM mechanism 
(a lower aggregate cost to resolve information asymmetries) can be offset by the public firm’s 
ability to extract a portion of the economic gain due to its relative bargaining power.  This 
tradeoff leads to the conclusion that negotiation with a single party is preferable to selling to 
dispersed outsiders when information asymmetries are more severe (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1999).  Therefore, I predict that firms characterized by greater information asymmetry are more 
likely to choose a RM rather an IPO. 
                                                          
4
 The number of investors that become informed about an IPO is potentially large.  Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) 
find that the average number of bids per IPO is 411 for a sample of 37 order books. 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms that are characterized by greater information asymmetry are more likely to 
choose a RM compared to an IPO.       
  
 Following the logic above, I also expect that firms characterized by greater information 
asymmetry are more likely to choose a sellout compared to an IPO.  This prediction is consistent 
with predictions in empirical papers such as Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003), Poulsen and 
Stegemoller (2008), and Bayar and Chemmanur (2012).  Because both a RM and a sellout are 
negotiated transactions, I do not expect that information asymmetries influence the choice 
between these two exit mechanisms.    
 In empirical tests, I proxy for information asymmetry using firm level, industry level, and 
market variables.  In support of the first hypothesis, previous studies have shown that RM firms 
tend to be smaller and younger than IPO firms (Floros and Sapp, 2010; Gleason, Jain and 
Rosenthal, 2008; Adjei, Cyree, and Walker, 2008).  I introduce several new proxies for greater 
information asymmetry including the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, an indicator if the 
firm lists R&D expenses on the income statement, greater dispersion of valuation multiples in 
the firm’s industry, greater volatility in the equity markets, an indicator if the firm is 
headquartered outside the U.S., and an indicator for high tech targets.  Previous research shows 
that reputable auditors and venture capitalists can resolve information asymmetries (see Beatty, 
1989 and Megginson and Weiss, 1991, respectively).  Therefore, I proxy for greater information 
asymmetry with an indicator if the firm does not use a Big 4 auditor and an indicator if the firm 
does not have venture capital or private equity (VC) backing.   
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 Next, I consider the influence of product market competition and private benefits of 
control on the choice among exit mechanisms.  Both a RM and an IPO allow private firm owners 
to retain private benefits of control.  However, the tradeoff is that the firm must compete 
independently in product markets following a RM or an IPO.  In contrast, a firm that chooses a 
sellout can better compete in product markets following integration with the public acquirer.  For 
example, the public acquirer can provide assistance in the product market by utilizing existing 
distribution channels, marketing campaigns, research and development, and other firm resources 
to support the private firm’s products.  However, the benefit of product market support must be 
weighed against the cost of forfeiting private benefits of control in the sellout exit mechanism.   
Bayar and Chemmanur (2011) show theoretically that the choice between an IPO and a 
sellout is influenced by private benefits of control and product market competition.  They show 
that an IPO is more likely than a sellout when the firm is better able to compete in product 
markets and when the private benefits of control are greater.  I extend their logic to the choice 
between a RM and a sellout to develop my second and third hypotheses.  Specifically, I predict 
that firms that are better able to compete as stand-alone firms in product markets (e.g. larger 
firms) are more likely to choose a RM over a sellout.  I also predict that firms that will benefit 
more from integration with a public acquirer are more likely to choose a sellout while firms that 
will benefit less are more likely to choose a RM.  I summarize these predictions in my second 
hypothesis.               
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that are more competitive in product markets and/or would benefit less from 
integration with a public operating firm are more likely to choose a RM compared to a sellout. 
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Next, I consider how private benefits of control affect the choice between a RM and a 
sellout.  Following the logic above, the RM mechanism allows private firm owners to retain 
private benefits of control while the owners of sellout firms forfeit their private benefits of 
control.  Therefore, my third hypothesis predicts that firms with greater private benefits of 
control are more likely to choose a RM compared to a sellout firm.      
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with greater private benefits of control are more likely to choose a RM 
compared to a sellout.  
  
 I also expect that firms that are more competitive in product markets or have greater 
private benefits of control are more likely to choose an IPO over a sellout.  This prediction is 
consistent with Bayar and Chemmanur (2011, 2012).  Both the RM and IPO exit mechanism 
allow firm owners to retain private benefits of control and require that firms compete 
independently in product markets.  Therefore, I do not expect private benefits of control and 
product market considerations to significantly influence the choice between a RM and an IPO.   
 I proxy for product market competition considerations with five variables.  Firms that are 
larger or operate in industries with more growth opportunities (i.e., industry Tobin’s Q is higher) 
are likely to be more successful as stand-alone firms.  I also predict that firms that execute a 
transaction when the optimism of small business owners is higher are better prepared to compete 
in product markets as a stand-alone firm.  I measure optimism by the Small Business Optimism 
Index, calculated monthly by the National Federation of Independent Business Research 
Foundation.  This index measures, among other things, plans to increase employment and capital 
outlays, expectation of future sales, credit conditions, and whether or not now is a good time to 
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expand.  I also predict that firms that compete in an industry dominated by a large firm are less 
competitive in product markets (Bayar and Chemmanur, 2012).  Finally, I predict that foreign 
based firms will benefit less from integration with a public U.S. based firm as there are likely to 
be fewer operational synergies between such firms.  Thus, foreign firms are more likely to 
choose a RM over a sellout. 
 I proxy for private benefits of control with two variables.  First, I proxy for private 
benefits of control based on the firm’s industry as in Bayar and Chemmanur (2012).  Firms in 
industries where CEOs have high perquisite consumption (both in absolute terms and relative to 
other firm executives) are likely to be characterized by greater private benefits of control.   
Following Bayar and Chemmanur (2012), firms in two-digit SIC industry codes 13 (Oil and Gas 
Extraction), 28 (Chemicals), 29 (Oil Refining), and 37 (Transportation Equipment) are classified 
as having high private benefits of control.
5
  I also proxy for private benefits of control by 
identifying firms that appear to have a family name in the name of the firm such as The Clark 
Group (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010).  
 
2.2. Hypotheses related to the wealth obtained in RMs 
 Next, I develop hypotheses regarding the wealth obtained by private firm owners 
following RMs, IPOs, and sellouts.  Theoretical models assume that private firm owners sell 
their firm by the mechanism that maximizes the value of their wealth (Zingales, 1995; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011).  For example, in Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1999), the private firm owner’s objective is to maximize the cash flow accruing to 
him/her following the exit.  Therefore, the wealth obtained through the RM mechanism is 
                                                          
5
 Bayar and Chemmanur (2012) use perquisite compensation statistics in Rajan and Wulf (2006) to create their 
industry level measure.  Perks include country club membership, chauffer service, and access to a company plane. 
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predicted to be greater than, or equal to, the wealth that could have been obtained in either an 
IPO or a sellout.  In other words, firm owners should not choose a RM if they could obtain more 
wealth in an IPO or sellout.  The following hypotheses predict that RM firm owners could not 
have achieved a higher level of wealth had they instead executed an IPO or a sellout.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The wealth obtained in a reverse merger is greater than, or equal to, the wealth 
that could have been obtained in an IPO. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The wealth obtained in a reverse merger is greater than, or equal to, the wealth 
that could have been obtained in a sellout. 
 
 In empirical tests of Hypotheses 4 and 5, I control for firm characteristics that affect the 
tradeoffs inherent among the RM, IPO, and sellout exit mechanisms.  Also, I control for both 
observable firm characteristics as well as unobservable factors that can influence the tradeoffs 
among the three mechanisms.   
 The above hypotheses assume that a firm can choose between all three exit mechanisms 
(RM, IPO, or sellout).  It may be the case, however, that certain frictions prevent private firms 
from gaining equal access to each exit mechanism.  Sjostrom (2008) and Comment (2010) 
suggest that many RM firms are not good candidates for an IPO because of their size.  
Specifically, Sjostrom (2008) notes that most RM firms fail to meet the revenue, net income, and 
potential for growth criteria of investment banks that underwrite IPOs.  This reasoning is 
supported by anecdotal evidence gleaned from conversations with practitioners.  If many RM 
firms do not have access to the IPO mechanism, then we may observe lower levels of wealth for 
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RM firms than seemingly comparable IPO firms.  The same logic applies to comparisons 
between RM firms and sellout firms.  However, I am not aware of a friction that could 
systematically prevent a RM firm from executing a sellout.     
 
2.3. Hypothesis related to the synergy generated in RMs 
 If the combined firm is worth more than the sum of the value of the private firm and 
public firm then synergy is created (Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, 2002).  RM transactions have the 
potential to generate synergy because private firms gain access to finance to fund positive NPV 
projects.  Indeed, the most common reason for a RM cited by the private firm is “growth” 
(Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins; 2005).  Empirical research shows that economic gains are 
generated by supplying finance to a firm (Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, 2012).  If RMs allow private 
firms to accept positive NPV projects then the increase in firm value will be reflected in the 
synergy generated.  Thus, I predict that synergy will, on average, be positive.   
An alternative prediction is that RMs do not generate positive synergy because this 
mechanism is used by firm owners who exploit public firm shareholders by committing fraud.  
Indeed, RMs are often associated with fraud in academic research (e.g., Ang, Jiang, and Wu, 
2012) and in the business press (Stengold, 2011).  In June 2011, the SEC issued a bulletin that 
warned investors to be wary of RMs due to accusations of rampant fraud in such transactions 
(see Appendix A).  If RMs are often used to commit fraud then stock market investors may bid 
down the price of the combined firm’s stock.  Thus, synergy generated in the transaction may, on 
average, be negative. 
I also predict that the level of synergy generated in the transaction will vary across RMs.  
I predict that private firms with access to higher quality projects will generate greater synergy in 
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RMs.  I proxy for the quality of the firm’s projects by operating margins and Tobin’s Q in the 
firm’s industry.  Because a RM is a business combination, the public firm has the opportunity to 
contribute personnel and operations to the combined firm.  Managers and directors of the public 
firm are likely to have valuable human capital that can benefit the combined firm.  For example, 
the public firm managers and directors have experience in running a publicly listed company, 
which can be valuable to the combined firm (this experience can include meeting disclosure 
requirements, interacting with analysts and media, etc.).  Therefore, I also predict that the 
synergy generated in the transaction is larger when the public firm contributes managers or 
directors to the combined firm.     
 
Hypothesis 6: The synergy generated in RM transactions is positive, on average, and is larger 
when the private firm has access to better projects or the public firm contributes managers or 
directors to the combined firm.   
 
3.  Data  
3.1. Sample of reverse mergers 
 Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins (2005, page 56) define a reverse merger (also called a 
reverse takeover) as “a specific corporate governance event where a private company is acquired 
by a public company in order to obtain the public listing, and where the private partner is the 
surviving public entity”.  My definition of reverse merger is consistent with Gleason, Rosenthal, 
and Wiggins (2005).  Specifically, I define a reverse merger as a business combination that 
meets the following criteria: 
1. A private operating company is combined with a public company. 
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2. The combined firm is a public company and carries on the business of the private 
operating company. 
3. Private company shareholders or management control the combined firm.  More 
specifically, either of the following occurs: 
a. Private company shareholders receive greater than 50% of the fully diluted equity, or 
b. Private company shareholders receive less than, or equal to, 50% of the equity of the 
combined firm and the CEO of the private company becomes the CEO of the 
combined company.
6
 
 RMs are identified by: 1) 8-K filings, 2) data used in Comment (2010), and 3) newspaper 
articles.
7
 First, RMs are identified by searching 8-K filings obtained from the SEC’s EDGAR 
system.  The goal is to identify RMs that were completed from 2005 to 2010.  The sample begins 
in 2005 because an SEC ruling in 2005 greatly expanded the disclosure requirements of RMs 
(see Appendix A).  Before this rule change, there was only very sparse information available on 
RMs.  The search procedure was executed in mid-2011, leaving time for the disclosure of deals 
completed in late 2010.  In the first step of the search procedure, I use the Perl programming 
language to search about 600,000 filings for keywords that indicate that a RM has occurred.
8
  
The primary keywords are reverse acquisition, reverse merger, reverse takeover, change in shell 
company status, blank check, and variations of these words.  In addition, 8-K reports with an 
unusually large number of disclosures are identified as potentially reporting a RM.  This first 
step results in a sample of about 6,000 filings.  In the second step, the contents of the filing are 
                                                          
6
 In the final sample, there are 29 RMs where the private company shareholders do not own a majority of the 
combined firm’s equity.  Among these firms, private company shareholders own 33.36% of the combined firm’s 
equity, on average.  Private firm shareholders are typically more concentrated than public firm shareholders.  Thus 
private firms shareholders with less than majority ownership can still represent a significant voting bloc in the 
combined firm. 
7
 I thank Bob Comment for generously providing his data on reverse mergers. 
8
 I thank Yuehua Tang and Andy Leone for Perl code and programming tips. 
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examined by hand to determine if a RM occurred or not.  This step identifies 1,300 deals that are 
likely to be RMs and were completed from 2005 to 2010.  
 The second source of data is a sample of RMs used in Comment (2010).  Comment 
analyzes SEC filings and identifies 1,460 RMs completed from 2005 to 2010.  There is 
substantial overlap between my hand collected sample and Comment’s sample.9  The third 
source of data is newspaper articles that identify a small number of RMs that were not included 
in the previous two data sets.      
 The sample of RM deals is filtered in order to draw comparisons to IPO and sellout firms.  
The first, and most significant, filter is that the firm’s stock must appear in the CRSP database 
within one year of the closing of the transaction.  About 10% of RMs meet this criterion.
 10
  This 
filter is important to ensure that RM firms are reasonably comparable to IPO firms and sellout 
firms.  Therefore, I exclude RM firms whose stock only trades in over-the-counter markets as 
they are likely to be quite different from the typical IPO and sellout firm.  An implication of this 
restriction is that my sample of RM firms is biased towards finding similarities to IPO firms. 
 The second filter is that financials and utilities (SIC code between 6000 and 6999 or 4910 
and 4949) are excluded from the sample.  Also, I remove deals that appear in both the RM and 
IPO sample.  After applying these filters, the sample is 110 RMs that were completed from 
January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010.  All data described below for RM firms is hand 
collected, with the exception of stock price data which is from CRSP, and the industry of the 
firm, which is from Compustat.  
                                                          
9
 In the final sample, about 75% of the deals are identified by my hand collection procedure and Comment (2010). 
10
 In the final sample, about 75% of RMs appear on CRSP within six months, which is a common criterion in the 
IPO literature.  About 90% appear on CRSP within 8.5 months.  Many RMs include public firms that are not listed 
on a major exchange.  In these deals, the public firm typically does not seek approval to list on a major exchange 
until after the transaction.  The approval process is often started soon after the deal closes and can take several 
months.  The twelve month cutoff allows time for the approval process. 
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3.2. Sample of IPOs and sellouts 
 IPOs are identified by the SDC Platinum New Issues database.  The offering must occur 
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010 and must be an original IPO.  Unit offers, 
ADRs, closed-end funds, REITs, rollups, limited partnerships, firms with a dual-class stock 
structure, and firms that appear in the RM sample are excluded.  The firm’s stock must appear in 
CRSP within one year of the offering.  The firm must have financial data on Compustat for the 
period ending one year before the offer date.  Industry is defined based on the historical SIC code 
in Compustat and financials and utilities are excluded.  The final sample includes 455 IPOs.   
 Sellouts are identified by the SDC Platinum M&A domestic and international databases.  
The target must be private and the acquirer must be a U.S. based firm with stock price data on 
CRSP.  The deal must be completed between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010 and the 
acquirer must acquire 100% of the target’s shares in the transaction.  Deals with target firms in 
the financial industry and utility industry are excluded as are deals with a deal value of less than 
one million dollars. The target firm must have sales data reported in SDC.  The final sample 
includes 805 sellouts.
11
   
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the sample.  To give a feel for the total 
volume of each deal type, Panel A shows the frequency of RMs, IPOs, and sellouts where few 
restrictions are put on the sample.
12
  The number of RMs is from Comment (2010) and holds 
                                                          
11
 Sellouts where the consideration is all cash might not be comparable to RMs as an exit mechanism.  I exclude 
such sellouts from the sample and find similar results as those presented below. 
12
 For example, the RM and IPO firms are not required to be listed on CRSP and the sellout firms are not required to 
have sales data available. 
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steady at over 200 per year from 2005 to 2010 while the number of IPOs varies from 31 to 181 
during this time.  The number of sellouts varies significantly over time, but is always greater than 
the number of RMs or IPOs.   
 Table 1, Panel B shows the frequency distribution of the final sample by year, as well as 
sub-samples of small firms (using the cutoff in Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) of sales less than $50 
million) and foreign firms.  The distribution shows a dramatic decrease in the number of IPOs 
from 118 in 2007 to 12 in 2008.  However, the number of sellouts does not decline until 2009 
while the number of RMs remains fairly stable at about 20 per year until 2010.  A greater 
proportion of RMs are small firms (69 of 110, 63%) than IPO firms (169 of 455, 37%).  Small 
firms account for 600 of 805 sellouts (75%).  There are nearly as many RMs of foreign firms 
(42) as IPOs of foreign firms (47).    
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample of 110 RMs.  Panel A shows 
frequency counts for dummy variables.  In 75% of the transactions, the firm owners receive only 
equity of the combined firm as consideration for their firm, while in 25% of the transactions they 
receive cash or other consideration (e.g. promissory notes or assumption of the firm’s debt).  In 
the sample, 38% of RMs involve a private foreign firm.
13
  In 58% of the transactions, the public 
firm has declared that it is a shell company before the transaction.  In 42% of the transactions, 
the public firm is an operating company.  However, most of the operating companies have 
suspended operations and are seeking strategic alternatives or have operations that will be spun 
off or sold after the transaction.   
It is common that the private company CEO has previous work experience or has been a 
director of a public company (42%).  In 92% of the transactions, the private company CEO 
                                                          
13
 The majority of those are firms headquartered in China or Hong Kong while other nations that are represented in 
the sample are Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.   
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immediately becomes the CEO of the combined company.  In 33% of the sample the private 
company nominates all the directors of the combined firm, while in 61% of the sample the 
private company nominates a majority of the directors.  In 56% of the transactions, the public 
company managers or directors have expertise in the private company’s industry (defined as 
previous work or director experience in the private firm’s industry or the public company states 
it’s intent on conducting a RM with a firm in the private firm’s industry).  In 12% of the 
transactions the public company managers or directors have previous experience with a RM.   
 Table 2, Panel B shows summary statistics for continuous variables, winsorized at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles.  Private company shareholders retain 63.37% of the combined company’s 
equity on average (on a fully-diluted basis).  Public company shareholders retain 33.19% while 
new investors receive 3.34% on average.  The variable Equity Wealth is the value of the private 
company owners’ equity after the deal (market value of the firm multiplied by percentage of 
shares retained) and its mean value is $125.06 million.  Net cash paid to private company owners 
is $12.35 million while other consideration is $1.44 million.  Private firms in RMs, on average,  
have a greater level of total assets than public firms ($78.55 vs. $52.96 million) and 63% of deals 
involve a private firm with larger total assets than the public firm.  Public firms, on average, have 
$17.40 million in cash (42% of total assets).  
 Table 3 presents an analysis of the sample by two-digit SIC code industry.  Panel A 
shows that RMs, IPOs, and sellouts tend to come from the same industries.  The top two-digit 
SIC code industries by deal volume for RMs and IPOs are 73 (Business Services), 36 
(Electronics), and 28 (Chemicals) while the top three industries for sellouts are 73 (Business 
Services), 36 (Electronics), and 38 (Measuring Instruments).   
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 While RMs and IPOs tend to come from the same industries, RM firms are significantly 
smaller, in terms of sales, than IPO firms in the same industry.  Panel B shows the mean and 
median sales for RM, IPO, and sellout firms in the eight industries with the greatest number of 
transactions.  In industry 73 (Business Services), RM firms average $35.1 million in sales while 
IPO firms average $184.2 million.   The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
However, sellout firms average $30.9 million in sales, not significantly different from RM firms.  
The same pattern holds in industries 36 (Electronics), 48 (Communications) and 13 (Oil and Gas 
Extraction).  Within an industry, RM firms in my sample appear to be much smaller than IPO 
firms, but of similar size as sellout firms.     
 
4. Characteristics of RM firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms and choice of exit mechanism 
 In this section I empirically test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, which make predictions 
regarding the choice of exit mechanism.  First, I make comparisons between RMs and IPOs.  
Then, I make comparisons between RMs and sellouts.  Finally, I use multinomial regressions to 
test predictions on the pooled sample of RMs, IPOs, and sellouts.   
 
4.1. Sales and wealth 
 In Table 4, Panel A, I show the mean and median values of sales, wealth measures, and 
other variables for sub-samples of RM firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms.  Variables are 
described in Appendix B.  In Appendix C: Supplemental Results, I show detailed summary 
statistics including the minimum and maximum of each variable.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level and the winsorization is done separately for RM, IPO, and 
sellout sub-samples due to the potential for differences in the distribution of variables in the sub-
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samples.  All dollar values are in millions of 2009 dollars unless otherwise specified.  Table 4, 
Panel A, shows that RM firms have a significantly lower level of sales ($73.79) than IPO firms 
($375.03), on average.  The median level of sales is lower for RM firms ($26.68) than for IPO 
firms ($85.02) as well, and the difference in distribution is significant based on a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test.  However, the mean and median of sales for sellout firms is $65.56 and $17.46, 
respectively, and not significantly different from that of RM firms. 
I measure the wealth of the private firm owners after the close of the transaction (Wealth) 
as the market value of equity holdings (Equity Wealth) plus cash and other consideration 
received in the transaction.  For RM firms, Equity Wealth is calculated as the percentage of 
shares retained multiplied by the market value of the combined firm at the close of the first day 
of trading after completion of the deal.  For sellout firms, Equity Wealth is calculated as the 
value of stock consideration received in the transaction, using the acquirer’s stock price at the 
close of the first day of trading after completion of the deal.  For IPO firms, Equity Wealth is 
calculated as the percentage of shares retained multiplied by the market value of the firm at the 
close of the first day trading.
14
  To calculate Wealth for RMs and sellouts I add Equity Wealth to 
cash or other consideration (e.g., the assumption of liabilities) received in the transaction.  For 
IPOs, I add Equity Wealth to cash obtained from selling secondary shares of stock.  Wealth for 
RM firms is, on average, $151.76 million, which is significantly less than Wealth for IPO firms 
($537.24) but not significantly different than Wealth for sellout firms ($116.05).  When scaling 
Wealth by sales (Wealth to Sales), there is no statistically significant difference in the average 
                                                          
14
 In Appendix C: Supplemental Results, I conduct a robustness test where I measure Equity Wealth for RMs and 
IPOs in two different ways: 1) percentage of shares retained multiplied by the market value of the firm at the close 
of trading 30 days after the first trade on CRSP (for both RMs and IPOs) and 2) percentage of shares retained 
multiplied by the market value of the firm 270 days after deal completion (for RMs) and 270 days after the offering 
(for IPOs).  This test addresses the concern that my results are influenced by large first day returns for IPOs (thus 
generating high wealth for IPO firm owners) and the fact that RM firms do not start trading until several months 
after deal completion. 
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between RMs (18.60) and IPOs (28.07) or between RMs and sellouts (30.84).  Due to skewness 
in this measure, I use the natural log transformation in empirical tests.          
 
4.2. Univariate evidence on differences between RM firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms 
 I compare proxies for information asymmetry across RM firms and IPO firms to test 
Hypothesis 1.  I measure dispersion of industry valuation multiples by the standard deviation of 
market value of equity-to-sales ratios for Compustat firms in the same four-digit SIC code 
(Dispersion of Multiples).  I find no significant difference between RM firms and IPO firms.  I 
find that RMs are executed when the return to the value-weighted stock market index over the 
past six months (Market Returns) is lower compared to IPOs.  However, RMs tend to occur 
when market volatility has been higher over the past six months (Market Volatility).  RM firms 
are more likely to be headquartered outside the U.S. (38%) than IPO firms (10%).   
 RM firms are significantly younger than IPO firms on average (11.88 years versus 19.59 
years).
15
  RM firms are significantly more likely to employ a non-Big 4 auditor (61% versus 
20%) and significantly less likely to have venture capital or private equity backing (45% versus 
80%).  Contrary to my prediction that RM firms are more R&D intensive, 36% of RM firms 
report R&D expenses on the income statement (R&D Dummy) compared to 58% of IPO firms.  
Also, only 16% of RM firms are considered high tech, according to Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) 
four-digit SIC code classification, compared to 31% of IPO firms. 
 Next, I compare proxies for product market competition between RM firms and sellout 
firms to test Hypothesis 2.  Table 4, Panel A, shows no significant difference between RM firms 
and sellout firms in the average Small Business Optimism Index value (Small Business 
                                                          
15
 Firm age for IPO firms is calculated based on data from the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates (Field 
and Karpoff, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2004), available on Jay Ritter’s website: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm 
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Optimism), percentage of sales of the largest Compustat firm in the 4-digit SIC code industry 
(Leader Market Share), or median Tobin’s Q of firms in the same 4-digit SIC code industry 
(Industry Tobin’s Q).16   
 I also examine proxies for private benefits of control to test Hypothesis 3.  RM firms are 
significantly more likely to operate in an industry with high private benefits of control (Private 
Benefits Industry) than sellout firms (35% versus 9%).  Contrary to my prediction, however, RM 
firms are less likely than sellout firms to have a person’s name in the firm’s name (7% versus 
13%).         
 
4.3. Information asymmetry and the choice of exit mechanism 
 I test Hypothesis 1 in a multivariate setting by estimating a probit model where the 
dependent variable is 1 for RM firms and 0 for IPO firms.  Sellout firms are excluded from this 
analysis.  Specifically, I estimate the equation  
 
  (     )   (                                        
                                          
                                            
                                   ), 
 
(1) 
where each observation, i, is a firm that has executed either a RM or an IPO. F(*) is the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable. The proxies for information 
asymmetry are described above: Log of Sales, Log of Age, Foreign, Tangible Assets, R&D 
                                                          
16
 SIC codes for sellouts are from SDC.  As a result, some four-digit SIC codes cannot be matched to Compustat 
data.  In this case, I fill in with Compustat data at the three-digit SIC code level. 
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Dummy, Non-Big 4 Auditor, VC Backing, Dispersion of Multiples, Market Volatility, and High 
Tech.  I also control for stock market returns because a firm’s choice of exit mechanism and 
timing of exit may be influenced by noise traders that are present in the market (Ljungqvist, 
Nanda, and Singh, 2006; Derrien, 2005).  In certain specifications, I also include proxies for 
product market competition (Small Business Optimism, Industry Tobin’s Q, and Leader Market 
Share) and proxies for private benefits of control (Private Benefits Dummy and Family Name).  
The regression includes year and industry dummies.  Because some two-digit SIC codes have a 
small number of deals, I measure industry at the SIC division level, which groups two-digit SIC 
codes (Kahle and Walkling, 1996).   
The independent variables in the regression can be highly correlated since many variables 
proxy for the same economic force.  For example, Table 4, Panel C shows that Log of Sales is 
highly correlated with Log of Age (0.5527) and R&D Dummy (-0.4104).  In un-tabulted results, I 
estimate Equation (1) and remove variables that are highly correlated with other variables in the 
regression.  I estimate Equation (1) multiple times, removing Log of Sales, VC Backing, R&D 
Dummy, Market Returns, and combinations of these variables each time.  The results are similar 
to those presented below and are not discussed for brevity.
17
 
 The results of the estimation of Equation (1) are presented in Table 5.  In column (1), I 
exclude proxies for product market competition and private benefits of control in order to focus 
on proxies for information asymmetry.  The coefficient on Log of Sales is -0.307 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which indicates that larger firms are less likely to execute a RM 
compared to an IPO.  The results in column (1) also show that a RM is more likely if the firm is 
                                                          
17
 One noteworthy specification removes Log of Sales from the regression in Table 5, column (1) and shows a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on Log of Age (t-stat = -3.582) and a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on Dispersion of Multiples (t-stat = 2.335).  The coefficients on the other independent 
variables remain similar to those presented in the table. 
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headquartered outside the U.S. or uses a non-Big 4 auditor and less likely if the firm has VC 
backing or a greater proportion of tangible assets.  Firms that execute a RM appear to have more 
severe information asymmetries than firms that execute an IPO, which supports Hypothesis 1.  
However, the coefficient on R&D Dummy is negative and statistically significant, opposite to my 
prediction.
18
     
In column (2), I add proxies for product market competition and proxies for private 
benefits of control.  The results show that a RM is more likely than an IPO when Small Business 
Optimism is higher, however the coefficients on Industry Tobin’s Q and Leader Market Share 
are statistically insignificant.  The significant coefficient on Small Business Optimism likely 
reflects the fact that RM firms tend to be small firms that exit when conditions are favorable for 
small business owners.  The coefficient on Private Benefits Dummy is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient on Family Name is not statistically significant.  
Therefore, I do not find strong evidence that private benefits of control influence the choice 
between a RM and an IPO. 
Because domestic firms could be systematically different from foreign firms, I re-
estimate the probit regression on the sub-sample of only domestic firms.  Column (3) shows that 
most of the results hold on the sub-sample of domestic firms.  In column (4), I add proxies for 
product market competition and private benefits of control.  The coefficient on Small Business 
Optimism is statistically significant at the 10% level and the coefficients on the other proxies are 
statistically insignificant.  
 Next, I investigate whether differences exist between RM firms and IPO firms that are 
similar in terms of size and industry.  I construct a matched sample based on industry and annual 
                                                          
18
 One possible explanation for this finding is that RM firms use less reputable auditors and therefore may not 
always disclose R&D expenses on the Income Statement. 
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sales.  I match each RM firm to the IPO firm in the same two-digit SIC code industry that has the 
closest level of sales.  I exclude matches where the level of sales differs by more than +/- 40%.  
A total of 67 RM firms can be matched to an IPO firm, for a sample of 134 firms in the Match 1 
to 1 sample.  The difference in sales between the RM firm and matched IPO firm is 9.0% on 
average, while the median is 5.5% and the 75
th
 percentile is 14.0%.  I estimate a conditional logit 
model on the Match 1 to 1 sample and present the results in Table 5, column (5).
19
  Several of the 
results disappear after matching as the coefficients on Non Big 4 Auditor, VC Backing, Market 
Returns, and Small Business Optimism are statistically insignificant. Thus, many of the 
differences between RM firms and IPO firms can be attributed to differences in size and 
industry.  However, is support of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on Foreign is positive and 
statistically significant.  The coefficient on Tangible Assets is positive and statistically significant 
and the coefficient on R&D Dummy is negative and statistically significant, opposite to my 
prediction.   
      
4.4. Product market competition, private benefits of control, and choice of exit mechanism 
 I test Hypotheses 2 and 3 in a multivariate setting by estimating a probit model where the 
dependent variable is 1 for RM firms and 0 for sellout firms.  IPO firms are excluded from this 
analysis.  The estimation is analogous to estimating Equation (1).  The independent variables 
include the proxies for product market competition and private benefits of control described 
above: Log of Sales, Foreign, Small Business Optimism, Industry Tobin’s Q, Leader Market 
Share, Private Benefits Dummy, and Family Name. I also include proxies for information 
asymmetry where data for sellout firms are always available (Market Volatility and High Tech) 
                                                          
19
 In order for the estimation to execute, several variables are excluded from the regression.  In unreported tests, I 
find the coefficients on Log of Sales, Log of Age, Dispersion of Multiples, Market Volatility, Industry Tobin’s Q, and 
High Tech are statistically insignificant. 
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and Market Returns to capture market conditions are the time of exit. The regression includes 
year and industry (SIC division) dummies.   
Again, the independent variables in the regression can be highly correlated since many 
variables proxy for the same economic force.  For example, Table 4, Panel B shows that the 
correlation of Log of Sales and Industry Tobin’s Q is -0.2851.  In un-tabulated results, I estimate 
the regression and remove variables that are highly correlated with other variables in the 
regression.  I estimate the regression multiple times, removing Log of Sales, Industry Tobin’s Q, 
Small Business Optimism, Leader Market Share, Market Returns, High Tech, Private Benefits 
Dummy, and combinations of these variables each time.  The results are similar to those 
presented below and a discussion of the results is omitted for brevity.  
 Table 6, column (1) shows that the coefficient on Foreign and Small Business Optimism 
is positive and statistically significant, indicating a greater likelihood to execute a RM rather than 
a sellout for foreign firms or when small business optimism is higher.  The coefficients on 
Industry Tobin’s Q and Leader Market Share are statistically significant and in the predicted 
direction.  This evidence supports Hypothesis 2.  However, the coefficient on Log of Sales is 
statistically insignificant.  In column (2), I add proxies for private benefits of control to the 
regression.  The coefficients on Foreign and Small Business Optimism remain statistically 
significant, but the coefficients on Industry Tobin’s Q and Leader Market Share become 
statistically insignificant.  In support of Hypothesis 3, the coefficient on Private Benefits Industry 
is positive and statistically significant.  However, the coefficient on Family Name has the 
opposite sign to what is predicted.  Thus, the evidence for Hypothesis 3 is inconclusive. 
 I present evidence on the sub-sample of domestic firms in Table 6 columns (3) and (4).  
The results are generally similar to those in column (1).  However, the coefficient on Log of 
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Sales is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that larger firms are less likely to choose 
a RM over a sellout, opposite to my prediction.  In column (5), the sample is the Match 1 to 1 
sample, constructed in a manner analogous to that described above for RM firms and IPO firms.  
The Match 1 to 1 sample is 69 RM firms matched to 69 sellouts in the same industry that are 
closest in annual sales.
20
  The difference in sales between the RM firm and matched IPO firm is 
8.8% on average, while the median is 5.6% and the 75
th
 percentile is 12.7%.  The results in 
column (5) show that foreign firms and firms that execute a transaction when small business 
optimism is high are more likely to execute a RM compared to a sellout.  This evidence supports 
Hypothesis 2.   
 
4.5. Multivariate tests of the exit decision- pooled sample of RMs, IPOs, and sellouts 
 I test the predictions generated in Section 2 on the pooled sample of RMs, IPOs, and 
sellouts.  First, I test for the influence of information asymmetry on the exit mechanism choice.  I 
predict that a RM and a sellout are both more likely than an IPO for firms that are characterized 
by greater levels of information asymmetry.  I test this prediction in two ways: 1) a multinomial 
logistic regression and 2) a logistic regression where I pool RM and sellout firms and compare 
them to IPO firms.  Table 7, Panel A shows the coefficient estimates from a multinomial logistic 
regression where the base case is an IPO and the other two choices are a RM (column (1)) and a 
sellout (column (2)).
21
  The independent variables are proxies for information asymmetry: Log of 
Sales, Foreign, Dispersion of Multiples, Market Volatility, and High Tech.  In support of my 
                                                          
20
 The regression in column (5) excludes one pair of observations due to missing data on Industry Tobin’s Q and 
Leader Market Share for one sellout firm. 
21
 I test whether or not the specification satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.  The 
null hypothesis is that the multinomial logit gives the same results as a specification where sellouts are deleted from 
the sample.  The p-value from a nonlinear Hausman-like test is 0.9713, suggesting that the IIA assumption is met.  
Similar results obtain for the other two multinomial logisitic regressions in Table 7. 
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prediction, the coefficients on Log of Sales, Foreign, and Market Volatility indicate that both a 
RM and a sellout are more likely than an IPO when information asymmetry is more severe.  The 
coefficients on High Tech and Dispersion of Multiples are opposite to my prediction and often 
statistically significant, however.
22
  I obtain similar results in column (3) of Panel A when IPOs 
are compared to the pooled sample of RMs and sellouts in a logistic regression. 
 Next, I test the prediction that both RMs and IPOs are more likely than a sellout for firms 
that are better prepared to compete in product markets or for firms that have higher private 
benefits of control.  Table 7, Panel B shows the coefficient estimates from a multinomial logistic 
regression where the base case is a sellout and the other two choices are a RM (column (1)) and 
an IPO (column (2)).  The independent variables are proxies for product market competition and 
private benefits of control: Log of Sales, Foreign, Small Business Optimism, Industry Tobin’s Q, 
Leader Market Share, Private Benefits Dummy, and Family Name.  Column (1) shows that 
foreign firms are more likely to execute a RM than a sellout, in support of the prediction that 
foreign firms benefit less than domestic firms from integration with a public acquirer.  In column 
(2), the statistically significant coefficients on Log of Sales, Small Business Optimism, Industry 
Tobin’s Q, and Leader Market Share indicates that firms that execute an IPO are better prepared 
to compete in product markets than firms that execute a sellout.  Again, I find mixed evidence on 
the prediction regarding private benefits of control.  In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on 
Private Benefits Dummy is in the predicted direction and statistically significant while the 
coefficient on Family Name is in the opposite direction and statistically significant.  I obtain 
similar results in column (3) of Panel B when sellouts are compared to the pooled sample of 
RMs and IPOs in a logistic regression. 
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 I note that both of these results are insignificant in Table 5 when additional variables are added to the regression.    
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 In Table 7, Panel C, I include proxies for information asymmetry, product market 
competition, and private benefits of control in one specification.  The specification is a 
multinomial logistic regression where the base outcome is RMs.  Overall, the results are 
consistent with the multinomial logistic regressions in Table 7, Panels A and B and the probit 
models presented in Tables 5 and 6.  The choice between RM and IPO appears to be significantly 
affected by proxies for information asymmetry (Log of Sales, Foreign, Market Volatility) and not 
significantly affected by proxies for product market competition (Industry Tobin’s Q and Leader 
Market Share) with the exception of Small Business Optimism.  Proxies for private benefits of 
control are either weakly statistically significant (Private Benefits Dummy) or not statistically 
significant (Family Name).  The choice between RM and sellout appears to be significantly 
impacted by three proxies for product market competition (Foreign, Small Business Optimism, 
and Industry Tobin’s Q) and the evidence is mixed for proxies for private benefits of control.  
Proxies for information asymmetry also provide mixed evidence (e.g., the coefficient on High 
Tech is negative and significant, but the coefficient on Market Volatility is insignificant).         
 
4.6. Summary of evidence 
 The univariate and multivariate evidence demonstrates that, compared to IPO firms, RM 
firms are significantly smaller, younger, have a lower proportion of tangible assets, are less 
likely to have VC backing, are more likely to be headquartered outside the U.S., and are more 
likely to employ a non-Big 4 auditor.  The evidence provides support for Hypothesis 1, that RM 
firms are characterized by greater information asymmetries than IPO firms.  I also find that RM 
firms, compared to sellout firms, are more likely to be headquartered outside the U.S. and 
execute a transaction when small business optimism is higher.  This evidence provides some 
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support for Hypothesis 2.  The evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, that RM firms have greater 
private benefits of control than sellouts firms, is mixed.   
 
 
5. Wealth obtained in RMs versus IPOs and sellouts 
 This section addresses the second research question which asks whether or not private 
firm owners who execute a RM obtain a similar level of wealth as those who execute an IPO or 
sellout.  Three methods are used to address this question: 1) matching RM firms to IPO and 
sellout firms by size and industry, 2) matching by propensity score, and 3) forecasts of wealth 
that control for self-selection bias. 
  
5.1. Matching methods: RM and IPO firms 
 I match RM firms to IPO firms by size and industry (the Match 1 to 1 sample), and by 
propensity score.  Propensity score matching is used to match each RM firm to an IPO firm 
based on observable firm, industry, and market characteristics.  The propensity score is the 
conditional probability that a firm will choose a RM given the vector of observed covariates 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  I calculate the propensity scores from the probit regressions in 
Table 5 column (1).   
  Following Bayar and Chemmanur (2012), the wealth of the matched IPO firm owners is 
multiplied by the annual sales of the RM firm to obtain the imputed wealth of the RM firm 
(Equation (2)).  The imputed wealth is an estimate of the wealth that would have been obtained 
in an IPO. 
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 I divide the actual wealth of the RM firm owners (Wealth) by the imputed wealth to 
obtain Relative Wealth, as in Equation (3).  Note that Relative Wealth is equivalent to the RM 
firm’s wealth-to-sales ratio divided by the matched IPO firm’s wealth-to-sales ratio. 
 
                
                 
                        
 
                
                       ⁄
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(3) 
 
 Tests for significance are conducted using the natural log transformation, LN Relative 
Wealth, due to skewness of the ratio measures.  If LN Relative Wealth equals zero, then the 
wealth obtained in the RM is exactly the same as the estimate of what could have been obtained 
in an IPO (Wealth equals Imputed Wealth and therefore Relative Wealth equals one).  In other 
words, Wealth to Sales for RM firm owners is equal to Wealth to Sales for matched IPO firm 
owners.  If LN Relative Wealth is positive, then the wealth of firm owners of the RM firm is 
greater than the wealth of firm owners of the matched IPO firm.  If LN Relative Wealth is 
negative, then the wealth of owners of the RM firm is less than the wealth of owners of the 
matched IPO firm.
23
   
 In Table 8, I present an analysis of LN Relative Wealth for various matching procedures.  
I show the mean, median, t-stat (for a test that mean equals zero), and the percentage of 
                                                          
23
 I require non-zero sales to create this measure.  In the sample, 14% of RM firms, 6% of IPO firms and 0% of 
sellout firms have zero sales.  One reason that there are no sellouts with zero sales in my sample is that very small 
private target acquisitions are often not disclosed.   
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observations where LN Relative Wealth is greater than zero.  Each row of Table 8, Panel A 
shows LN Relative Wealth calculated with RM firms and IPO firms under a different matching 
procedure.  In the first row of Panel A, I calculate LN Relative Wealth, where IPO firms are 
matched on two-digit SIC code industry and sales (the Match 1 to 1 sample).  The mean of LN 
Relative Wealth is -0.80 and the t-stat is -5.76, indicating that RM firm owners obtain 
significantly less wealth than matched IPO firm owners.  In fact, only 21% of the observations 
have positive LN Relative Wealth.   
In the next eight rows of Table 8, Panel A, the matched IPO firms are from propensity 
score matching.
24
  I provide an analysis of the quality of the match in Appendix C: Supplemental 
Results. I first match every RM firm to the IPO firm with the closest propensity score with 
replacement.  The average value of LN Relative Wealth is -2.14 and the t-stat is -6.46, again 
indicating that RM firm owners obtain significantly less wealth than matched IPO firm owners.  
The median of LN Relative Wealth is -1.80 and only 28% of the observations have LN Relative 
Wealth greater than zero.  Next, I restrict the matched IPO firm to have a propensity score within 
0.01 of the RM firm.  This restriction increases the quality of the match, at the expense of a loss 
in sample size.  I can find an appropriate match for 58 RM firms and I find that average LN 
Relative Wealth is -0.81 (t-stat = -2.42).  Although LN Relative Wealth is closer to zero when the 
quality of the match is increased, the results still show that RM firm owners obtain significantly 
less wealth than matched IPO firm owners.
25
  Similar results obtain when I match without 
replacement or run the tests on only domestic RM and IPO firms, as shown in the remaining 
                                                          
24
 I use the Stata program “psmatch2” to execute the matching procedure (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).  
25
 I also match using the probit regression which includes proxies for product market competition and private 
benefits of control (as in Table 5, column (2)) to generate propensity scores.  Matching with caliper = 1 results in 
average LN Relative Wealth of -0.37 (t-stat = -1.44) with 45% of the observations less than zero.  Matching with 
caliper = 0.01 results in average LN Relative Wealth of -0.77 (t-stat = -2.25) with 39% of the observations less than 
zero.  However, I note that most of the proxies for product market competition and private benefits of control are 
statistically insignificant in the probit regression, and therefore I do not report these results.  
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rows of Panel A.  The evidence indicates that RM firm owners obtain lower Wealth to Sales than 
matched IPO firms, inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.  
 
5.2. Dunbar (1995) Method: RM and IPO firms 
 One drawback of the propensity score matching method is the inability to address 
unobservable factors that cause firm owners to prefer RMs or IPOs.  Dunbar (1995) proposes a 
method to address self-selection bias.  As described in more detail in Appendix C: Supplemental 
Results, I apply Dunbar’s (1995) method to obtain a forecast of the wealth-to-sales ratio (LN 
Wealth to Sales) that each RM firm owner would have obtained in an IPO.  Then, I compare the 
actual wealth-to-sales ratio obtained in the RM to the forecasted wealth-to-sales ratio that would 
have been obtained in an IPO.  For each RM, I subtract the forecast of LN Wealth to Sales from 
the actual LN Wealth to Sales obtained in the RM.  This measure is equivalent to LN Relative 
Wealth, where the forecast of the wealth-to-sales ratio replaces the matched firm wealth-to-sales 
ratio in Equation (3).   
Table 9, Panel A, presents the mean and median of actual LN Wealth to Sales, forecasted 
LN Wealth to Sales, and LN Relative Wealth where the Dunbar (1995) procedure is applied to 
various samples of RM and IPO firms.  The far right column shows the t-statistic from a t-test 
where the null hypothesis is that LN Relative Wealth is equal to zero.  The results from the full 
sample show that RM firm owners have actual LN Wealth to Sales of 1.17 on average, but the 
forecast of LN Wealth to Sales is 2.29, on average.  The average difference of -1.12 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = -9.42).
26
  Similar results are obtained for the sub-
sample of domestic firms.   
                                                          
26
 I also execute Dunbar’s (1995) method using a probit regression which includes proxies for product market 
competition and private benefits of control (as in Table 5, column (2)).  I find very similar results as those reported.  
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 An issue with the Dunbar (1995) method is that forecasts of wealth are computed based 
on wealth-to-sales ratios of the entire sample of IPO firms.  To the extent that many IPOs are not 
comparable to RM firms, these forecasts could be inaccurate.  To address this concern, I obtain 
forecasts of LN Wealth to Sales from IPO firms that are in similar industries and are of similar 
size as RM firms.  Specifically, I use the Match 1 to 1 sample and another sample, which I refer 
to as the Match 1 to Many sample.  The Match 1 to Many sample includes all the RM firms in the 
Match 1 to 1 sample plus all IPO firms that have sales within +/- 40% and are in the same two-
digit SIC code as any of those RM firms.  There are 192 IPO firms that meet this criterion.  Thus, 
the Match 1 to 1 sample is a sub-sample of the Match 1 to Many sample.  I find that the average 
of LN Relative Wealth is -2.66 (t-stat = -19.43) for the Match 1 to Many sample and -2.65 (t-stat 
= -18.27) for the Match 1 to 1 sample.
27
  In summary, the results provide evidence against 
Hypothesis 4.   
 
5.3. Matching methods: RM and sellout firms 
 I use the same techniques as above to test Hypothesis 5, which says that the wealth 
obtained in a RM is greater than, or equal to, the wealth that could have been obtained in a 
sellout.  In Table 8, Panel B, I present an analysis of LN Relative Wealth for various matching 
procedures where RM firms are matched to sellout firms.  Panel B is structured the same as 
Panel A and shows the mean, median, t-stat (for a test that mean equals zero), and the percentage 
of observations where LN Relative Wealth is greater than zero.  In the first row of Panel B, I 
analyze LN Relative Wealth where the denominator is calculated from sellouts matched on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
For the full sample (N=93), the mean of LN Relative Wealth is -1.13 (t-stat = -9.43).  Again, I note that most of the 
proxies for product market competition and private benefits of control are statistically insignificant in the probit 
regression, and therefore I do not report these results. 
27
I cannot calculate LN Relative Wealth for one RM firm due to missing data on Dispersion of Multiples. 
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industry and size (the Match 1 to 1 sample).  I find that the average of LN Relative Wealth is 0.34 
with a t-stat of 2.07.  Also, the median is 0.50 and 61% of RM firms have LN Relative Wealth 
greater than zero.  This evidence suggests that RM firms obtain wealth levels that are 
significantly greater than that of matched sellout firms, on average.   
 Next, I match based on propensity scores calculated from the probit regression in Table 6, 
column (2).
28
  In the second row of Table 8, Panel B, I analyze LN Relative Wealth where each 
RM firm is matched to the sellout that has the closest propensity score.  The average of LN 
Relative Wealth is 0.04 (t-stat = 0.17) and 46% of the observations have LN Relative Wealth 
greater than zero.  Thus, RM firms appear to obtain a similar level of wealth as matched sellouts 
when matching is done based on propensity scores.  I restrict the match to those where the 
propensity score is within 0.01.  A total of 75 RM firms can be matched and the results again 
show that LN Relative Wealth is positive (0.07), but not significantly different from zero (t-stat = 
0.28).  Matching without replacement shows similar results.   
 In the last four rows of Table 8, Panel B, I restrict the sample to only RM firms and 
sellout firms that are headquartered in the U.S.  I match 56 RM firms to sellout firms and find 
that the average LN Relative Wealth is 0.69 and statistically significant (t-stat = 2.25).  Also, 59% 
of the observations have LN Relative Wealth greater than zero.  Thus, domestic RM firms appear 
to obtain wealth that is greater than matched domestic sellout firms.  The results are slightly 
weaker when the caliper is reduced to 0.01 and when matching is done without replacement.  
Overall, the results provide support to Hypothesis 5.   
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 I provide an analysis of the quality of the match in Appendix C: Supplemental Results.  
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5.4. Dunbar (1995) Method: RM and sellout firms 
 I use Dunbar’s (1995) method to forecast the wealth that an RM firm owner could obtain 
in a sellout.  Table 9, Panel B, shows the mean and median of actual LN Wealth to Sales, 
forecasted LN Wealth to Sales, and Relative Wealth where the forecasts correspond to the wealth 
that RM firm owners could have obtained in a sellout.  For the full sample of RM firms, actual 
LN Wealth to Sales is 1.13 on average while forecasted LN Wealth to Sales is 2.13.   The mean of 
LN Relative Wealth is -1.00 (t-stat = -7.83), which indicates that RM firm owners obtain 
significantly less wealth than they could have obtained in a sellout.  The results are similar for a 
sample of only domestic firms.  On this sub-sample, the mean of LN Relative Wealth is -1.62 (t-
stat = -8.91).  This evidence, using the full sample of sellouts to forecast LN Wealth to Sales, 
does not support Hypothesis 5.  
 Next, I calculate forecasted LN Wealth to Sales and LN Relative Wealth on the Match 1 to 
1 sample and the Match 1 to Many sample of RM and sellout firms.  The Match 1 to Many 
sample includes all the RM firms in the Match 1 to 1 sample plus 380 sellouts that have sales 
within +/- 40% and are in the same two-digit SIC code as any of those RM firms.  When using 
the Match 1 to Many sample, actual LN Wealth to Sales is 1.24, on average, while forecasted LN 
Wealth to Sales is 1.20.   The mean of LN Relative Wealth is 0.04 (t-stat = 0.24), which indicates 
that RM firm owners obtain roughly the same wealth that they could have obtained in a sellout.  
In the Match 1 to 1 sample, the mean of actual LN Wealth to Sales is 1.24, of forecasted LN 
Wealth to Sales is 0.37, and of LN Relative Wealth is 0.86 (t-stat = 5.08).  Thus, compared to 
sellouts of similar size and in the same industry, RM firm owners obtain similar or greater wealth 
compared to what could have been obtained in a sellout.  This evidence supports Hypothesis 5.   
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5.5. Cross-sectional variation in LN Relative Wealth 
 In Table 10, I examine whether or not LN Relative Wealth varies cross-sectionally with 
characteristics of RM firms and characteristics of the public firm.  Specifically, I estimate the 
equation  
 
 
                                                       
                                       
(4) 
 
where the unit of observation is RM firm i.  The private firm characteristics include an indicator 
for sales less than $50 million, Log of Age, Foreign, High Tech, Non-Big 4 Auditor, VC Backing, 
an indicator for whether or not the private firm hired a financial advisor, and an indicator for 
whether or not the private firm CEO has public company experience.  The public firm 
characteristics include an indicator for shell companies and an indicator for whether or not the 
public company has industry expertise in the private firm industry.   
 In Table 10, Panel A, LN Relative Wealth is calculated by comparing RM firms to IPO 
firms.  In column (1), LN Relative Wealth is calculated using the propensity score method 
(caliper = 1, with replacement) on the full sample of firms.  In column (2), LN Relative Wealth is 
calculated using the Match 1 to 1 sample of firms.  In column (3), LN Relative Wealth is 
calculated using the Dunbar (1995) method on the full sample of firms.  In column (4), LN 
Relative Wealth is calculated using the Dunbar (1995) method on the Match 1 to 1 sample of 
firms. 
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 Column (1) shows that LN Relative Wealth is greater in magnitude when the private 
company CEO has experience in a publicly-traded company, although the statistical significance 
is weak (t-stat = 1.694).  The size, age, foreign status, high tech status, auditor reputation, and 
presence of VC backing of the company does not significantly affect LN Relative Wealth.  Also, 
there appears to be no effect if the public company is a shell, or if public company 
managers/directors have industry experience in the private firm’s industry.  Column (2) shows 
similar results.  In columns (3), LN Relative Wealth is greater for RM firms that did not employ a 
Big 4 auditor.  Column (4) shows a similar result and also shows that foreign based firms have 
lower LN Relative Wealth.  I also find that LN Relative Wealth is positively associated with 
private company CEOs who have experience in a publicly-traded company (t-stat = 2.741).   
 Panel B of Table 10 is structured the same as Panel A.  However, in Panel B, LN Relative 
Wealth is calculated by comparing RM firms to sellout firms.  Columns (1) and (2) show a 
positive association between LN Relative Wealth and small firms and between LN Relative 
Wealth and firms with VC backing.  Column (4) shows a positive association between LN 
Relative Wealth and foreign firms, firms with VC backing, and firms where the CEO has 
experience in a publicly-traded company. 
  
5.6. Discussion of Results 
 The above empirical tests are designed to test Hypotheses 4 and 5, which state that the 
wealth obtained in a RM is greater than, or equal to, the wealth that could have been obtained in 
either an IPO or a sellout.  The evidence from industry and size matched samples, propensity 
score matched samples, and forecasts of wealth that control for self-selection bias clearly 
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indicates that RM firm owners achieve significantly lower levels of wealth than IPO firm 
owners.
29
  Therefore, Hypothesis 4 can be rejected.   
 The evidence from industry and size matched samples and propensity score matched 
samples supports Hypothesis 5.  Specifically, RM firm owners obtain wealth that is greater than, 
or equal to, the wealth that sellout owners obtain.  The evidence from Dunbar’s (1995) method is 
more nuanced.  When estimating forecasts based on the full sample of sellouts, RM firm owners 
appear worse off.  When using matched samples to estimate forecasts, RM firms owners appear 
no worse off or better off than sellout firm owners.  When taken together, the evidence supports 
Hypothesis 5.      
 
6. Synergy and Public Firm Valuation 
 In this section, I calculate the synergy generated in RMs and examine how the synergy is 
divided between the private firm owners and public firm owners.   
 
6.1. Synergy calculation  
Synergy is created in a RM if the combined firm is worth more than the sum of the stand-
alone values of the private firm and public firm (Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, 2002).  I calculate 
synergy as the combined firm’s equity value (         ) less the stand-alone equity values of the 
public company (       ) and the private company (        ), as in Equation (5).    
 
                                   
 
                                     
(5) 
                                                          
29
 In Appendix C: Supplemental Results, I find similar results if I replicate the analysis using wealth-to-assets 
measures for RM and IPO firms rather than wealth-to-sales measures. 
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The equity value of the combined firm and public firm are calculated based on data from 
CRSP.  The value of the combined firm is measured by the share price multiplied by the number 
of shares outstanding after the deal is complete.  The stand-alone value of the public firm is 
measured as the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding one day before the 
announcement of the transaction.   
The value of the private firm is challenging to obtain since, by definition, the firm does 
not have publicly traded stock.  I use two methods to calculate the stand-alone value of the 
private firm: 1) private firm valuations produced by financial advisors to the public firm and 2) 
private firm valuations inferred from industry multiples of takeovers of private targets by private 
acquirers.   
The benefit of financial advisor valuations is that the valuation is specific to each firm 
and includes a detailed discounted cash flow analysis.  The downside to financial advisor 
valuations is that the valuation may be inflated.  Managers (and boards of directors) of public 
companies in RMs can benefit from inflated private firm valuations that help convince 
shareholders to vote for the completion of the RM and/or protect management from lawsuits that 
can arise following a bad deal.  Thus, managers may encourage advisors to present inflated 
valuations of the target or choose advisors who have a reputation for issuing inflated valuations.  
In contrast, valuations inferred from private-private takeovers are not subject to manipulation by 
the public firm managers.  While valuations inferred from private-private takeovers are not truly 
stand-alone firm values, they are constructed with prices of firms that choose to remain private.  
However, the downside to valuations inferred from private-private takeovers is that the valuation 
multiple will contain a portion of any synergy generated in the transaction.  Thus, the valuation 
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may be biased upwards.  Also, the valuation is inferred from industry multiples rather than 
calculated based on the individual private firm’s future cash flows.  In the end, I believe that the 
issues associated with financial advisor valuations render them unreliable and more emphasis 
should be put on valuations inferred from private-private takeovers. 
I also make two adjustments to the synergy measure to deal with cash transactions.  First, 
I subtract the value of private placement funds as these will otherwise inflate the value of the 
combined firm.  Second, I add back cash paid to the private firm owners in the transaction as 
these funds are part of the synergy accruing to the private firm owners.  Thus, the variable 
Synergy is equal to the market value of the combined firm’s equity minus the market value of the 
public firm’s equity minus the equity value of the private firm minus private placement funds 
plus cash paid to private firm owners. 
 
6.2. Data on private firm valuations by financial advisors 
The data for stand-alone private firm valuations produced by financial advisors are 
obtained from the public firm’s filings around the RM transaction.  These data are available for a 
sub-sample of 60 RMs in which the board of directors of the public firm obtained and disclosed a 
fairness opinion.
30
  A fairness opinion, written by a financial advisor, renders an opinion about 
whether or not the transaction is fair, from a financial point of view, to the firm’s shareholders.31  
The fairness opinion is obtained after the terms of the merger have been agreed upon and it only 
says whether or not the transaction is fair, given the terms of the merger.  It does not make a 
recommendation about whether shareholders should vote for the merger, offer guidance on how 
                                                          
30
 Many public shell companies are required to combine with firms which are valued at 80% or more of the value of 
the public firm’s assets.  Fairness opinions are one tool used to demonstrate that the deal meets this criteria.  
However, many public companies which do not have to meet the 80% rule obtain fairness opinions as well. 
31
 The phrase “fair, from a financial point of view” is not well defined (Cain and Denis 2013).   
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the public firm should structure the transaction, or offer strategic alternatives to the public 
company.   
With a few exceptions, the financial advisor does not provide investment banking or 
other advisory services to the public company.  The fees paid to financial advisors are almost 
always flat fees that are not contingent on the merger outcome.  The fee ranges from $50,000 to 
$500,000, but are typically between $75,000 and $100,000.  The most common financial 
advisors in my sample are Capitalink (8 firms) and Jefferies & Company (5 firms).  The board of 
directors rendered the fairness opinion for 8 firms.  Financial advisors typically have access to 
non-public internal accounting records and management forecasts from both the public and 
private firms to assist with their valuation of the private firm.  The private firm managers often 
meet with the financial advisor as well.   
I read the filings and record the valuations of the private firm.  The valuations are 
typically done based on a discounted cash flow analysis (DCF), a comparable public firm 
analysis (Comparables), or a similar transaction analysis (Transactions).  The similar transaction 
is often a regular merger rather than a reverse merger, although in a few cases reverse mergers 
are used.  Typically, advisors disclose a range of valuations from which I record the lowest and 
highest valuation for each methodology.  In a small number of cases, the advisor discloses 
several different valuations and I record a median valuation in addition to the low and high 
valuation.  If the advisor only discloses one valuation, or if the text of the fairness opinion 
focuses on one valuation as the most reliable, then I record this valuation as the “best” valuation.   
Financial advisors typically disclose either an equity valuation or an enterprise valuation.  
In either case, I use the information in the fairness opinion and/or the firm’s financial statements 
to calculate the value of the firm’s net debt and subsequently obtain both enterprise and equity 
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valuations for each firm.  The variables Enterprise Value and Equity Value are the best valuation, 
if available.  If not available, I use the median valuation.  If neither the best nor median are 
available, I use the midpoint of the low and high valuation.  For DCF valuations, 9 of the 51 are 
best valuations and the remaining are the midpoint of the low and high valuations. 
 Table 11, Panel A presents frequency counts for 60 private firm valuations.  The 
breakdown across valuation types is: 51 DCF, 49 Comparables, and 39 Transactions.  Many 
firms receive valuations from more than one method as 40 firms have both DCF and 
Comparables, 35 have both DCF and Transactions, 38 have both Comparables and Transactions, 
and 34 have all three types of valuations.  Table 11, Panel B shows the differences between the 
sub-sample of RM firms with and without valuations.  RM firms with valuations have a 
significantly larger level of sales, on average ($100.57 versus $41.65 million), than other RM 
firms.  Also, they are significantly older, on average (16.95 versus 6.24 years), and less likely to 
be a foreign firm (28% versus 50%).  There is no significant difference in Wealth to Sales, the 
presence of VC backing, or the percentage of public firms that are shell companies. 
 In Table 11, Panel C, I report summary statistics on valuations.  In discussing the results, 
I focus on the median rather than the mean due to outliers.  The median of Enterprise Value, 
based on the DCF valuation, is $179.35 million.  The median of Enterprise Value to Sales is 
2.82.  The median of Equity Value, based on the DCF valuation, is $145.50 million and the 
median of Equity Value to Sales is 2.37.  Next, I consider the return to the private firm owners by 
comparing the post-deal equity wealth of firm owners (Equity Wealth) to the pre-deal equity 
value.  The median of Equity Wealth to Equity Value is 0.48.  This finding is puzzling because it 
suggests that private firm owners lose more than half of their (equity) wealth by completing a 
RM.  However, this is consistent with financial advisors producing inflated valuations of private 
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firms.  The median discount rate used in the DCF analysis is 17.50.  The rest of Panel C presents 
similar statistics for the Comparables and Transactions methodologies.   In general, the DCF 
methodology gives the highest valuations followed by the Comparables methodology and then 
the Transactions methodology. 
 
6.3. Synergy from financial advisor valuations and public firm valuation 
 I calculate the synergy generated in each RM.  Table 12, Panel A, shows that the median 
of Synergy is -$74.02 million when using the DCF method to value the private firm.  I find that 
the median is -$52.96 million when using the Comparables method and -$4.46 million when 
using the Transactions method.  In 70% of the deals, Synergy is negative when using the DCF 
method.  For the Comparables method this number is 66% and for the Transactions method this 
number is 52%.  Thus, it appears that the majority of RMs fail to generate positive Synergy. 
 The next three rows in the table show Synergy calculated using the low equity values 
reported in the range of financial advisor valuations.  If the equity values of the private firm are 
accurate, this should give an upper estimate of Synergy.  Again, I find negative median Synergy 
for the DCF method and Comparables method (-$38.54 and -$15.62).  Using the low DCF 
valuation, 68% of the observations have Synergy less than zero.  The Transactions method shows 
$15.60 as the median Synergy with 39% as negative values.        
 The sample is restricted to 33 observations when I require data on private firm valuations 
and market price data for public firms.  I loosen this restriction, and replace the market value of 
the public firm with the book value of assets or the book value of equity (assets minus liabilities).  
Panel A shows that median Synergy is again negative for the majority of RMs using both of these 
methods.   
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 Next, I examine the returns to public companies in RMs.  In Table 12 Panel B, I calculate 
the returns to 56 public companies that conducted a RM.  The average (median) market value for 
these firms is $87 ($48) million one day before the transaction.  The market value of the 
combined firm is $173 ($105) million at the close of trading on the first day after completion, of 
which an average of 38.76% (34.41%) is owned by the original public firm shareholders.  I 
calculate the percentage change in the value of their holdings (PubCo Return) as 19% on average 
and -17% at the median.  Despite the large magnitude, the average percentage change is not 
statistically different from zero (t-stat = 1.33).  Thus, the returns to public firm shareholders are 
not significantly different from zero, on average. 
 
6.4. Valuations from takeovers of private firms by private firms 
 Next, I infer valuations of private firms from private-private takeovers.  I construct a 
sample of private-private takeovers from Pratt’s Stats data.  The sample is 286 takeovers from 
2005 to 2010.  The sample includes private firms with sales of $5 million or more.  Table 13, 
Panel A, provides a basic description of the data.  There are 51 two-digit SIC code industries 
represented by the 286 takeovers.  The average level of sales for private targets is $29.9 million 
while the median is $9.10 million.  Thus, these firms are smaller than the RM firms in my 
sample. 
   I calculate the median price-to-sales ratio for private targets for each two-digit SIC code.  
Then, I multiply the industry median price-to-sales ratio by the actual sales of the private firm in 
each RM transaction to obtain the inferred value of the private firm.  Finally, I calculate Synergy 
using the inferred value of the private firm.  To make comparisons to previous calculations of 
Synergy, I only use the 60 RM firms that have valuations from financial advisors in these 
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calculations.  Table 13, Panel B shows data on 56 RM firms for which calculations can be made.  
On average, there are 6.73 private-private takeovers in the RM firm’s industry from which to 
calculate price-to-sales ratios.  The average price-to-sales ratio is 0.83.  The inferred value of the 
56 private firms averages $42.19 million, while the median is $25.95 million.  This value is less 
than the average (median) of Enterprise Value calculated from DCF valuations of $249.61 
($179.35) million shown in Table 11, Panel C. The average of Synergy for the 36 firms with 
available data is $45.08 million while the median is $20.60.  Thus, the value of Synergy changes 
dramatically when private firms are valued according to industry multiples of private-private 
takeovers rather than valuations produced by financial advisors. 
   
6.5. Cross-sectional variation  
 In Table 14, I examine whether Synergy (calculated from DCF valuation) and Synergy 
(calculated from private-private valuations) vary systematically with characteristics of RMs.  
Specifically, I estimate the equation  
 
                                                                       
                                
(6) 
 
where the unit of observation is RM i.  The private firm characteristics include Log of Age, 
Foreign, High Tech, Non-Big 4 Auditor, VC Backing, Industry Operating Margins, Industry 
Tobin’s Q, and an indicator for whether or not the private firm CEO has public company 
experience.  The public firm characteristics include an indicator for shell companies, an indicator 
for whether or not the public company has industry expertise in the private firm industry, an 
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indicator for whether or not managers and/or directors remain with the combined firm, and an 
indicator for whether or not some of the operations of the public company remain with the 
combined firm.  The deal characteristics include Small Business Optimism, Market Returns, and 
Market Volatility.   
In Table 14 the dependent variable is Synergy (calculated from DCF valuation) in 
column (1) and Synergy (calculated from private-private valuations) in column (2).  Table 14, 
column (1) shows that Synergy (calculated from DCF valuation) is significantly higher when the 
private firm operates in an industry with higher margins or Tobin’s Q.  This evidence supports 
Hypothesis 6, which says that synergy is greater when the private firm has access to better 
quality projects.  I also find that synergy is significantly higher when the public firm has 
expertise in the private firm’s industry, the private company CEO has experience at a publicly 
traded company, overall market returns are higher before the deal announcement, or the firm is 
headquartered outside the U.S.  In column (2), Synergy (calculated from private-private 
valuations) is positively associated with Small Business Optimism and VC Backing.       
 
6.6. Discussion of results  
 Taken at face value, the results in this section indicate that RMs fail to generate positive 
synergy, on average, when using valuations of private firms from financial advisors.  However, 
an alternative explanation is that financial advisors provide inflated valuations to the public 
company which drive the estimate of synergy down mechanically.  This explanation is consistent 
with Cain and Denis (2013), who find that financial advisors to acquirers systematically inflate 
the valuations of the target.  Synergy is positive on average (and at the median) when valuations 
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of private firms are calculated using multiples of price-to-sales ratios from private-private 
takeovers.    
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper examines RMs, IPOs, and sellouts as exit mechanisms for private firm 
owners.  I find that information asymmetries influence the choice between the three mechanisms.  
Firms that are smaller, headquartered outside the U.S., or execute a transaction in more volatile 
markets are more likely to choose either a RM or a sellout than an IPO.  I also find that product 
market considerations influence the choice of exit mechanism.  Firms that execute a transaction 
when small business owners are more optimistic and foreign firms are more likely to choose a 
RM compared to a sellout.  I find that proxies for the ability to compete in product markets such 
as firm size, industry growth opportunities, and lack of a large competitor influence the choice of 
an IPO compared to a sellout.  I find mixed evidence for the influence of private benefits of 
control on the choice of exit mechanism.    
 I examine the wealth obtained in RMs compared to IPOs and sellouts using matching 
methods as well as methods that control for self-selection bias.  The evidence demonstrates that 
RM firm owners obtain less wealth per dollar of sales than firm owners of seemingly comparable 
IPO firms.  In conjunction with the evidence that RM firms are significantly different from IPO 
firms along observable characteristics, I interpret this finding as evidence that many RM firms do 
not have the option of executing an IPO.  However, RM firm owners obtain the same or greater 
wealth per dollar of sales than comparable sellout firms.  Thus, a sellout appears to be a viable 
alternative to a RM for many firms. 
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 Finally, I examine whether or not RMs generate positive synergy.  I find that RMs 
generate negative synergy, on average, when synergy is calculated using private firm valuations 
from financial advisors to the public firm board of directors.  In contrast, I find that synergy is 
positive, on average, when synergy is calculated using valuations of private firms that are 
inferred from industry multiples of private-private takeovers.  Overall, the evidence leads me to 
conclude that financial advisors produce inflated valuations of private firms that mechanically 
drive down the estimate of synergy.   
 This paper extends the existing literature on exit mechanisms by examining RMs, IPOs, 
and sellouts in a unified framework.  Also, this is the first paper to examine the wealth generated 
in RMs compared to IPOs and sellouts.  My analysis informs regulators by demonstrating that a 
sellout is a viable alternative exit mechanism for many RM firms, thus mitigating negative 
effects from placing restrictions on the listing of RM firms on major U.S. exchanges.  Finally, I 
uncover evidence that financial advisors to public firm boards of directors produce inflated 
valuations of private firms in RMs.      
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Appendix A: Institutional Details on Reverse Mergers 
 
Description of a reverse merger and examples 
 A reverse merger (RM) is a business combination between a private firm and a public 
firm.  The public firm often has no operations and assets that mainly consist of cash.  The private 
firm shareholders and/or management control the combined company after the transaction which 
carries on the business of the private firm.  See Sjostrom (2008) for a nice overview of the 
reverse merger process and the players involved.     
 Reverse mergers are typically structured so that the public firm (or a newly created 
subsidiary of the public firm) survives the deal.  The public firm is legally the acquirer and 
therefore the surviving entity.  However, the private firm shareholders are issued a large enough 
portion of the public firm’s equity to give them a majority stake in the surviving firm.  In other 
words, the public firm shareholders are diluted out of their majority ownership position to a 
minority ownership position.  While the public firm is legally the acquirer and the surviving 
entity, the historical accounting statements of the public company are replaced by those of the 
private company.  To the best of my understanding, the term “reverse” in reverse merger refers 
to the fact that the legal surviving entity is different than (reversed) from the surviving firm for 
accounting purposes.         
 As an example, consider the February 2009 RM of privately held Cardiovascular Systems 
and NASDAQ listed Replidyne.  Cardiovascular Systems is a medical device company that filed 
a registration statement to conduct an IPO in January 2008, but withdrew it due to equity market 
conditions.  Replidyne was a biopharmaceutical company that suspended its operating activities 
in August 2008 after a series of setbacks in the development of its main product.  As of 
December 2008, Replidyne had about $34 million in cash on its balance sheet and relatively few 
liabilities.  After the RM, Cardiovascular Systems shareholders held about 80% of the equity of 
the combined firm and appointed a majority of the directors.  The Cardiovascular Systems CEO 
and management team operate the combined firm, which continued to trade on NASDAQ.  
 Another example is the RM of privately held Summer Infant (Summer) with the public 
shell company KBL Healthcare Acquisition II (KBL).  KBL’s IPO was on April 27, 2005 with a 
business plan to effect a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition or other similar 
business combination with an unidentified operating business in the healthcare industry.  The net 
proceeds of the IPO, $49,168,000, were deposited into a trust account.  In February 2006, KBL 
was introduced to Summer Infant, a company in the juvenile health, safety and wellness products 
industry.  An acquisition agreement was signed on September 1, 2006.  Summer shareholders 
received $20 million in cash and 3,916,667 in KBL common stock (25.9% of outstanding 
common stock).  Also, KBL will assume $11.7 million of Summer’s net debt.  The deal was 
approved March 6, 2007 by KBL stockholders.  Summer stock trades on NASDAQ (SUMR).  
One of KBL’s directors remains as Chairman.  Summer’s management team runs the combined 
company.   
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Reverse mergers and the Securities and Exchange Commission  
 Although a RM is legally a business combination, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) considers them to be capital transactions in substance. According to SEC 
interpretations and guidance on accounting and financial reporting, “the merger of a private 
operating company into a non-operating public shell corporation with nominal net assets 
typically results in the owners and management of the private company having actual or effective 
operating control of the combined company after the transaction, with shareholders of the former 
public shell continuing only as passive investors. These transactions are considered by the staff 
to be capital transactions in substance, rather than business combinations. That is, the transaction 
is equivalent to the issuance of stock by the private company for the net monetary assets of the 
shell corporation, accompanied by a recapitalization”.32 
 Many public company acquirers are considered shell companies.  In July 2005, the SEC 
defined a shell company as a registrant with: no or nominal operations and either no or nominal 
assets, assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or assets consisting of any amount 
of cash and cash equivalents and nominal other asset.  Registrants must declare in their filings if 
they are a shell company and must disclose changes in shell company status in an 8-K.  A 
company can achieve shell status if the firm: 1) went public and raised capital in order to seek a 
private firm with which to conduct a reverse merger (these are called blank check or special 
purpose acquisition vehicles), 2) is in development stage with few assets, or 3) is a defunct 
operating companies that has sold most of its assets.  In addition, the SEC required firms that 
conduct a RM to disclose, in an 8-K filing, all information that would be on a Form 10 or 10-SB. 
This disclosure change greatly expanded the amount of information available on firms that 
conduct a RM.  Prior to this rule change, RM firms disclosed very limited information about 
themselves when conducting a RM. 
 Recent SEC pronouncements and regulation have impacted the RM mechanism of going 
public.  In June 2011, the SEC published an investor bulletin which warned investors to be wary 
of reverse merger companies.
33
  This bulletin was motivated by a large number of reverse merger 
firms that had recently made a financial restatement, been delisted from a stock exchange, or the 
managers were accused of fraud.  See Sterngold (2011) for an example of the types of fraud that 
have occurred in RM firms.  In November 2011, the SEC approved regulations which limit the 
ability of RM firms to trade on the NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE.  A firm that executes a RM to 
become public must trade for one year on a different exchange and maintain a requisite 
minimum share price for 30 of the 60 days prior to its listing application and the exchange’s 
decision to list.
34
  These “seasoning” rules are intended to protect investors from fraud in RM 
firms.       
  
                                                          
32
 See:  http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfactfaq.htm 
33
 The bulletin can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf 
34
 The SEC’s press release can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm 
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Sample of 110 Reverse Mergers 
 
Date PERMNO Private Firm Name 
1 8/16/2005 77097 IDM, S.A. 
2 11/4/2005 91286 VirtualScopics, LLC 
3 9/21/2005 76020 Synergetics, Inc. 
4 11/30/2005 89831 Syntax Groups Corporation 
5 6/10/2005 91140 Kuhlman 
6 5/25/2005 91180 Pegasus Wireless Corp 
7 5/20/2005 91164 House of Taylor Jewelry 
8 4/29/2005 91170 Blue Concept,LLC 
9 3/23/2005 86165 Pacific Ethanol, Inc 
10 5/20/2005 90159 Lander Co., Inc. 
11 10/31/2005 91211 Aurora Energy Ltd. 
12 1/14/2005 90738 Particle Drilling Technologies, Inc. 
13 11/8/2005 90976 State Harvest Holdings Limited 
14 12/31/2006 86080 Protalix Ltd 
15 12/28/2006 91661 Partner Success Holdings Limited 
16 12/15/2006 83790 BPO Management Services 
17 12/26/2006 91665 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Holdings Corp 
18 11/29/2006 92298 InfoLogix, Inc. 
19 10/31/2006 92130 Pipex Therapeutics, Inc 
20 10/31/2006 92216 Nanchang Best Animal Husbandry Co. 
21 10/27/2006 92197 Sureland Industrial Fire Safety Limited 
22 10/11/2006 92047 Kinfair Holdings Limited 
23 6/28/2006 91355 Hill International, Inc. 
24 10/3/2006 88148 TorreyPines Therapeutics 
25 8/30/2006 90727 FiberTower 
26 5/8/2006 91283 RAM Energy, Inc. 
27 9/13/2006 88434 Infinity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
28 11/29/2006 90795 Jamba Juice Company 
29 5/5/2006 89863 Micromet AG 
30 3/27/2006 90098 Cyclacel 
31 2/9/2006 91092 etrials Worldwide, Inc. 
32 11/24/2006 91913 Yucheng Technologies Limited 
33 8/16/2006 84420 Predix Pharmaceuticals Holdings, Inc. 
34 12/18/2007 77865 Rise and Grow Limited 
35 12/12/2007 91136 American Apparel Inc. 
36 11/13/2007 91091 The Orchard 
37 6/5/2007 87838 VIA Pharmaceuticals, Inc 
38 10/2/2007 89756 HowStuffWorks 
39 9/17/2007 92686 Nile Therapeutics, Inc. 
40 8/10/2007 68145 Neonode Inc 
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 Date PERMNO Private Firm Name 
41 8/3/2007 90926 PharmAthene, Inc. 
42 7/23/2007 92553 Sino Palace Holdings Limited 
43 7/5/2007 87084 VirnetX 
44 6/29/2007 92589 Continental Development Limited 
45 6/8/2007 92456 Athersys, Inc. 
46 5/15/2007 86812 M & I Electric Industries, Inc. 
47 10/1/2007 88830 Snowflake Entities 
48 4/17/2007 38755 Southern Bay Oil & Gas L.P. 
49 3/30/2007 92037 Equity Broadcasting Corporation 
50 3/27/2007 82567 Acuity Pharmaceuticals and Froptix Corporation 
51 10/12/2007 90826 eToys Direct 
52 3/6/2007 91909 Summer Infant, Inc. 
53 6/21/2007 92193 Alsius Corporation 
54 2/12/2007 84321 New Motion 
55 2/12/2007 91817 ClearPoint Resources, Inc. 
56 7/2/2007 90830 American Community Newspapers Inc. 
57 1/19/2007 92218 Total Site Solutions 
58 1/12/2007 92054 Towerstream Corporation 
59 9/20/2007 92769 HollySys Holdings 
60 12/24/2008 93130 Xinda 
61 11/10/2008 92936 Shisheng 
62 10/31/2008 90183 Cornerstone BioPharma Holdings, Inc. 
63 10/15/2008 91161 VBV LLC 
64 9/3/2008 92982 Deer International Group Ltd 
65 8/19/2008 82526 OncoGenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc 
66 8/11/2008 77186 Model Reorg, Inc. 
67 7/31/2008 92773 Primoris Corporation 
68 6/26/2008 90777 Crusader entities 
69 9/19/2008 90873 PepperBall 
70 4/14/2008 92875 Shenyang Taiyu Machinery & Electronic Equipment 
71 3/7/2008 10258 Celldex Therapeutics, Inc. 
72 2/22/2008 92105 Boise Paper Group 
73 2/12/2008 80452 Dara BioSciences, Inc. 
74 2/12/2008 91199 The Clark Group, Inc. 
75 2/8/2008 92768 Color Man Holdings Limited 
76 1/28/2008 48020 Frederick’s of Hollywood, Inc 
77 1/16/2008 92805 Raygere Limited 
78 1/4/2008 92689 XLNT Veterinary Care, Inc. 
79 1/18/2008 92519 GaoKe Head Dragon Holdings Limited 
80 4/9/2008 92749 China Cablecom Ltd 
 
60 
 
 Date PERMNO Private Firm Name 
81 8/12/2008 91453 Global Ship Lease, Inc. 
82 6/24/2009 92159 China Networks Media Limited 
83 12/23/2009 88244 Wuhan Vogue-Show Jewelry Co 
84 12/8/2009 93188 Cambium Learning, Inc 
85 12/14/2009 88177 Bio-Quant 
86 11/5/2009 93353 Hongkong Chenxin International Development 
87 10/30/2009 92486 SearchMedia International Limited 
88 10/29/2009 92547 Ultimate Escapes Holdings, LLC 
89 10/21/2009 92507 Windrace International Company Limited 
90 10/15/2009 92422 Hong Kong Mandefu Holding Limited 
91 12/21/2009 90968 Neuromed Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
92 9/29/2009 92596 Iridium Holdings LLC 
93 9/25/2009 93031 Resolute Natural Resources 
94 9/22/2009 77011 Gold Lion Holding Limited 
95 6/26/2009 93274 China Net Online Media Group Limited 
96 5/28/2009 93195 Westway Holdings Corporation 
97 3/31/2009 92541 HUGHES Telematics, Inc 
98 2/25/2009 91365 Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. 
99 1/30/2009 91279 Transcept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
100 1/27/2009 85293 ARCA biopharma, Inc 
101 6/1/2009 86444 VGX PHARMACEUTICALS 
102 4/9/2009 93075 AutoChina Group Inc. 
103 11/20/2009 92475 Jinjiang Hengda Ceramics Co., Ltd 
104 7/2/2010 12485 Liaoning Creative Bellows Co., Ltd 
105 4/22/2010 12311 Keyuan International Group Limited 
106 4/7/2010 93106 CAMAC Energy Holdings Limited 
107 3/9/2010 84581 Pernix Therapeutics, Inc 
108 2/5/2010 88278 Top Favour, SinoCoking 
109 10/1/2010 91969 Dialogic Corporation 
110 8/18/2010 92265 Shanghai ConnGame Network 
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Appendix B: Variable Construction 
Variable Details 
Annual Sales  RM: Annual sales is net revenues disclosed in annual financial statements close to the first trade of the 
firm’s stock.  In about 10% of the sample, sales are estimated from quarterly or semi-annual data.  
IPO: Annual sales before the offering, from Compustat 
Sellout: Net sales from SDC 
Percent Retained RM: Percent of firm retained, including any equity purchased in private placement by original owners. 
IPO: One minus ((primary shares + secondary shares)/SHROUT) 
Equity Wealth RM & IPO: Market value of firm at end of first trade on CRSP multiplied by Percent Retained 
 
Wealth RM: Equity Wealth plus net cash received in transaction plus other consideration.  Net cash is cash 
consideration less cash paid for shares in private placement. 
IPO: Equity Wealth plus proceeds from sales of secondary shares (offer price multiplied by shares sold) 
Sellout: Deal value, adjusted so that stock consideration reflects the acquirer’s post-deal closing stock 
price. 
Small Business 
Optimism 
Level of Small Business Optimism Index measured in the month before the announcement of the RM or 
sellout, or before the initial filing date of the IPO. 
Tangible Assets Net Property, Plant, and Equipment divided by Total Assets (PPENT/AT) 
R&D Dummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports R&D expenses (XRD) and 0 otherwise.   
HighTech Following Loughran and Ritter (2004), if the firm’s four-digit SIC code is: 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 
3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 
3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, or 7379 then the firm is a high tech firm.   
Market Return Buy and hold return to the value weighted CRSP index (vwretd) over the 126 trading days (about 6 
months) before the announcement of the RM or sellout or the initial filing date of the IPO. 
Market Volatility Standard Deviation of the daily returns of the value weighted CRSP index (vwretd) over the 126 trading 
days (about 6 months) before the announcement of the RM or sellout or the initial filing date of the IPO. 
Dispersion of 
Multiples 
The market value to sales ratio of each firm in Compustat is calculated at the end of every calendar 
quarter.  This ratio is winsorized each industry-quarter due to outliers.  Then, for each industry-quarter, 
the standard deviation of this ratio is calculated.  Industry is four-digit SIC code.   
Leader Market 
Share 
Sales of the largest firm in the four-digit SIC code industry in Compustat divided by total industry sales. 
Industry Tobin’s Q Median Tobin’s Q of firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry in Compustat 
Private Benefits 
Industry 
Dummy that equals 1 for firms in two-digit SIC codes 13 (Oil & Gas Extraction), 28 (Chemicals), 29 (Oil 
Refining), and 37 (Transportation Equipment) and 0 otherwise.  Bayar and Chemmanur (2012) identify 
these industries as having high private benefits of control, based on data on managerial perks in Rajan and 
Wulf (2006).   
Family Name Dummy that equals 1 if the firm’s name contains the name of a person or family and 0 otherwise. 
Non-Big 4 Auditor Dummy that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is not Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Industry Operating 
Margins 
Average operating margins (operating income / sales) of firms in the four-digit SIC code industry in 
Compustat. 
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Table 1: Frequency of RMs, IPOs, and Sellouts 
Panel A shows the volume of RMs, IPOs, and sellouts, where few restrictions are placed on the data.  RM data are from Comment (2010) while 
IPO and sellout data are from SDC.  Panel B reports the volume of RMs, IPOs, and sellouts in my final sample.  RM data in Panel B are from 
hand collection and Comment (2010) while IPO and sellout data are from SDC.  In Panel B, IPOs must be listed on CRSP and have financial 
statement data on Compustat while sellouts must have data on the target’s annual sales.   
Panel A: Broad Sample          
Year Comment RMs  SDC IPOs  SDC Sellouts  
2005 238  178  936  
2006 227  175  971  
2007 248  181  927  
2008 208  31  658  
2009 216  47  370  
2010 323  136  506  
Total 1,460   748   4,368  
 
Panel B: Final Sample                     
            Sales < $50M     Foreign Firms 
Year RMs IPOs Sellouts   RMs IPOs Sellouts   RMs IPOs Sellouts 
2005 13 108 176   10 36 128   2 10 32 
2006 20 118 152   15 52 113   9 13 29 
2007 26 118 171   19 53 119   5 9 29 
2008 22 12 186   10 3 145   10 1 17 
2009 22 34 67   11 3 55   11 3 7 
2010 7 65 53   4 22 40   5 11 11 
Total 110 455 805   69 169 600   42 47 125 
Percent of Total     63% 37% 75%  38% 10% 16% 
  
66 
 
 
Table 2: Reverse Merger Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of the sample of 110 RM transactions from 2005-2010. Panel A shows frequency counts of deal characteristics and private firm characteristics.  Panel B 
shows statistics on ownership of various parties after the deal, consideration paid, and assets of private firms and public firms in RMs.  Private firms in RMs are referred to as 
“PrvCo” while the public company is referred to as “PubCo”.  All data are hand collected from SEC filings except for stock price data which are from CRSP.  Dollar values are in 
millions of 2009 dollars. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
Panel A: Frequency Counts                 
 
  Num Percent   
 
Num Percent 
Deal Characteristics         Public company experience  
All Equity Transaction   83 75%   PrvCo CEO has public company experience 42 42% 
Mix of Equity, Cash, and Other Consideration  27 25%   PrvCo CFO has public company experience  31 28% 
          
PrvCo director or other executive officer has public 
company experience 
49 45% 
PrvCo is based in U.S.   68 62%           
PrvCo is not based in U.S.   42 38%   Who becomes CEO of Combined Company? 
          PrvCo CEO becomes Combined Co CEO 101 92% 
PubCo is a Shell   64 58%   PrvCo CEO and PubCo CEO are co-CEOs  3 3% 
PubCo is an operating company  46 42%   Public Co CEO remains as Combined Co CEO 6 5% 
                  
Type of Shell         Who controls board of Combined Co? 
     Blank Check / SPAC   32 29%   PrvCo directors replace all PubCo directors 37 33% 
     Defunct Operating Company   22 20%   PrvCo directors control a majority of board seats 67 61% 
     No or nominal operations 10 9%   PrvCo directors control a minority of board seats 6 5% 
Type of Operating Company                 
     Seeking Strategic Alternatives   27 25%   Other        
     Operations will be spun off / sold   7 6%   Concurrent private placement 21 19% 
     Operations are likely to remain   12 11%   PubCo has industry expertise 62 56% 
          PubCo CFO remains as CFO of Combined Co 18 16% 
     PubCo has previous reverse merger experience 13 12% 
   
 
PubCo has stock price data on CRSP before RM 56 51% 
continued… 
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Table 2, continued 
Panel B: Summary Statistics                 
Summary Statistics  N Mean Std. Dev. Min 10th  25th Median 75th 90
th
  Max 
PrvCo shareholders percent owned 110 63.37 22.61 2.32 31.38 49.50 66.00 79.87 92.34 98.90 
PubCo shareholders percent owned 110 33.19 22.69 0.84 5.50 14.00 32.25 46.53 67.27 97.68 
New Investors percent owned 110 3.34 10.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.04 46.70 
                  
Equity Wealth ($millions) 110 125.06 159.76 1.46 15.60 38.55 82.12 161.3 219.74 1,064.30 
Net Cash Paid to PrvCo ($millions) 110 12.35 42.93 -25.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.11 250.58 
Other Consideration Paid ($millions) 110 1.44 6.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.95 
                  
Total Assets of PrvCo ($millions) 108 78.55 126.79 0.37 2.43 10.91 26.31 70.18 220.83 639.85 
Total Assets of PubCo ($millions) 110 52.96 83.35 0.00 0.00 0.18 24.95 66.5 135.05 406.05 
Dummy if TA PrvCo > TA PubCo 110 0.63             
                  
Cash of PubCo ($millions) 110 17.4 56.94 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.79 8.16 41.06 404.61 
Cash / Total Assets of PubCo 106 0.42 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.97 1.00 1.00 
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Table 3: Industry analysis   
Sample is 110 RMs, 455 IPOs, 805 Sellouts from 2005-2010.  Industry is defined as two-digit SIC code.  Panel A shows the industry distribution by deal type for the 
eight industries with the greatest number of deals.  Panel B shows mean and median sales by deal type for the eight industries with the greatest number of total deals.  
T-tests evaluate difference in the mean from the mean of RMs while Wilcoxon rank-sum tests evaluate whether the distribution is different from that of RMs. 
Significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Industry Distribution                       
 RM Firms    IPO Firms    Sellout Firms    
SIC Industry Num Pct SIC Industry Num Pct SIC Industry Num Pct  
28  Chemicals 30 27% 73  Business Services 82 18% 73  Business Services 265 33%  
73  Business Services 14 13% 28  Chemicals 77 17% 36  Electronics  81 10%  
36  Electronics  7 6% 36  Electronics  44 10% 38  Measuring Instruments 71 9%  
48  Communications 7 6% 38  Measuring Instruments 38 8% 87 Engineering Services 56 7%  
13  Oil And Gas Extraction 7 6% 35  Indust. & Comm. Mach. 25 5% 28 Chemicals 45 6%  
38  Measuring Instruments 4 4% 48  Communications 21 5% 35 Indust. & Comm. Mach. 29 4%  
34  Fabricated Metal  3 3% 13  Oil And Gas Extraction 20 4% 50 Wholesale Trade, durables 27 3%  
16  Heavy Construction 3 3% 44  Water Transportation 13 3% 80 Health Services 26 3%  
 
 
Panel B: Sales by Industry and Deal Type                      
        RM Firm Sales   IPO Firm Sales      Sellout Firm Sales   
SIC Name Deals N Mean Median N Mean   Median   N Mean   Median   
73 Business Services 361 14 35.1 25.0 82 184.2 *** 75.2 *** 265 30.9   11.0   
28 Chemicals 152 30 17.5 2.2 77 218.1 * 2.4   45 72.4 ** 17.6 *** 
36 Electronics 132 7 42.3 40.2 44 236.8 ** 70.2 * 81 38.5   11.2 * 
38 Measuring Instruments 113 4 13.9 14.3 38 72.7 n/a 11.7 n/a 71 31.5 n/a 12.3 n/a 
87 Engineering Services 66 2 77.6 77.6 8 593.5 n/a 134.2 n/a 56 65.4 n/a 14.4 n/a 
35 Indust. & Comm. Mach. 56 2 136.7 136.7 25 240.4 n/a 85.0 n/a 29 32.0 n/a 17.9 n/a 
48 Communications 49 7 57.0 6.8 21 353.1 ** 239.0 *** 21 96.1    29.5   
13 Oil And Gas Extraction 44 7 54.8 21.2 20 228.7 *** 118.9 ** 17 92.9    25.5   
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Table 4: Univariate comparison of RM firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms  
Panel A reports means, medians, and significance tests for a sample of 111 RMs and 456 IPOs from 2005-2010.  Panels B and C report correlation matrices.  All dollar 
values are in millions of 2009 dollars.  Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels respectively.  The winsorization is performed separately for RM 
firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms.  Variables are described in Appendix B.  T-tests evaluate difference in the mean from the mean of RMs while Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests evaluate whether the distribution is different from that of RMs. Significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Panel A: Means and Medians                
    RMs       IPOs           Sellouts       
Variable N Mean Median   N Mean   Median     N Mean   Median   
Sales 110      73.79       26.68    455    375.03  ***      85.02  ***   805      65.56        17.46    
Wealth  110    151.76       86.10    455    537.24  ***    281.12  ***   801    116.05        38.58  *** 
Wealth to Sales 95      18.60         2.58    426      28.07           3.03      801      30.84         2.00    
Small Business Optimism 110      95.38       96.60    455      97.21  ***      98.20  ***   805      95.64        96.70    
Dispersion of Multiples 108      50.12       19.40    451      49.21         23.52      759      45.86        30.43    
Market Returns 110        4.08         5.61    455        8.36  ***        7.91  ***   805        2.06         4.41  * 
Market Volatility 110      0.011         0.01    455      0.008  ***        0.01  ***   805        0.01         0.01    
Leader Market Share 110        0.39         0.33    455        0.36           0.33      773        0.42         0.35  ** 
Industry Tobin’s Q 110        1.82         1.70    455        1.84           1.73      773        1.79         1.72    
Foreign 110        0.38      455        0.10  ***       805        0.16  ***     
Private Benefits Industry 110        0.35      455        0.24  **       805        0.09  ***     
Family Name 110        0.07      455        0.11          805        0.13  *     
High Tech 110        0.16      455        0.31  ***       805        0.44  ***    
NYSE Listed 110        0.02      455        0.28  ***       805        0.27  ***     
Age 110      11.88         6.00    455      19.59   ***       10.00  ***             
Tangible Assets 108 0.22 0.12   455 0.24    0.14               
Non-Big 4 Auditor 110        0.61      455        0.20   ***        
 
    
R&D Dummy 110        0.36      455        0.58   ***                  
VC Backing 110        0.45      455        0.80   ***                  
            continued… 
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Table 4, continued 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix, RM, IPO, and sellouts (N=1,318) 
  
Log of 
Sales 
Foreign Dispersion 
of Multiples 
Market 
Volatility 
Market 
Returns 
High 
Tech 
Small 
Business 
Optimism 
Industry 
Tobin’s Q 
Leader 
Market 
Share 
Private 
Benefits 
Dummy 
Family 
Name 
Log of Sales 1                       
Foreign -0.024 1                     
Dispersion of Multiples -0.3389 -0.0149 1                   
Market Volatility -0.0667 0.0009 -0.0628 1                 
Market Returns 0.1278 0.0241 0.0795 -0.6094 1               
High Tech -0.2264 -0.0034 0.1253 0.0633 -0.0853 1             
Small Business Optimism 0.0663 -0.0054 0.0483 -0.7857 0.3605 -0.0471 1           
Industry Tobin’s Q -0.2851 -0.0448 0.5375 -0.0558 0.0203 0.1572 0.2072 1         
Leader Market Share 0.0709 0.0126 -0.2807 0.0176 -0.005 -0.1755 -0.0223 -0.1095 1       
Private Benefits Dummy -0.1215 -0.0381 0.4449 -0.0651 0.0731 -0.3531 0.0687 0.2848 -0.2919 1     
Family Name 0.1082 -0.0298 -0.0564 -0.0163 -0.0266 -0.1295 0.0285 -0.027 0.0815 0.0197 1   
 
 
 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix, RM and IPO sample (N=563) 
  
Log of 
Sales 
Log of 
Age 
Tangible 
Assets 
R&D 
Dummy 
Non-Big 4 
Auditor 
VC 
Backing 
Log of Sales 1           
Log of Age 0.5527 1         
Tangible Assets 0.2211 0.0272 1       
R&D Dummy -0.4104 -0.1632 -0.4139 1     
Non-Big 4 Auditor -0.1624 -0.1848 -0.0066 -0.1794 1   
VC Backing 0.0084 0.0742 -0.1742 0.2563 -0.3906 1 
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Table 5: Multivariate analysis on choice between RM and IPO 
This table presents coefficients from probit (columns (1) through (4)) and conditional logit (column (5)) regressions.  
The sample is RMs and IPOs from 2005 to 2010.  In column (5), each RM firm is matched to the IPO firm in the same 
two-digit SIC code industry with closest sales not exceeding +/- 40% of the RM firm’s sales.  The dependent variable 
equals 1 for RMs and 0 for IPOs.  Variables are described in Appendix B.  Industry dummies are based on SIC divisions, 
which group two-digit SIC codes.  t-stats are reported in parentheses and significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample 
  
All  
RM & IPO 
All  
RM & IPO 
Domestic 
RM & IPO 
Domestic 
RM & IPO 
Match 1 to 1  
RM & IPO 
 Dependent Variable   RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 
  Prediction         
Log of Sales - -0.307*** -0.314*** -0.293*** -0.297***   
    (-5.580) (-5.560) (-4.777) (-4.614)   
Log of Age - -0.079 -0.090 -0.220* -0.241*   
    (-0.751) (-0.886) (-1.675) (-1.904)   
Foreign  + 0.809*** 0.757***     100.387*** 
    (3.635) (3.241)     (13.286) 
Tangible Assets - -0.871** -0.878** -0.310 -0.437 8.934** 
    (-2.159) (-2.035) (-0.651) (-0.849) (2.402) 
R&D Dummy + -1.173*** -1.215*** -1.052*** -1.060*** -79.963*** 
    (-4.324) (-4.407) (-3.430) (-3.291) (-13.544) 
Non-Big 4 Auditor + 0.560*** 0.525*** 0.551*** 0.545*** 3.214 
    (3.126) (2.855) (2.693) (2.646) (0.985) 
VC Backing - -0.471** -0.531*** -0.453** -0.531*** 0.638 
    (-2.560) (-2.882) (-2.275) (-2.655) (0.220) 
Dispersion of Multiples + 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003   
    (0.413) (-0.629) (-0.615) (-1.353)   
Market Volatility + 32.701 74.677** 16.985 52.880   
    (1.032) (2.085) (0.400) (1.131)   
Market Returns - -0.017* -0.018** -0.014 -0.015 -0.223 
    (-1.943) (-2.028) (-1.370) (-1.436) (-0.829) 
High Tech  + -0.042 0.188 -0.080 0.151   
    (-0.205) (0.745) (-0.362) (0.516)   
Small Business Optimism   0.097**  0.087* -0.123 
    (2.428)  (1.876) (-0.764) 
Industry Tobin's Q   -0.084  -0.158  
    (-0.342)  (-0.572)  
Leader Market Share   0.439  0.146  
    (0.892)  (0.253)  
Private Benefits Dummy   0.616*  0.606  
    (1.740)  (1.409)  
Family Name   -0.229  -0.054  
   (-0.856)  (-0.198)  
Year & Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   557 557 471 471 134 
Pseudo- R squared   0.421 0.437 0.359 0.373 0.914 
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Table 6: Multivariate analysis on choice between RM and sellout 
This table presents coefficients from probit and conditional logit regressions.  The sample is RMs and sellouts from 
2005 to 2010.  The dependent variable equals 1 for RMs and 0 for sellouts.  Columns (1) through (4) are probit 
specifications.  Column (5) is a conditional logit where the sample is RM firms plus matched sellout firms in the same 
two-digit SIC code industry with the closest sales.  Variables are described in Appendix B.  Industry dummies are 
based on SIC divisions, which group two-digit SIC codes.  t-stats are reported in parentheses and significance is 
indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Sample 
  
All 
RM &  
Sellout 
All 
RM &  
Sellout 
Domestic 
RM & 
Sellout 
Domestic 
RM & 
Sellout 
Match 1 to 1  
RM & 
Sellout 
 Dependent Variable   RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 
  Prediction           
Log of Sales + -0.069 -0.057 -0.101** -0.092*   
    (-1.643) (-1.333) (-2.004) (-1.812)   
Foreign  + 0.738*** 0.713*** 
 
  1.039* 
    (5.401) (5.208) 
 
  (1.882) 
Small Business Optimism + 0.145*** 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.127*** 0.270** 
    (4.110) (4.139) (2.956) (2.837) (2.058) 
Industry Tobin's Q + 0.319** 0.203 0.237 0.168 -0.148 
    (2.420) (1.340) (1.482) (0.912) (-0.217) 
Leader Market Share - -0.559* -0.298 -0.877** -0.688* -1.263 
    (-1.811) (-0.925) (-2.170) (-1.687) (-0.903) 
Private Benefits Dummy +  0.452**  0.299   
     (1.969)  (1.127)   
Family Name +  -0.401*  -0.265 -1.183 
     (-1.862)  (-1.193) (-1.478) 
Market Returns   -0.004 -0.004 -0.016 -0.016 -0.022 
    (-0.386) (-0.411) (-1.245) (-1.291) (-0.512) 
Market Volatility   3.291 2.376 -92.057** -94.664*** -25.793 
    (0.108) (0.078) (-2.560) (-2.626) (-0.207) 
High Tech    -0.741*** -0.611*** -0.752*** -0.673*** -2.190** 
    (-5.016) (-3.743) (-4.403) (-3.668) (-2.159) 
Constant   -11.024*** -11.440*** -8.261* -7.871   
    (-2.829) (-2.902) (-1.689) (-1.593)   
Year Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations   883 883 719 719 136 
Pseudo- R squared   0.233 0.245 0.230 0.235 0.340 
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Table 7: Multivariate analysis of all three exit mechanisms (RM, IPO, sellout) 
This table presents results from multinomial logistic regressions and standard logistic regressions.  The 
sample is RM firms, IPO firms, and sellout firms pooled together.  Panel A includes independent variables 
which proxy for information asymmetry.  Panel B includes independent variables which proxy for product 
market competition and private benefits of control.  In each panel, columns (1) and (2) present coefficient 
estimates from a multinomial logistic regression while column (3) presents coefficient estimates from a 
standard logistic regression.  Panel C includes independent variables which proxy for information asymmetry, 
product market competition, and private benefits of control.  Columns (1) and (2) present coefficient estimates 
from a multinomial logistic regression.  Variables are defined in Appendix C.  Industry dummies are based on 
SIC divisions, which group two-digit SIC codes.  t-stats are reported in parentheses and significance is 
indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.    
Panel A: Information Asymmetry 
 
Prediction Multinomial Logit 
Base Case is IPO  
Logit 
 
 
 
 Indicator for 
 RM 
Indicator for  
Sellout   
Indicator for 
RM or Sellout 
 
   (1) (2)   (3)  
Log of Sales - -0.573*** -0.499***   -0.510***  
   (-7.584) (-10.305)   (-10.775)  
Foreign  + 1.663*** 0.470**   0.697***  
   (6.081) (2.311)   (3.574)  
Dispersion of Multiples + -0.005** -0.009***   -0.008***  
   (-2.376) (-5.591)   (-5.490)  
Market Volatility + 112.909*** 90.348***   93.810***  
   (5.680) (5.837)   (6.165)  
High Tech + -1.012*** 0.240   0.111  
   (-3.327) (1.593)   (0.748)  
Constant  0.684 -12.808***   1.088  
   (0.343) (-10.710)   (0.759)  
Year Dummies  No No   No  
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes   Yes   
Observations  1,318 1,318   1,318  
Pseudo R-squared  0.184 0.184   0.202  
     continued…  
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Table 7, continued       
Panel B: Product Market Competition and Private Benefits of Control 
 
Prediction Multinomial Logit 
Base Case is Sellout  
Logit 
 
 
  
 Indicator for 
RM 
Indicator for 
IPO   
Indicator for  
RM or IPO 
 
   (1) (2)   (3)  
Log of Sales + 0.050 0.523***   0.424***  
   (0.723) (10.877)   (9.803)  
Foreign  + 1.243*** -0.500**   0.043  
   (5.161) (-2.520)   (0.251)  
Small Business Optimism 
+ 
-0.015 0.038***   0.025** 
 
   (-0.784) (3.004)   (2.129)  
Industry Tobin's Q + 0.137 0.424***   0.369***  
   (0.590) (2.883)   (2.639)  
Leader Market Share - 0.118 -1.025***   -0.718**  
   (0.218) (-2.737)   (-2.090)  
Private Benefits Dummy + 1.564*** 1.006***   1.178***  
   (4.657) (3.649)   (4.592)  
Family Name + -0.804* -0.618***   -0.667***  
   (-1.761) (-2.733)   (-3.172)  
Constant  13.572*** 7.549***   10.323***  
   (6.910) (3.528)   (7.858)  
Year Dummies  No No  No  
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes   Yes  
Observations  1,338 1,338   1,338  
Pseudo R-squared  0.177 0.177   0.165  
     continued…  
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Table 7, continued  
Panel C: Proxies for information asymmetry, product market competition, and private benefits 
 
Multinomial Logit 
Base Case is RM 
 
 
Prediction Indicator for 
IPO  
Prediction 
 
Indicator for  
Sellout 
 
   (1)   (2)  
Log of Sales + 0.560***  - 0.048  
   (7.436)   (0.666)  
Foreign  - -1.908***  - -1.354***  
   (-6.547)   (-5.206)  
Dispersion of Multiples - 0.007**   0.006**  
   (2.343)   (2.134)  
Market Volatility - -142.005***   -9.718  
   (-2.620)   (-0.198)  
Market Returns + 0.017   0.007  
  (1.050)   (0.489)  
High Tech - 0.700**   1.048***  
   (2.054)   (3.244)  
Small Business Optimism  -0.229***  - -0.266***  
  (-3.354)   (-4.213)  
Industry Tobin’s Q  0.180  - -0.640**  
  (0.575)   (-2.073)  
Leader Market Share  -0.785  + 0.748  
  (-1.169)   (1.139)  
Private Benefits Dummy  -0.722*  - -1.116***  
  (-1.675)   (-2.577)  
Family Name  0.258  - 0.704*  
  (0.582)   (1.690)  
Constant  24.125***   16.044**  
   (3.239)   (2.392)  
Year Dummies  Yes   Yes  
Industry Dummies  Yes   Yes  
Observations  1,318   1,318  
Pseudo R-squared  0.251   0.251  
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Table 8: Analysis of wealth obtained in RMs compared to IPOs and sellouts, using matching methods 
This table presents means and medians for LN Relative Wealth.  The sample is 95 RMs from 2005 to 2010.  Each RM 
firm is matched to an IPO firm (Panel A) or a sellout firm (Panel B) based on industry and sales or propensity score.   
Relative Wealth is the Wealth to Sales of the RM firm divided by the Wealth to Sales of the matched firm.  The t-stat is 
from a test of whether or not the mean of LN Relative Wealth equals zero.  
Panel A: RM firms matched to IPO firms  
     LN Relative Wealth  
Matching Technique Foreign Firms Caliper Replacement N  Mean Median T-stat Pct > 0 
Industry & closest sales  Yes N/A N/A 67 -0.80 -0.71 -5.76 21% 
                  
Propensity score Yes 1 With 93 -2.14 -1.80 -6.46 28% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 With 58 -0.81 -0.97 -2.42 37% 
Propensity score Yes 1 Without 89 -0.70 -0.94 -2.56 44% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 Without 49 -0.99 -0.97 -2.91 39% 
                  
Propensity score No 1 With 54 -2.15 -1.73 -4.97 27% 
Propensity score No 0.01 With 37 -1.15 -1.03 -2.32 38% 
Propensity score No 1 Without 55 -0.85 -0.78 -2.00 38% 
Propensity score No 0.01 Without 35 -1.19 -1.03 -2.27 33% 
                  
Panel B: RM firms matched to sellout firms    
     LN Relative Wealth  
Matching Technique Foreign Firms Caliper Replacement N  Mean Median T-stat Pct > 0 
Industry & closest sales  Yes N/A N/A 69 0.34 0.50 2.07 61% 
                  
Propensity score Yes 1 With 95 0.04 -0.25 0.17 46% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 With 75 0.07 -0.15 0.28 49% 
Propensity score Yes 1 Without 95 0.14 0.07 0.63 52% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 Without 74 0.13 0.24 0.49 51% 
                  
Propensity score No 1 With 56 0.69 0.45 2.25 59% 
Propensity score No 0.01 With 50 0.53 0.33 1.62 54% 
Propensity score No 1 Without 56 0.59 0.33 1.89 52% 
Propensity score No 0.01 Without 50 0.50 0.33 1.55 52% 
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Table 9: Analysis of wealth obtained in RMs compared to IPOs and sellouts, using Dunbar’s (1995) method 
This table presents statistics for LN Wealth to Sales and LN Relative Wealth.  The sample is 95 RMs from 2005 to 
2010.  Forecasted LN Wealth to Sales is obtained using Dunbar’s (1995) method.  LN Relative Wealth is equivalent to 
Actual LN Wealth to Sales minus Forecasted LN Wealth to Sales. Forecasts are obtained from four samples of IPO 
firms or sellout firms: the full sample, domestic firms only, firms in the same industry within +/-40% of sales (Match 
1 to Many), firm with the closest sales to an RM firm in an industry (Match 1 to 1).  The t-stat is from a test of 
whether or not the mean of LN Relative Wealth equals zero.  
Panel A: RM firms compared to IPO firms   
 
  
Actual 
LN Wealth to Sales 
Forecasted 
LN Wealth to Sales 
 
LN Relative Wealth t-stat 
Full Sample, N=93 Mean 1.17 2.29 -1.12*** -9.42 
  Median 0.97 2.18 -1.10*** 
     
   
 Domestic Firms Only, N=56 Mean 1.14 4.22 -3.08*** -19.24 
  Median 0.96 4.45 -2.96*** 
     
   
 Match 1 to Many, N=66 Mean 0.81 3.47 -2.66*** -19.43 
  Median 0.65 3.47 -2.64*** 
     
   
 Match 1 to 1, N=66 Mean 0.81 3.46 -2.65*** -18.27 
  Median 0.65 3.25 -2.72***   
      
Panel B: RM firms compared to sellout firms    
  
Actual 
LN Wealth to Sales 
Forecasted 
LN Wealth to Sales 
 
LN Relative Wealth t-stat 
Full Sample, N=95 Mean 1.13 2.13 -1.00*** -7.83 
  Median 0.95 2.08 -1.09*** 
           
 Domestic Firms Only, N=56 Mean 1.14 2.76 -1.62*** -8.91 
  Median 0.96 2.69 -1.71*** 
           
 Match 1 to Many, N=69 Mean 1.24 1.20 0.04*** 0.24 
  Median 1.09 1.19 -0.07*** 
           
 Match 1 to 1, N=69 Mean 1.24 0.37 0.86*** 5.08 
  Median 1.09 0.42 0.71***   
 
 
78 
 
Table 10: Cross Sectional analysis of LN Relative Wealth  
This table presents the results from a regression (OLS) of LN Relative Wealth on RM firm characteristics.  The dependent 
variable is LN Relative Wealth, calculated from either propensity score matching or Dunbar’s (1995) method.  The Match 
1 to 1 sample includes RM firms plus a matched IPO (or sellout) firm, where matching is done based on two-digit SIC 
industry code and closest sales, as long as sales are within +/-40%.  In Panel A (B), LN Relative Wealth is calculated with 
RM firms and IPO (sellout) firms.  Private firms in RMs are referred to as “PrvCo” while the public company is referred 
to as “PubCo”.  Variables are described in Appendix B.  Industry dummies are based on SIC divisions, which group two-
digit SIC codes.  t-stats are reported in parentheses and significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively.    
Panel A: RM firms and IPO firms 
Method Propensity Score Matching Dunbar (1995) Method 
Sample Full Sample Match 1 to 1 Full Sample Match 1 to 1 
Dependent Variable LN Relative Wealth LN Relative Wealth LN Relative Wealth LN Relative Wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Sales <= $50 million 0.679 -0.206 -0.060 -0.377 
  (0.890) (-0.623) (-0.218) (-1.021) 
PubCo is a shell -0.303 0.409 0.114 0.060 
  (-0.387) (1.108) (0.380) (0.151) 
PubCo is an industry expert -0.840 -0.249 -0.111 0.048 
  (-1.289) (-0.615) (-0.456) (0.143) 
PrvCo hired a financial  
         advisor 
0.949 0.059 -0.262 -0.356 
(1.124) (0.163) (-0.850) (-0.968) 
PrvCo CEO has public  
        company experience 
1.249* 0.482 0.367 0.768*** 
(1.694) (1.543) (1.480) (2.741) 
Log of Age 0.149 -0.164 0.035 0.170 
  (0.388) (-0.883) (0.254) (1.053) 
Foreign  -1.109 0.114 -0.014 -1.084*** 
  (-1.347) (0.355) (-0.055) (-3.062) 
High Tech 0.074 0.623 0.261 0.455 
  (0.071) (1.065) (0.778) (1.278) 
Non-Big 4 Auditor -0.820 0.632 0.610* 0.773** 
  (-0.950) (1.625) (1.907) (2.076) 
VC Backing -0.087 0.478 -0.275 0.297 
  (-0.123) (1.182) (-0.966) (0.963) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.247 -1.154 -0.496 -3.287*** 
  (-0.094) (-1.056) (-0.563) (-3.750) 
Observations 92 67 93 66 
R-squared 0.47 0.31 0.41 0.50 
continued… 
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Table 10, continued     
Panel B: RM firms and sellout firms 
Method Propensity Score Matching Dunbar (1995) Method 
Sample Full Sample Match 1 to 1 Full Sample Match 1 to 1 
Dependent Variable LN Relative Wealth LN Relative Wealth LN Relative Wealth LN Relative Wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Sales <= $50 million 1.913*** 1.114** 0.123 0.080 
  (3.587) (2.494) (0.384) (0.189) 
PubCo is a shell -0.182 -0.367 0.097 -0.151 
  (-0.341) (-0.889) (0.291) (-0.328) 
PubCo is an industry expert 0.111 -0.326 -0.109 -0.025 
  (0.217) (-0.753) (-0.417) (-0.065) 
PrvCo hired a financial 
       advisor 
-0.570 -0.328 -0.119 -0.255 
(-0.998) (-0.665) (-0.338) (-0.535) 
PrvCo CEO has public  
      company experience 
0.340 -0.052 0.340 0.803* 
(0.715) (-0.131) (1.192) (1.984) 
Log of Age 0.204 -0.116 -0.141 -0.113 
  (0.718) (-0.509) (-0.883) (-0.530) 
Foreign  0.687 -0.181 0.126 1.009** 
  (1.154) (-0.492) (0.430) (2.468) 
High Tech -0.521 0.436 0.164 0.156 
  (-0.760) (1.171) (0.449) (0.317) 
Non-Big 4 Auditor -0.467 0.287 0.339 0.364 
  (-0.819) (0.566) (1.123) (0.680) 
VC Backing 1.032* 0.656* 0.375 0.765* 
  (1.963) (1.707) (1.363) (1.747) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.768 0.319 -0.888 0.698 
  (-1.104) (0.225) (-0.918) (0.578) 
Observations 95 69 95 69 
R-squared 0.39 0.46 0.36 0.42 
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Table 11: Private firm valuations, summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of private firm valuations.  Valuations are disclosed in the public 
company filings for 60 RMs.  The valuations are typically done as part of a fairness opinion, written by a 
financial advisor (although in 8 cases, the board of directors provides the valuation).  The valuation can 
include a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, a comparison to publicly traded firms (Comparables), 
and/or a similar transactions analysis (Transactions).  Private firms in RMs are referred to as “PrvCo” 
while the public company is referred to as “PubCo”.  Panel A provides a frequency count.  Panel B 
compares RM firms with and without valuations.  Panel C provides summary statistics of valuations.  
Panel A: Frequency counts   
PrvCo has at least 1 valuation 60  
   
PrvCo has DCF valuation 51  
PrvCo has Comparables valuation 49  
PrvCo has Transactions valuation 39  
     
PrvCo has both DCF and Comparables 40  
PrvCo has both DCF and Transactions 35  
PrvCo has both Comparables and Transactions 38  
PrvCo has all three valuation methods 34  
     
 
Panel B: Comparison of RM firms with and without valuations 
 RMs without valuations  RMs with valuations  
Variable N Mean Median  N Mean 
 
Median   
Sales 50 41.65 9.47 60 100.57 *** 39.49 ** 
Wealth to Sales 43 21.28 3.71 52 16.38   1.82 ** 
Age  50 6.24 5.50 60 16.95 *** 6.50 ** 
PubCo is a shell 50 0.62   60 0.55       
VC Backing 50 0.40   60 0.48       
Foreign 50 0.50   60 0.28 **     
continued… 
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Table 11, continued      
Panel C: Summary statistics of private firm valuations 
 N Mean 25
th
 Median 75
th
  
Discounted Cash Flow      
Enterprise Value 51 249.61 73.05 179.35 399.55 
Enterprise Value to Sales 44 8.41 1.36 2.82 10.41 
      
Equity Value 51 209.35 62.95 145.50 343.00 
Equity Value to Sales 44 7.15 1.07 2.37 7.48 
Equity Wealth to Equity Value 51 0.59 0.17 0.48 0.75 
Discount Rate 48 18.66 12.50 17.50 23.25 
            
Comparables           
Enterprise Value 49 194.30 80.85 181.60 300.09 
Enterprise Value to Sales 44 6.00 1.17 2.57 6.59 
      
Equity Value 49 161.93 65.60 132.10 245.30 
Equity Value to Sales 44 5.31 0.84 1.49 4.67 
Equity Wealth to Equity Value 49 0.74 0.24 0.46 0.76 
            
Transactions           
Enterprise Value 39 186.98 69.95 100.35 321.30 
Enterprise Value to Sales 35 3.96 1.10 2.24 4.36 
      
Equity Value 39 141.52 68.58 88.25 193.15 
Equity Value to Sales 35 3.15 0.86 1.24 4.04 
Equity Wealth to Equity Value 39 0.87 0.30 0.66 1.07 
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Table 12: Synergy and returns to public company shareholders in RMs 
This table presents estimates of synergy generated in RMs as well as returns to public company stockholders.  RMs 
are completed between 2005 and 2010.  Synergy is calculated as the market value of the combined firm’s equity 
minus the market value of the public firm’s equity minus the equity value of the private firm minus private 
placement funds plus cash paid to private firm owners.  Private firm valuations are based on a discounted cash flow 
(DCF) analysis, a comparison to publicly traded firms (Comparables), and/or a similar transactions analysis 
(Transactions).  Private firms in RMs are referred to as “PrvCo” while the public company is referred to as “PubCo”.   
Panel A presents Synergy calculated using different PrvCo and PubCo valuations.  Panel B presents equity values of 
the PubCo and Combined Co’s stock, as well as the raw return to PubCo shareholders.     
Panel A: Synergy       
 
N Mean 25th  Median 75th % Negative 
PubCo valuation is market value of the public company's stock 
Synergy using DCF  33 -107.74 -270.52 -74.02 12.50 0.70 
Synergy using Comparables 29 -27.64 -138.10 -52.96 21.53 0.66 
Synergy using Transactions  23 14.20 -119.84 -4.46 26.60 0.52 
       
PubCo valuation is market value of the public company's stock and PrvCo valuation is the “Low” valuation 
Synergy using Low DCF 28 -39.08 -197.31 -38.54 22.22 0.68 
Synergy using Low Comparables  27 51.11 -84.30 -15.62 44.24 0.56 
Synergy using Low Transactions 23 80.03 -39.49 15.60 48.68 0.39 
              
PubCo valuation is book value of assets  
Synergy using DCF  51 -93.57 -242.47 -58.85 13.83 0.73 
Synergy using Comparables 49 -47.40 -150.94 -50.66 11.78 0.69 
Synergy using Transactions  39 -25.38 -122.54 -22.55 19.82 0.62 
              
PubCo valuation is book value of equity (assets – liabilities) 
Synergy using DCF  51 -65.95 -204.31 -38.49 14.54 0.71 
Synergy using Comparables 49 -22.45 -134.06 -29.83 13.04 0.65 
Synergy using Transactions 39 3.91 -102.90 -1.43 26.17 0.54 
              
Panel B: Returns to PubCo Shareholders             
 
N Mean 25th 50th 75th t-stat 
PubCo Market Value Before, $mil 56 87.80 18.21 48.04 92.68   
Combined Company Market Value, $mil 56 173.01 54.98 105.86 222.08   
Pct Owned by PubCo 56 38.76 24.25 34.41 49.00   
PubCo Return 56 0.19 -0.59 -0.17 0.51 1.33 
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Table 13: Private firm value inferred from private-private takeovers  
This table presents data from an analysis of private firm value and synergy calculated using valuations obtained 
from takeovers of private firms by private firms.  Panel A shows basic information on private-private takeovers 
from Pratt’s Stats data.  The takeovers are from 2005 to 2010 and include deals where the target has annual sales of 
$5 million or more.  Panel B shows valuation data for 56 RM firms.  For each private firm in a RM, the value of 
the firm is calculated based on industry price-to-sales multiples of private targets in private-private takeovers.     
Panel A: Basic Information on Private-Private Takeover Sample   
Number of private firm takeovers of other private firms 286  
Number of two-digit SIC codes represented in the data 51  
Average sales of the 286 private takeover targets (millions of dollars) $29.90  
Median sales of the 286 private takeover targets (millions of dollars) $9.10  
 
Panel B: Inferred Valuation and Synergy  
  
N Mean 25th  Median 75th  
Number of private-private takeovers in RM firm’s industry 56 6.73 2.00 4.50 8.00 
Median industry price-to-sales ratio for RM firm’s industry 56 0.83 0.54 0.73 1.00 
Inferred value from private-private takeovers ($millions) 56 42.19 2.04 25.95 62.10 
Synergy, calculated with inferred value ($millions) 36 45.08 -22.01 20.60 103.89 
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Table 14: Cross-sectional evidence on synergy and returns to firms in RMs 
OLS regression results are presented.  RMs are completed between 2005 and 2010.  The dependent variables 
are Synergy calculated using DCF valuations in column (1) and Synergy calculated using private-private 
takeover industry valuations in column (2).  Synergy is the market value of the combined firm’s equity minus 
the market value of the public firm’s equity minus the equity value of the private firm minus private placement 
funds plus cash paid to private firm owners.  The constant is not reported.  t-stats are reported in parentheses 
and significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.    
 
(1) (2)   
Dependent Variable Synergy, 
DCF 
Synergy, 
Private-private 
 
 
PubCo is a shell 52.377 -7.254   
 
(0.627) (-0.201)   
PubCo is an industry expert 220.392* 15.258   
 
(2.023) (0.408)   
PrvCo CEO has public company experience 197.193** 23.403   
(2.793) (0.953)   
PubCo has RM experience -154.490 -18.760   
 
(-1.264) (-0.533)   
PubCo managers/directors remain 163.215 -41.915   
(1.769) (-0.976)   
PubCo operations remain -208.068 23.270   
 
(-1.400) (0.905)   
Small Business Optimism -1.225 9.758*   
 
(-0.058) (1.732)   
Industry Operating Margins 7.877** 0.257   
 
(2.229) (0.606)   
Industry Tobin’s Q 189.975** 12.600   
 
(2.820) (0.665)   
Market Returns 9.198** 1.851   
 
(2.937) (1.405)   
Market Volatility 1,148.809 4,612.228   
 
(0.074) (1.294)   
Log of Age 41.235 -14.130   
 
(1.017) (-0.974)   
Foreign 226.600* 0.788   
 
(1.947) (0.026)   
High Tech -126.975 6.822   
 
(-0.986) (0.202)   
Non-Big 4 Auditor 124.745 40.593   
 
(1.254) (1.232)   
VC Backing 195.450 73.820**   
 
(1.227) (2.450)   
Year Dummies Yes Yes   
Observations 33 52   
R-squared 0.80 0.57   
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Appendix C: Supplemental Results  
 
 This appendix contains additional results which are discussed in the text, but not presented above.  An 
outline of the tables contained in Appendix C is given below.  The tables in Appendix C are numbered C-1, C-2, C-
3, etc. 
 
 
 
Table Description 
C-1 Summary statistics for RM, IPO, and sellout samples 
C-2 Analysis of Propensity Score Match Quality for RMs and IPOs 
C-3 Analysis of Propensity Score Match Quality for RMs and sellouts 
C-4 Dunbar (1995) Method, intermediate steps 
C-5 Analysis of wealth obtained in RMs compared to IPOs using alternatives of Equity Wealth 
C-6 Analysis of wealth to assets of RM firms and IPO firms 
C-7 Analysis of wealth to assets obtained in RMs compared to sellouts where consideration is not all cash 
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Table C-1: Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics for samples of RMs (Panel A), IPOs (Panel B), and sellouts (Panel C).  The 
variables are described in Appendix B.  Variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles separately for RMs, 
IPOs, and sellouts. 
Panel A: RMs        
 
N Mean Min 25
th
 50
th
  75
th
 Max 
Sales 110 73.79 0.00 3.19 26.68 79.99 562.99 
Wealth 110 151.76 5.58 41.4 86.1 187.96 1533.36 
Wealth to Sales 95 18.6 0.15 0.77 2.58 9.28 370.85 
Small Business Optimism 110 95.38 84.1 89.3 96.6 99.8 105.9 
Dispersion of Multiples 108 50.12 0.19 1.66 19.4 99.89 178.04 
Market Returns 110 4.08 -35.59 0.12 5.61 11.15 32.67 
Market Volatility 110 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Leader Market Share 110 0.39 0.10 0.24 0.33 0.5 1.00 
Industry Tobin’s Q 110 1.82 0.91 1.30 1.70 2.26 3.65 
 
 
 
Panel B: IPOs        
 N Mean Min 25
th
 50
th
  75
th
 Max 
Sales 455 375.03 0.00 27.05 85.02 305.62 7833.37 
Wealth 455 537.24 0.00 149.69 281.12 635.79 4575.15 
Wealth to Sales 426 28.07 0.00 1.10 3.03 8.09 809.75 
Small Business Optimism 455 97.21 86.5 94.6 98.2 100.8 106.1 
Dispersion of Multiples 451 49.21 0.16 2.06 23.52 91.65 198.06 
Market Returns 455 8.36 -12.95 2.81 7.91 11.91 44.96 
Market Volatility 455 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Leader Market Share 455 0.36 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.47 0.97 
Industry Tobin’s Q 455 1.84 0.78 1.40 1.73 2.23 3.27 
 
 
 
Panel C: Sellouts        
 N Mean Min 25
th
 50
th
  75
th
 Max 
Sales 805 65.56 0.06 5.99 17.46 50.81 1025.07 
Wealth 801 116.05 1.78 15.03 38.58 115.22 1517.04 
Wealth to Sales 801 30.84 0.10 0.97 2.00 4.41 1443.08 
Small Business Optimism 805 95.64 81.00 91.1 96.7 100.7 106.1 
Dispersion of Multiples 759 45.86 0.17 1.73 30.43 77.69 174.27 
Market Returns 805 2.06 -41.09 -2.54 4.41 9.09 32.98 
Market Volatility 805 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Leader Market Share 773 0.42 0.11 0.3 0.35 0.52 1.00 
Industry Tobin’s Q 773 1.79 0.91 1.4 1.72 2.19 3.15 
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Table C-2: Analysis of Propensity Score Match Quality for RMs and IPOs 
This table shows coefficients from probit regressions from three samples.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 for RMs and 0 for IPOs.  Sellouts are excluded in this analysis.  In column (1), the sample is all RMs and 
IPOs.  In column (2), the sample is RMs plus propensity score matched IPOs.  Each RM is matched to the IPO with the 
closest propensity score.  In column (2), the sample is RMs plus propensity score matched IPOs where each RM is 
matched to the IPO with the closest propensity score and the difference in propensity scores cannot exceed 0.01 in 
absolute value.  Variables are defined in Appendix B.  Industry dummies are at the SIC division level.  t-stats are 
reported in parentheses and significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Full Sample Propensity Score Matched 
Caliper=1 
Propensity Score Matched 
Caliper=0.01 
 
RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 
Log of Sales -0.307*** -0.174* -0.074 
 
(-5.580) (-1.670) (-0.637) 
Log of Age -0.079 0.030 0.133 
 
(-0.751) (0.189) (0.774) 
Foreign 0.809*** 0.538* 0.243 
 
(3.635) (1.826) (0.678) 
Tangible Assets -0.871** -0.271 0.032 
 
(-2.159) (-0.452) (0.049) 
R&D Dummy -1.173*** -0.477 0.041 
 
(-4.324) (-1.147) (0.081) 
Non-Big 4 Auditor 0.560*** 0.258 0.204 
 
(3.126) (0.847) (0.647) 
VC Backing -0.471** -0.412 -0.304 
 
(-2.560) (-1.504) (-0.982) 
Dispersion of Multiples 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.413) (0.076) (0.206) 
Market Volatility 32.701 20.178 -11.224 
 
(1.032) (0.477) (-0.206) 
Market Returns -0.017* -0.010 -0.001 
 
(-1.943) (-0.748) (-0.054) 
High Tech -0.042 -0.189 -0.144 
 
(-0.205) (-0.557) (-0.358) 
Constant 1.390* 0.956 -0.236 
 
(1.653) (0.983) (-0.188) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 557 138 105 
Pseudo R-squared 0.421 0.133 0.0398 
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Table C-3: Analysis of Propensity Score Match Quality for RMs and sellouts 
This table shows coefficients from probit regressions from three samples.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 for RMs and 0 for sellouts.  IPOs are excluded in this analysis.  In column (1), the sample is all RMs and 
sellouts.  In column (2), the sample is RMs plus propensity score matched sellouts.  Each RM is matched to the sellout 
with the closest propensity score.  In column (2), the sample is RMs plus propensity score matched sellouts where each 
RM is matched to the sellout with the closest propensity score and the difference in propensity scores cannot exceed 
0.01 in absolute value.  Variables are defined in Appendix B.  Industry dummies are at the SIC division level.  t-stats are 
reported in parentheses and significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full Sample Propensity Score Matched 
Caliper=1 
Propensity Score Matched 
Caliper=0.01 
 
RM=1 RM=1 RM=1 
Log of Sales -0.057 0.017 0.032 
 
(-1.333) (0.226) (0.394) 
Foreign 0.713*** 0.293 0.029 
 
(5.208) (1.272) (0.110) 
Small Business Optimism 0.148*** 0.012 -0.028 
 
(4.139) (0.203) (-0.451) 
Industry Tobin’s Q 0.203 0.047 -0.106 
 
(1.340) (0.165) (-0.344) 
Leader Market Share -0.298 0.043 -0.017 
 
(-0.925) (0.074) (-0.027) 
Private Benefits Dummy 0.452** 0.136 0.003 
 
(1.969) (0.373) (0.008) 
Family Name -0.401* -0.365 -0.187 
 
(-1.862) (-0.982) (-0.499) 
Market Returns -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 
 
(-0.411) (-0.655) (-0.224) 
Market Volatility 2.376 -28.732 -16.991 
 
(0.078) (-0.780) (-0.409) 
High Tech -0.611*** -0.257 -0.159 
 
(-3.743) (-0.810) (-0.494) 
Constant -11.440*** 3.376 3.156 
 
(-2.902) (0.527) (0.483) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 883 164 142 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2450 0.0570 0.0295 
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Dunbar (1995) Method 
 
The method begins with a probit regression to estimate the likelihood that a firm chooses a RM or 
an IPO (Table C-4, column (1)).  The specification of the probit is the same as the model in Table 5, 
column (1), except that the dependent variable is equal to 1 for IPOs and 0 for RMs to simplify later 
calculations.  Also, the specification adds a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the firm’s stock 
is listed on NYSE.  This variable is included in order to meet the exclusion restriction.  The justification 
for this variable is that the listing of a firm’s stock on NYSE is much more common for IPO firms than 
RM firms.  Also, the choice of listing exchange (NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX) should not affect the 
wealth of private firm owners since all three listing exchanges are competitive markets to value the firm’s 
stock.  However, the choice of listing exchange could affect the wealth of the firm’s owners because of 
correlation with unobserved factors that affect the decision to execute an IPO or RM (e.g., firm quality). 
In the second step, the coefficients from the probit regression are used to estimate the inverse 
Mills ratio for each observation.   
Third, I regress LN Wealth to Sales of each IPO firm on factors that affect the firm’s valuation as 
well as the inverse Mills ratio (Table C-4, column (2)).  This OLS regression is estimated on the sample 
of IPO firms only and the independent variables include those in the probit except the NYSE dummy.  
The inverse Mills ratio is included in the OLS regression to control for unobservable factors that affect 
both the decision to execute an IPO and the valuation of IPO firms.   
Fourth, the coefficients of the OLS estimation of IPO firm valuation are applied to the data on 
RM firms to calculate a forecast of LN Wealth to Sales for each RM firm, had that firm chosen an IPO.  
The forecast of LN Wealth to Sales is the product of the OLS regression coefficients and the independent 
variables for each RM observation.
 
As in Dunbar (1995), the inverse Mills ratio is not used in this 
calculation since its purpose is to control for selection bias.   
 The procedure is repeated for RMs and sellout firms.  The regressions for the full sample of firms 
are shown in Table C-4, columns (3) and (4).   
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Table C-4: Dunbar (1995) methodology, intermediate steps 
This table shows the results from intermediate steps of the Dunbar (1995) procedure on a sample of RM and IPO firms 
(columns (1) and (2)) and RM and sellout firms (columns (3) and (4)).  Columns (1) and (3) are probit regressions and 
columns (2) and (4) are OLS.  Variables are defined in Appendix B.  Industry dummies are at the SIC division level.  t-stats 
are reported in parentheses and significance is indicated by ***, **, * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  (1) (2)     (3) (4) 
Sample 
RMs &  
IPOs 
IPOs  
Only   
RMs & 
Sellouts 
Sellouts 
Only 
Dependent Variable IPO=1 
LN Wealth 
to Sales   
 
Sellout=1 
LN Wealth 
to Sales 
Log of Sales 0.260*** -0.720***   Log of Sales -0.018 -0.553*** 
 
(4.594) (-18.051)   
 
(-0.374) (-16.370) 
Log of Age 0.064 -0.127**   Foreign  -0.858*** 0.283** 
 
(0.564) (-2.010)   
 
(-5.718) (2.119) 
Foreign -0.874*** 0.387**   Small Business Optimism -0.145*** 0.031 
 
(-3.809) (2.269)   (-3.767) (1.047) 
Tangible Assets 0.565 0.084   Industry Tobin’s Q -0.157 0.357*** 
 
(1.290) (0.335)   
 
(-0.978) (2.835) 
R&D Dummy 1.228*** 0.097   Leader Market Share 0.384 -0.732*** 
 
(4.460) (0.624)   
 
(1.104) (-2.786) 
Non-Big 4 -0.397** -0.493***   Private Benefits Industry -0.509** 0.473** 
 
(-2.084) (-3.651)   
 
(-2.113) (2.154) 
VC Backing 0.493** 0.582***   Family Name 0.321 0.096 
 
(2.551) (4.362)   
 
(1.353) (0.655) 
Dispersion of Multiples -0.001 0.001   Market Returns 0.004 -0.002 
 
(-0.534) (0.662)   
 
(0.424) (-0.176) 
Market Volatility -34.208 -36.960   Market Volatility 0.591 -26.525 
 
(-1.060) (-1.362)   
 
(0.021) (-1.094) 
Market Returns 0.011 -0.006   High Tech 0.645*** 0.213* 
 
(1.214) (-1.003)   
 
(3.809) (1.763) 
High Tech 0.040 -0.116      
 
(0.190) (-1.040)      
NYSE 1.460*** 
 
  NYSE 1.805***  
 
(3.426) 
 
   (5.943)  
Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
1.056   Inverse Mills Ratio  3.630*** 
  
(0.931)     (3.116) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes  Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes  Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -1.285 4.420***   Constant 11.237*** 0.540 
 
(-1.502) (4.694)   
 
(2.659) (0.182) 
Observations 557 415   Observations 883 770 
Pseudo R
2
/ R
2
 0.45 0.73   Pseudo R
2
/ R
2
 0.33 0.39 
 
Reference: Dunbar, Craig, 1995, The Use Of Warrants As Underwriter Compensation In Initial Public Offerings, 
Journal of Financial Economics 38, 59-78. 
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Table C-5: Analysis of wealth obtained in RMs compared to IPOs 
This table presents means and medians for LN Relative Wealth.  Relative Wealth is the Wealth to Sales of the RM firm divided by 
the Wealth to Sales of the matched IPO firm.  The t-stat is from a test of whether or not the mean of LN Relative Wealth equals 
zero.  
     LN Relative Wealth  
Matching Technique Measurement of market value N  Mean Median T-stat Pct > 0 
Industry & closest sales  First trade on CRSP 67 -0.80 -0.71 -5.76 21% 
Industry & closest sales 30 days after first trade on CRSP 67 -0.87 -0.69 -5.64 27% 
Industry & closest sales 270 days after deal completion (RM) or offering (IPO) 59 -0.94 -0.78 -5.35 22% 
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Table C-6: Analysis of wealth to assets obtained in RMs compared to IPOs, using matching methods 
Panel A presents means and medians for LN Relative Wealth.  The sample is 106 RMs from 2005 to 2010.  Each RM firm 
is matched to an IPO firm based on industry and assets or propensity score.   Relative Wealth is the Wealth to Assets of 
the RM firm divided by the Wealth to Assets of the matched firm.  The t-stat is from a test of whether or not the mean of 
LN Relative Wealth equals zero.  Panel B presents statistics for LN Wealth to Assets and LN Relative Wealth.  Forecasted 
LN Wealth to Assets is obtained using Dunbar’s (1995) method.  LN Relative Wealth is equivalent to Actual LN Wealth to 
Assets minus Forecasted LN Wealth to Assets. Forecasts are obtained from four samples of IPO firms or sellout firms: the 
full sample, domestic firms only, firms in the same industry within +/-40% of assets (Match 1 to Many), firm with the 
closest assets to an RM firm in an industry (Match 1 to 1).  The t-stat is from a test of whether or not the mean of LN 
Relative Wealth equals zero. 
Panel A: RM firms matched to IPO firms, scale by assets  
     LN Relative Wealth  
Matching Technique Foreign Firms Caliper Replacement N  Mean Median T-stat Pct > 0 
Industry & closest assets Yes N/A N/A 70 -0.85 -0.79 -5.27 32% 
                  
Propensity score Yes 1 With 106 0.75 -0.87 -3.78 37% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 With 64 -0.33 -0.30 -1.48 41% 
Propensity score Yes 1 Without 103 -0.18 -0.49 -0.85 43% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 Without 49 -0.63 0.60 -2.79 32% 
                  
Propensity score No 1 With 63 -0.72 -0.71 -3.02 36% 
Propensity score No 0.01 With 40 -0.69 -0.70 -2.65 29% 
Propensity score No 1 Without 66 -0.15 -0.62 -0.47 37% 
Propensity score No 0.01 Without 38 -0.76 -0.70 -2.66 26% 
 
 
Panel B: Dunbar (1995) Method, RM firms compared to IPO firms 
  
Actual 
LN Wealth to Assets 
Forecasted 
LN Wealth to Assets 
 
LN Relative Wealth t-stat 
Full Sample, N=106 Mean 1.15 1.98 -0.82*** -6.82 
  Median 0.87 1.97 -0.77   
    
   
  
Domestic Firms Only, N=67 Mean 1.36 1.77 -0.41*** -2.65 
  Median 0.97 1.89 -0.30  
    
   
 
Match 1 to Many, N=71 Mean 0.87 3.04 -2.16*** -13.77 
  Median 0.66 3.13 -2.15  
    
   
 
Match 1 to 1, N=71 Mean 0.87 4.15 -3.27*** -21.12 
  Median 0.66 4.31 -3.24  
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Table C-7: Analysis of wealth to assets obtained in RMs compared to sellouts where consideration is not all cash 
This table presents means and medians for LN Relative Wealth.  The sample is 110 RMs from 2005 to 2010.  Each RM 
firm is matched to a sellout firm based on propensity score.  The sample of sellouts includes 421 deals where the 
consideration was not all cash.  The t-stat is from a test of whether or not the mean of LN Relative Wealth equals zero. 
     LN Relative Wealth  
Matching Technique Foreign Firms Caliper Replacement N  Mean Median T-stat Pct > 0 
Propensity score Yes 1 With 95 0.64 0.50 2.95 62% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 With 70 0.43 0.23 1.61 56% 
Propensity score Yes 1 Without 95 0.41 0.27 1.77 55% 
Propensity score Yes 0.01 Without 35 0.64 0.31 1.77 57% 
                  
Propensity score No 1 With 56 0.47 0.25 1.80 54% 
Propensity score No 0.01 With 44 0.78 0.75 2.53 64% 
Propensity score No 1 Without 56 0.61 0.45 2.33 57% 
Propensity score No 0.01 Without 35 0.64 0.31 1.77 57% 
 
 
